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INTRODUCTION 
Peter Taylor Forsyth was born at Old Machar, Aberdeen, i n 18U8, 
and after studying at Aberdeen, Gottingen and London, was called to the 
ministry of the Congregational Church at Shipley, Yorkshire, i n 1876. 
There followed twenty five years of pastoral work i n five churches 
before ho was called to the Principalship of Hackney/Theological 
College i n 1901. He remained at Hackney for twenty years, during 
which time most of his theological work was done, until his death i n 1921. 
In the early days of his ministry he was unpopular among the 
orthodox Congregationalists of Yorkshire, and was considered a leader 
among " .. a school of writers and speakers which makes for i t s e l f very 
high claims. The rank and f i l e assume for themselves the position 
of advanced thinkers; they speak of many differing from them as 
old-fashioned and narrow; .." (justice and Mercy. A review of a 
Sermon published by Rev. P.T. Forsyth, no date, cited W.L. Bradley, 
P.T. Forsyth, the Man and His work, p33). Later, i t i s clear, he saw 
himself as a prophet to his own age. (PPMM pl93). Always he 
addressed himself to the problems of his age, frequently using the 
expression "the question of the hour i s so that any assessment 
of his work must take account of the theological climate i n which 
he worked. 
General Background 
I t i s often f e l t that the Victorian Age was an age of settled 
religious f a i t h . Certainly among the upper and middle classes 
attendance at church was expected, while among the lower classes outward 
acceptance of religion was at least as strong as i t had ever been. 
I t was an age of missionary zeal, and there was an encouraging 
interest in theological literature. But, in spite of a l l this , 
L.E. ELliott-Binns described i t as " .. supremely an age of doubt and 
1. 
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conflict, and also of much inconsistency. "(L.E. Elliott-Binns, 
The Development of English Theology i n the Later Nineteenth Century, 
19f>0, p7). He goes on to point out that "The biographies of the 
l a t e r nineteenth century contain not a few records of prolonged, and 
often indecisive> conflict i n the minds of those who sought to 
reconcile their s p i r i t u a l needs with their intellectual principles." 
(ib i d p8). 
Such conflicts would have been rare at the beginning of 
Victoria; 1 s reign. The intellectual revolution which had taken place 
on the continent of Europe, associated primarily with the name of 
Immanuel Kant, had not, generally speaking, had much effect on 
English religious thought. C.C.J. Webb gives four assumptions which 
he considers to have been basic to English theological thinking i n 
18$0:- (a) the transcendence of God; (b) the origin of the material 
world in an act of creation i n timej (c) the claim of scripture to 
be an authoritative revelation of truth otherwise unobtainable by man; 
(d) the happiness and salvation of individual souls as the supreme 
concern of religion. (C.C.J. Webb. Religious Thought i n England 
from 18^0. 1932. p9). The next half century, that i s the period 
during which Forsyth received his theological training, grew to maturity, 
and was involved i n pastoral work, saw each of these assumptions 
cnestioned and, for a time at least, overthrown. 
The f i r s t , and most sensational, challenge to the accepted scheme 
of the nation's religious thought came from the natural sciences. 
This was a period of great advance in the natural sciences, so much so 
that the concept of 'Science' was almost deified by the end of the 
period, and the pronouncements of scientists were treated with the awe 
and reverence which had once been the preserve of the theologians. 
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I t was from the Science of Geology that the f i r s t attack came, 
undermining the Genesis stories of creation. At f i r s t the orthodox 
©fused'to take the attack seriously or defended their position 
b/ means of ingenious juggling with numbers. However i t became 
clear that the traditional belief that God had created the universe, 
sun, moon and stars, very much as we know them now, i n a period of 
six days i n the year UOOli, was untenable for one who took Geology 
seriously. 
But the disturbance caused in religious c i r c l e s by the findings 
of the Geologists was as nothing compared with that caused by the 
Biologists and the theory of evolution. This had f i r s t appeared 
before the general public in iQkk with the anonymous publication of 
'The Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation 1, which was l a t e r 
discovered to be the work of a Scotsman named Robert Chambers. 
This work was severely c r i t i c i s e d by scientists, which gave the 
orthodox a false sense of security. But i n 1859 came Charles 
Darwin's 'Origin of Species', to be followed twelve years l a t e r by 
•The Descent of Han1. Darwin had amassed such a wealth of data 
that henceforth the theory of evolution had to be taken with real 
seriousness. Though i t was at f i r s t c r i t i c i s e d , even by many 
scientists, by the turn of the century John Oman was admitting that 
evolution was the dominant concept of the day (John Oman. Vision 
and Authority. 1902. p7). 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t to exaggerate the differences which acceptance 
of this theory made in the thought of the time. Negatively i t was 
a denial of the accuracy of the Genesis creation narratives and, by 
implication, a number of related doctrines. For instance the 
traditional conception of man as a being specially created by God and 
specially endowed with a capacity for communion with Him, was 
replaced by a doctrine which traced man's origin to the operation 
of natural and impersonal laws. With the denial of this doctrine 
went the denial of the related doctrine of the F a l l , which explained 
man's loss of communion with his Maker, hence i t was a popular gibe 
i 
among the anti-orthodox that when he f e l l man had f a l l e n upwards. 
Ax almost equally serious result was that the apologist was robbed 
of one of his favourite arguments, the argument from design. 
Nature was depicted as a ruthless struggle for survival, rather than 
as the vast, complex, but exceptionally well oiled machine which 
Christian apologists had traditionally claimed i t to be, an argument 
given c l a s s i c a l expression i n Paley's i l l u s t r a t i o n of the watch and 
the watchmaker. Underlying a l l this of course was the realisation 
that i f the creation narratives were false the old idea of the Bible 
as containing divine revelation in the form of i n f a l l i b l e 
propositions must be abandoned. 
However, the theory of evolution also made a constructive 
addition to man's thought. Beginning as a s c i e n t i f i c hypothesis 
i n the study of biology i t was extended to cover every part of man's 
being and history. When, for instance, the renewed interest i n 
the study of history, which was characteristic of the l a t t e r part 
of the nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth, brought 
to li g h t the vastness of man's history, an attempt was made to apply 
the concept of evolution to that; and when this renewed interest 
in history brought to li g h t the similarity between the religion of 
I s r a e l and that of neighbouring tribes, and gave impetus to the study 
cf comparative religion, the concept of evolution was again applied. 
Not only had man himself developed from a primitive organism but his 
©ligion and moral customs were also i n a process of development. 
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One result of this near deification of 'Science' and more 
particularly of the theory of evolution was a s c i e n t i f i c agnosticism. 
The attitude which was willing to turn i t s back completely on any 
thought of revelation and accept as true only that which could be 
proved by s c i e n t i f i c experiment. Such an attitude led to a 
concentration on the present time and i t s i l l s and opportunities, 
often producing valuable social teaching and work. Typical of 
such an attitude was Darwin's s e l f appointed populariser Huxley, who 
asked, "Why trouble ourselves about matters about which, however 
important they may be, we know nothing and can know nothing? 
We lives i n a world which i s f u l l of misery and ignorance, and the 
plain duty of a l l of us i s to make the l i t t l e corner he can influence 
somewhat less miserable? and ignorant than i t was before he entered i t " 
(quoted L.E. Elliott-Binns. op. c i t . p9). In i t s most extreme form 
this led to the philosophical school of 'Positivism', whose chief 
exponent, Corate, attempted to find:in 'humanity' the inspiration and 
object of reverence which had previously been found i n God. This 
did not have a great following i n England. The nearest equivalent 
was Utilitarianism, which was also an attempt to promote the 
greatest happiness and comfort of mankind as a whole, and which saw 
the chief means to this end as the removal of a l l traditional 
restraints, especially as these had been embodied i n religion. 
The chief exponent of this school had been John Stuart Mill] hence the 
movement suffered a severe setback with the posthumous publication 
of Mill's essay 'Theism* (1870), i n which he allowed that creation 
gave evidence of an intelligent mind at work. 
A second result, and a more widespread one, was the growth of 
a sort of religion of nature. This had i t s roots i n the Romantic 
movement and had been introduced into England from Germany, f i r s t 
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through Coleridge and Carlyle, but later finding i t s most 
influential expression i n the poetry of Wordsworth, Tennyson and 
Browning. I t seems to have been a half conscious attempt to find 
ri.thin nature i t s e l f the inspiration and absolute values which had 
previously been fteld to come from outside i t . The growth of the 
movement i s evidence of the widespread dissatisfaction with the 
understanding of nature which saw i t as a mere machine, and with the 
hegemony of the natural sciences and the?idea of uniform laws. 
Nature was not seen as a machine, obeying some monotonous laws, i t 
was a far deeper and more v i t a l thing tham that; i t was i t s e l f a 
i 
l i v i n g organism. 
Such a dependence on nature can easily develop into pantheism, 
or nature worship. Indeed there can be l i t t l e doubt that Wordsworth 
reached this position; i n his poetry i f not i n his s p e c i f i c a l l y 
religious writings. But there was a more sophisticated understanding 
of such immanent ism than mere naturalism. This was philosophical 
idealism, which, in varying forms, was the reigning orthodoxy in 
B i t i s h philosophy from the eighties of the l a s t century to the 
twenties of th i s . Like the naturalism just mentioned i t kept the 
centrality of the idea of evolution, but i t was an advance in that i t 
claimed that ultimate r e a l i t y was found not only i n the sphere of 
the natural sciences, but also i n aesthetic, moral and religious 
experiences. The great strength of this movement was that i t was 
able to! keep s p i r i t u a l values, and recognise the s p i r i t u a l element 
i n man, while denying the traditional doctrines of Christianity. 
Which denial seemed necessary following the recent advances i n science 
and h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m . The result was that for many i t took the 
place of Christianity. 
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I t was vastly helped i n this by i t s moralism which f i t t e d i n with 
the nation's general!religious outlook, and by i t s a b i l i t y to f i t 
with another contemporary movement. Matthew Arnold's description 
of religion as "Morality touched with emotion" has always been more 
true of the Englishman's religion than of most. By the end of the 
nineteenth century dissatisfaction with the supposed immorality of 
traditional orthodoxy, especially i t s particularism and i t s Hell f i r e , 
was the cause of many defections from the f a i t h among intellectuals. 
The problem was further complicated by a growth of social concern to 
which the blatant other-wordiness of much Victorian religion seemed 
either indifferent or opposed. The work of the Christian Socialist 
movement of 18U8-5U had failed, at least as far as the founding of 
co-operative movements was concerned. But the influence of i t s 
leaders, especially the ubiquitous F.D. Maurice, was strong throughout 
the whole of this period. The s p i r i t of Democracy was i n the a i r 
and growing stronger. For many Id e a l i s t philosophy provided both 
a s p i r i t u a l basis for l i f e and an inspiration for social reform. 
(T.U.C. was formed i n 1868 and met annually after 1871). 
Faced then with such challenges, from the natural sciences, from 
h i s t o r i c a l criticism, from the general philosophical approach of the 
age, and from the growing power of the idea of democracy, a l l i n some 
measure permeated by the idea of evolution, the old orthodoxy was 
bound to crumble. Some fresh apologetic was necessary. The f i r s t 
reaction of the religious leaders to evolution was terror, followed 
by denial, and they received some support for this attitude from the 
s c i e n t i f i c world of the day. No doubt for many humble believers 
Darwin and his followers, together with the Bi b l i c a l c r i t i c s , were 
veritable antichrists, and they would have been s a t i s f i e d with their 
fathers' traditional appeal to the Bible as the 'Word of God'. 
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Thus when thai new views were f i r s t thrust upon the attention of the 
English religious public by the publication of 'Essays and Beviews' (1860) 
followed; shortly by Bishop Colenso's 'Introduction to the Pentateuch 
and the 3ook of Joshua' (1862), there was widespread support, 
particularly among the clergy, for the indictment of two of the 
contributors to 'Essays and Reviews' for heresy, and for the deposing 
of Colenso, Bishop of Natal, from his see. Similarly, twenty five 
years later, Spurgeon, the extremely conservative Baptist leader, got 
considerable support from the rank and f i l e of his own denomination 
when, in 1 the 'Down Grade' controversy, he denounced as heretical those 
who accepted the new c r i t i c a l conclusions concerning the inspiration 
of scripture. (cp. J.W. Grant. Free Ghurchmanship i n England, 
i 
1870-19UO. 1955. p 93f) But clearly such an attitude could not be 
maintained. I t was impossible for educated men to adopt one attitude 
for their religion while preferring another for their intellectual 
l i v e s . J 
I t [appeared obvious that, i f denial of the new? movements was 
1 
impossible, there had to be some concession or accommodation from the 
religious camp. Since the f i r s t attack, both of science and of 
hi s t o r i c a l criticism, had been on the supposed history of the Old 
Testament, i t was in this sphere that concessions were first'made. 
I t was allowed that much of what had been taken as history was nothing 
but folk-lore, however i t was insisted that i t was folk-lore with a 
moral. ( As for creation, the theory of evolution was not only accepted, 
but, making a virtue out of a necessity, several argued that the 
wonder 6f God's act was enhanced i f i t was understood as spreading 
over many geological ages instead of taking place i n a few days. 
However [such concessions came too l a t e . They were normally1 made in 
too apologetic a tone, and they did not meet the real problem of the 
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cleavage between traditional Christianity and the intellectual s p i r i t 
of the age. A far mores thorough-going theological re^construction 
was called for. 
The tools for such a reconstruction came, as the attack had come, 
from Germany. Though England had been some time behind the 
intellectual l i f e of Europe, the distress through which her religious 
l i f e was now passing stemmed originally from the work of Immanuel Kant, 
Kant's philosophy can be best understood, very generally, by means of 
three propositions. F i r s t , he argued that w.e can only have certain 
and definite knowledge of truth through sense impressions. Outside 
such sense impression our attitude must be one. of agnosticism. 
Hence he denied a l l the metaphysical arguments for the existence of 
God as "being beyond the scope of our mind, and gave impetus to the 
dominance of the s c i e n t i f i c method. Secondly, he allowed that 
we could have touch with ultimate r e a l i t y through our moral , sense, 
that i s at the le v e l of experience of moral obligation and sense of 
duty, i Reflection on such experience implies the existence of God, 
Freedom of the w i l l , and Immortality of the soul. But these are 
not proved. Thirdly, he asserted, that in the act of knowing, the 
mind i s not passive but active. I t helps to shape what we know by 
organising i t i n forms of space and time. These three aspects 
developed independently can lead to different philosophical 
positions, hence much l a t e r thought can trace i t s e l f back to Kant, 
and often, as we s h a l l see, contradictory theories each claimed to 
be true to Kant. 
The most' immediately popular development of Kantianism came from 
Hegel. • Hegel took up the third of the above propositions, the 
/regulative and active part of mind i n knowledge, and stressed i t . 
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Meanwhile he denied the f i r s t , that we can have no knowledge 
teyond sense impression. For Hegel everything must be knowable 
and everything must be reducable to mind. The ultimate r e a l i t y i s 
pure thought or s p i r i t which manifests i t s e l f i n various ways, but 
supremely i n the human mind or s p i r i t , so that the a c t i v i t i e s of the 
human mind are the best clue, and the only means, for understanding 
the ultimate r e a l i t y or world s p i r i t . H.R. Mackintosh says of him, 
"No one has ever been quite sure what Hegel believed about God, but 
we s h a l l not be far out i f we describe his general system as a form 
of pantheistic Monism or lo g i c a l Evolutionism" (H.R. Mackintosh. 
Types of Modern Theology. 1937. pl02). Being, l i k e thought, i s 
a dialectic process which moves forward by the reconciliation of 
opposites. As i n thought progress i s made by the reconciliation 
of thesis and antithesis i n synthesis, both thesis and antithesis 
being necessary for each other and the f i n a l synthesis, so i n history, 
claimed Hegel, we can see the same thing happening. Thus he 
describes history as God's realisation of Himself through or i n the 
process of human experience. 
Such a reconstruction had obvious advantages, and there i s no 
doubt that Hegel considered himself a Christian apologist. "Nothing 
can be more certain than that Hegel meant to be friendlyj indeed he 
appears to have been quite sincerely persuaded that for the f i r s t 
time he was giving the Christian religion an opportunity to 
understand i t s e l f . Reconciliation was to be the watchword of the 
new era. The truth formulated by speculation i s actually none 
other than that preached by religion i n more childlike tones." 
(ibid pl06). Of course Hegel saw that the understandings of ultimate 
B a l i t y as pure thought was only possible for philosophers. The 
masses of mankind were not capable of grasping i t , so for them the 
11. 
t r u t h would continue to be taught i n the p i c t o r i a l language of 
religi o n and grasped by the imagination, a lower faculty than reason. 
Nevertheless, properly understood, such religious teaching was not 
filse, for a l l the principle Christian doctrines could be affirmed 
from Hegel's standpoint. A.R. Vidler gives the following 
explanation of the T r i n i t y as typical of Hegelian theologising. 
"As pure abstrsct idea, God i s Father; as going f o r t h into f i n i t e 
being, the element of change and variety, God i s Son; as once more 
sublating or cancelling this distinction, and turning again home 
enriched by this outgoing i n so called manifestation or incarnation, 
God is Holy S p i r i t . " (A.R. Vidler. The Church i n an Age of 
Revolution. 1961. p30). 
i 
The advantages of this system were that i t gave a s p i r i t u a l 
understanding of the world, saving man's s p i r i t u a l instincts from the 
s c i e n t i f i c agnosticism of the Fositivists. By i t s emphasis on the 
clash of thesis and antithesis i t allowed that progress would not 
always be a smooth forward march, while, at the same time the notion 
of development remained central to the system. I t found room for 
the philosopher and for the humble believer, without completely 
discarding the t r a d i t i o n a l Christian language. The Importance of 
the secular was allowed, since there was no r i g i d distinction between 
s p i r i t u a l and material, and i t was thus congenial to those who were 
enthusiastic for social improvement, and to Christian Socialism. 
Finally, not least attractive i n th i s period, though never e x p l i c i t l y 
stated, was that i t acknowledged the dignity and importance of man. 
Rarely can a theological system have been so blatantly anthropocentric. 
But the system also had i t s disadvantages. Christian doctrine 
had to pay dearly for i t s philosophical i n t e g r i t y . No more could be 
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heard of the uniqueness of Jesus. Hegel could speak i n terms of 
incarnation, but not i n terms of a unique incarnation. This was not 
always clearly realised i n England. For him the two natures 
language was merely a p i c t o r i a l way of expressing the fact that there 
is no real distinction between God and man. Both need each other. 
"The idealism of Hegel being rigorously immanental, the Absolute 
mind i s not another mind, but the essence-of a l l f i n i t e minds, 
and they are constituents of i t . " (Mackintosh pl03). Thus the 
man Jesus of Nazareth was only one of the "great men" of history who 
had caught a glimpse of the great speculative t r u t h which Hegel had 
worked out, and t r i e d to teach i t to his disciples. Such an 
understanding of Jesus was worked out from a Hegelian standpoint 
f i r s t by Strauss, and then by Baur, the l a t t e r carrying his rhythm of 
thesis and antithesis on i n to the history of the church. 
The Hegelian philosophy was introduced into England by the 
i n f l u e n t i a l Oxford philosopher T.H. Green. I t s impact on theology i n 
t h i s country was by no means as great as i t had been i n Germany, 
where i t had enjoyed enormous prestige. I t has never been customary 
i n Qigland f o r any one philosophical system to completely dominate the 
theological scene. As far as the question of New Testament 
cr i t i c i s m was concerned, Baglish theology was saved from the extremes 
of Strauss and Baur by the work of the three Cambridge scholars, 
Westcott, Lightfoot and Hort. Of Lightfoot, A.S. Vidler has written, 
" .. his commentary on Galatians v i r t u a l l y demolished the theory of 
Baur and the Tubingen school, which had dated most of the New 
Testament documents i n the second century. He showed that a 
severely c r i t i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l study led to conclusions quite 
different from those that the German c r i t i c s reached because they 
started with a theory into which they made the facts f i t " (op. c i t . 
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pl33). Nevertheless, Hegelianism exercised a considerable 
influence i n England. I n Glasgow the two eminent teachers John and 
Edward Caird were both deeply influenced by i t . 
However i t s influence was most clearly seen i n a product of 
Oxford University. The collection of Essays under the t i t l e 
•Lux Mundi', appeared i n 18$?, the work of a group of 'High' Anglicans 
under the leadership of Charles Gore, at that time Principal of Pusey 
House. In his preface Gore said that he and his collaborators 
were " .. aiming only at interpreting the f a i t h we have reeeived 
though he admitted that the i n t e l l e c t u a l , social and sc i e n t i f i c 
changes of the age were such as to " .. necessitate some general 
i 
restatement of i t s claim and meaning For a book with such an 
apparently modest aim the affect of 'Lux Mundi' was phenomenal. 
J.K. Mozley has said of i t , "Few books i n modern times have so clearly 
marked the presence of a new era and so deeply influenced i t s 
character .." (J.K. Mozley. Some Tendencies i n B r i t i s h Theology. 
1951. pl7). The chief interest at the time was aroused by Gore's 
article i n which he showed that he no longer held to the inerrancy of 
scripture and adumbrated the Kenotic Christology which he was to put 
forward l a t e r i n his Bampton lectures. However, more important was 
the wholehearted acceptance of immanentism. Many of the 
contributors had been pupils of T.H. Green, and the sub-title of the 
volume 'j"a series of studies i n the re l i g i o n of the Incarnation", 
showed a d i s t i n c t movement from thte Atonement as the central interest 
i n theology. F.D. Maurice had shown that the incarnation provided 
a f a r better starting point for those who wished to minimise the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between God and man. Evolution i s gladly accepted and 
Aubrey Moore rejoiced that "Evolution has restored to us the Immanence 
of God which Deism denied". 
11*. 
The Lux Mundi party dominated Anglican theology, and to a lesser 
extent the whole^of English theology, for the next t h i r t y years. As 
fa r as Gore was concerned, though he worked out his own Christology 
more f u l l y i n his Bamptom lectures of 1892, the movement had gone far 
enough.' Gore was consistently loyal to the Catholic creeds. But 
the insistence on immanence, though necessary at the time, taken with 
other contemporary forces, was to lead i n a direction i n which Gore 
had no wish to go. I t reached i t s nadir i n the work of R.J. Campbell 
and the 'New Theology1 controversy of 1907, to which we shall have to 
return. 
Meanwhile we must note that Hegel's was not the only theological 
reconstruction to come from Germany. Against i t s a r i d i t y and 
intellectualism, Albrecht RLtschl, also appealing to Kant, protestted 
i n favour of moral and personal religion; and i t i s probable that 
Ritschl had more general effect on English theology. He set himself 
to establish the primacy of historic revelation, denying our a b i l i t y 
to know God apart from His revelation of Himself to us. From this 
standpoint he denied a purely metaphysical theology, such as Hegel's, 
as a Hellenistic intrusion into the pure New Testament f a i t h . In i t s 
place he put the person of the historic Jesus which he was sure could 
be adequately constructed from the Gospels. But Jesus, he said, 
could only be understood by His work, which was, by obedience, to win 
redemption and to establish the Kingdom of God as an ethical 
community. Thus we have the basis of his celebrated description of 
Christianity as "an ellipse with two f o c i " , namely j u s t i f i c a t i o n by 
f a i t h and the Kingdom of God. H.R. Mackintosh describes i t thus, 
"The fount of a l l redemption i s Christ's supreme act i n establishing 
the church on earth. In perfect f i d e l i t y He f u l f i l l e d the vocation 
given Him by the Father, suffering a l l that hatred and unbelief could 
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i n f l i c t and exhibiting utter patience unto death; and this great act 
of obedience i s the ground on which His followers, as a community, 
are deplared righteous by God and have their sins forgiven." 
(op. c i t . pl6l). However, this historic revelation, merely as a 
fact, is of no value to us u n t i l we assert i t for ourselves by a 
•value-judgment1. Thus "Jesus Christ died on Calvary" i s a simple 
judgment of fact, which the pure historian might make; but "we have 
redemption through His blood" i s , i n Ritschlian terms, "an 
independent value-judgment", or, i n plain English, a personal 
conviction." ( i b i d pl53). Of course^ judgments of value, 
presuppose judgments of fact. I t i s not Ritschl's argument that we 
can believe what we l i k e as long as we believe i t f i r m l y enough. 
Fuller treatment of Hitschl would need discussion of his 
Christology. He speaks of Jesus only as Founder of Christianity 
whose influence i s prolonged by memory and meditation on history, 
and he ignores many points normally discussed i n a Christology. 
Certainly he thought he had kept the d i v i n i t y of Christ. His 
theology i s thoroughly Christo-centric, and the honour given to 
Christ i s tremendous. But i t i s far from certain that to say He 
has the 'worth of God f o r us' i s what Christianity has t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
understood by the Godhead of the Son. 
More important for our present purposes i s to see that Ritschl has 
restored emphasis to the historic Jesus, and has shown that Christian 
confession involves personal involvement and commitment to Christ. 
But, on the debit side, he has minimised dogma, overstressed the idea 
of the kingdom as an ethical community committed to social reform, and, 
however good his intentions i n this respect, given impetus to 
subjectivism. 
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Tee result of minimising of dogma was Liberal Protestantism, 
which took up Ritschl's criticism of dogma as the Hellenising of the 
pure New Testament f a i t h and attempted to get back behind the 
reli g i o n about Jesus, found i n Paul and John, to the r e l i g i o n of 
Jesus, which, i t was supposed, could be found by hi s t o r i c a l 
criticism of the synoptic gospels. Such a view had been propounded 
i n England by Hatch as early as 1888, but i t s real apostle was Adolf 
Harnack i n his 'History of Dogma1 (1886-9), translated into English 
as 'What i s Christianity? 1 (1901). "According to Harnack, the 
essence of Christianity was what he regarded as the essence of 
Christ's teaching: the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of 
man. ... The time had now come to reduce Christianity to i t s true 
essence^ f i l i a l and individual trust i n the divine fatherhood" 
(A.R. Vidler. op. c i t . pl83). This was opposed by the French 
Catholic Modernist Loisy, who insisted that Jesus should be 
understood as an eschatological preacher. But i t was not u n t i l 
Schweitzer's 'Quest of the h i s t o r i c a l Jesus' appeared i n English 
i n 1910 that t h i s understanding was fi r m l y established. Even then, 
outside theological circles, the simple gospel of Jesus the ethical 
teacher was the religion of the age, at least i n England. 
Meanwhile the Bible was regarded as simply the expression of man's 
highest s p i r i t u a l consciousness. 
The impetus Eitschl had given to subjectivism led to an appeal 
to Religious Experience as an apologetic to o l . This was not 
completely new. I t had always been f o r many, and especially for 
Evangelicals, the surest proof of th e i r f a i t h , against which no 
int e l l e c t u a l argument, however strong, could ultimately prevail. 
But i t had not previously been used as a major theological argument; 
now i t was being so used. I n 1890, R.W. Dale, denying that 
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Biblical., c r i t i c i s m could shake the f a i t h of Christians i n Christ, 
had written, "Their f a i t h i n Him rests on foundations which l i e f a r 
beyond the reach of s c i e n t i f i c andihistorical c r i t i c i s m . They know 
for themselves that Christ i s the Saviour of men; for they have 
received through Him the remission of thei r own sins; He has 
translated them into the Divine Kingdom; He has given them strength 
f o r righteousness and through Him they have found God" (R.W. Dale. 
The Living Christ and the Four Gospels. 1890. p23). Such 
arguments, and Dale was not alone i n using them, opened the way for an 
appeal to 'the inner l i g h t 1 , and 'the d i v i n i t y i n every man'. Works 
of Inge, Underhill, and von Hugel, led i n a revived interest i n 
mysticism, not always maintaining any objective h i s t o r i c a l 
revelation i n Christ, or distinguishing between a Christian and 
non Christian mysticism. 
Such an apologetic was open to cr i t i c i s m from the growing 
science of psychology, and such criticism came: from Starbuck and 
William James. The l a t t e r 1 s Gifford Lectures on the 'Varieties 
of Religious Experience' (1901-2), made i t easy to discount r e l i g i o n 
as merely subjective, and to see the desire for salvation as an 
expression of the ins t i n c t f or self-preservation. James himself 
was a Christian, but not a l l of those who used his arguments shared 
his f a i t h . E l l i o t t Binns comments that such arguments " ... were 
often accompanied by the patronising admission that religion might 
be a useful thing, even i f itis t r u t h was a matter of indifference", 
(op. c i t . p l l 7 ) . 
A more important result, however, was the obvious a f f i n i t y 
between the concentration on inner experience and the current stress 
on immanence. The combination of these tendencies, together with 
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the widespread and long continuing neglect of theology, particularly 
affected non conformity. The Church of England was saved from i t s 
worst affects by the strength of the 'Church idea 1, stemming from the 
Lux Mundi group, and the personal influence of Gore, who came to be 
looked upon as something of a reactionary. But the doctrine of the 
Church was weak i n non-conformity at this tine, and there was no 
party or leader to be compared with the Lux Mundi group and Gore, 
at least for theological leadership. The result was the 'New. 
Theology* of R.J. Campbell, to which b r i e f allusion has already been 
made. A s l i g h t l y f u l l e r treatment i s necessary, not because of the 
i n t r i n s i c worth of the movement, which was small, but because i t was 
a logical development from the current trends, and because i t often 
seems to l i e behind some of Forsyth's work. 
R»J. Campbell was minister of the City Temple and thus holder of 
the most i n f l u e n t i a l pulpit i n Congregationalism. In the autumn of 
1906, he addressed the London Board of. Congregational Ministers on 
'The Changing Sanctions of Popular Theology', a paper, l a t e r 
published i n 'The Christian World', giving an interpretation of Godrs 
dealings with man almost exclusively i n terms of Divine immanence. 
The result was a controversy i n which Campbell was accused of 
departing from the Evangelical f a i t h . Shortly after i t s beginning 
Campbell outlined his position more f u l l y i n a somewhat 
disputatious book, 'The New Theology' (1907). Other books and 
pamphlets i n support of his position soon followed, and he organised 
his followers into 'The Progressive League', which he soon 
reorganised, i n the hope of excluding extremists, as 'The Liberal 
Christian League1. 
Campbell defined his position as "the attitude of those who 
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believe that the fundamentals of the Christian f a i t h need to be 
rearticulated i n terms of the immanence of God". Which, apart from 
the e x p l i c i t use of the word immanence, i s not too far removed from 
the aim which Gore had given as the inspiration of the Lux Mundi 
group. Later, i n an interview i n the Daily Mail, Campbell 
described his message as "The Gospel of the Humanity of God and of 
the d i v i n i t y of Man" (cited. J.W. Grant, op. c i t . pi35). From thi s 
point of view h i s t o r i c a l revelation was set aside and doctrine after 
doctrine was interpreted i n accordances with the laws of evolving 
human l i f e . The uniqueness of Christ was a special object of 
attack, and the l i f e of Jesus was held out as the normal l i f e of a l l 
men. The Bible was replaced by appeal to inner witness, "Never 
mind what the Bible says about thi s or that, i f you are i n search of 
tru t h , but tr u s t the voice of God within you" (attributed to Campbell 
by W.H.S. Aubrey, i n The Old Faith and the New Theology, cited by 
J.W. Grant, op. c i t . pl3S). 
Incidental to the whole movement, though less evident i n 
Campbell than i n some of his followers, was the claim, to be the 
theological manifestation of Socialism. The church, they claimed, 
existed for social reform and for that alone. 
This movement, as represented by Campbell and his immediate 
supporters, did not have wide support, even i n Campbell's own 
denomination Congregationalism. So much can be seen by the names 
of those who opposed i t i n the volume 'The Old Faith and the New 
Theology' (1907), edited by C.H. Vine. But i t did bring to l i g h t 
the great dangers i n current trends of thought. The combination of 
a philosophy of immanence, a concern for social righteousness and an 
indifference to Dogmatic Theology was common i n much contemporary 
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theology. I t had gained much from Maurice, and was particularly 
strong i n non-conformity. As Sir J.C. Compton Hickett t o l d the 
Congregational Union i n 1908, "No recent utterance would have set the 
heather on f i r e i f that heather had not been already dry as tinder" 
(cited J.W. Grant, op. c i t . plliU). 
This then was the general background against which Forsyth 
worked? Wesmust now consider how i t handled the problem of 
Authority. 
21. 
Contemporary Thought on Authority. 
Every theological system has to come to terms with the problem of 
authority. Accepting the Pauline dictum that there i s no authority 
but of, God, the problem has always been ^  what i s the nature of that 
authority, and where i s i t to be found. I t has frequently been noted 
as a preliminary to t h i s discussion (cp J. Iverarch.. EJ1.E. arts. 1906, 
and T.A. Lacey. Authority i n the Church. 1928. i n t . a l . ) , that the 
English word authority has two d i s t i n c t , though closely related, 
meanings. In the f i r s t place i t can mean legal power ( l a t i n jus), 
the power to say the l a s t word, as i n the authority of an Act of 
Parliament. In this sense there i s usually an underlying threat of 
force to compel obedience i f need be. Alternatively, i t can be used 
to refer to moral weightiness, ( l a t i n auctoritas), the r i g h t to 
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influence opinion. I t i s i n this sense that a counsel quotes 
authorities, opinions which one i s under a moral obligation to 
consider. This distinction i s useful, but must not be overpressed 
since the two meanings overlap. "The common element i n a l l forms 
of Authority i s ultimately to enforce opinion, and to constrain 
belief. Without this element of coerciveness, authority has no 
real meaning." (Iverarch. op. c i t . ) . 
As f a r as the question of religious authority i s concerned there 
seems always to have been two major temptations; to confuse 
authority with i n f a l l i b i l i t y , and to look f o r authority i n the form 
of de f i n i t e pronouncements on a particular subject. The two main 
positions are familiar; there has been the appeal to the authority 
of the Bible as the 'Word of God1, and there has been the appeal to 
the Church as the divinely inspired, S p i r i t f i l l e d , community. 
For the Roman communion another factor was added i n 1870 when the 
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Vatican Council issued a decree declaring that, i n certain 
circumstances, the Pope also possessed i n f a l l i b l e authority. There 
has also been a t h i r d position, nearer as strong as the other two but 
always having i t s adherents. That i s the appeal to the 'inner 
l i g h t 1 , the immediate? witness of the S p i r i t i n the heart of the 
believer. Broadly speaking i t i s this t h i r d stream of thought 
which had the pre-eminence at the end of the nineteenth century and 
the beginning of the twentieth. 
There were, of course, at t h i s time, those who made th e i r appeal 
straight to the Bible or to the Church i n the t r a d i t i o n a l way. 
However most writers on the subject agree i n denying both these 
alternatives, at least i n t h e i r crudest forms. In fact sometimes 
they appear to be stated i n unnecessarily crude and naive forms i n 
order to be rejected the more easily. There i s a revolt against the 
old idea of a f i n a l external authority, either from the Bible or the 
Churcho The s p i r i t of the age leads towards freedom from old 
restraints and dependence on the immanence of God i n man, or at least 
i n his highest moral aspirations. Often there i s a crusading a i r 
about those who champion freedom against what they regard as the old 
obscurantism. They write with great confidence, as those sure of 
right and confident of victory i n the near future. Many would have 
agreed with Sabatier's characterisation of the religious situation; 
"Two systems of theology s t i l l confront one another: the theology 
of authority and the theology of experiences They are 
characterised by methods radically opposed i n the s c i e n t i f i c 
development of religious ideas and Christian dogmas. ... At the 
present hour one method i s dying and destined soon to disappear; 
the other i s taking on ever more vigorous development, and i s 
destined to triumph." (A. Sabatier. The Religions of Authority and 
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the Religion of the S p i r i t . English Trans. 1910. p x i i i ) . 
Hence characteristic of a l l i n f l u e n t i a l writing on the subject during 
this period i s the demand that authority should be moral and 
experimental, and must commend i t s e l f to the individual conscience. 
In England the most radical rejection of external authority 
appeared i n James Martineau's "The Seat of Authority i n Religion" 
(1890). Martineau was not an orthodox Christian but a convinced 
theist who had been a unitarian pastor before becoming a 
professional philosopher. He adopted a radically c r i t i c a l approach 
to the New Testament, seeing Jesus as merely an ethical teacher. 
Hence he prefers to speak of relig i o n rather than of Christianity, 
and seems to fee l r e l i e f at what he sees as the imminent f a i l u r e of 
tr a d i t i o n a l Christianity and the p o s s i b i l i t y of theism without i t . 
For Martineau the seat of authority i s the moral conscience. The 
ideals of duty are divine. In the course of history t h i s t r u t h 
has been blended with error due to i t s expression i n mythological 
terms, but when the claims of consciences are r i g h t l y interpreted 
man i s i n personal relationship with God. He seems unwilling to 
give h i s t o r i c a l evidence any function i n reli g i o n which, f o r him was 
a purely personal and individual matter to be born anew; i n each mind. 
Martineau's was an extreme position among English theologians 
who generally showed a greater desire to keep i n some form the 
authority of the Bible and of the Church. But there was s t i l l a 
tremendous emphasis on freedom; evolutionary progress i n man's moral 
and s p i r i t u a l faculties; and the primacy of individual experience or 
i n t u i t i o n . 
A l l these tendencies are found i n the work of John Oman.whose 
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rVision and Authority' appeared i n 1902. Oman accepts the 
immanence of God as shorn i n evolution, but he argues that as man has 
developed s p i r i t u a l faculties and aspirations he must be understood 
i n terms of them and not i n terms of his past development, " .. his 
reli g i o n cannot be explained away by the road he has travelled, but 
the road he has travelled i s to be explained by his r e l i g i o n " 
(op. c i t . p l l ) . Any idea of a coercive authority he denies. He 
sees i t as God's purpose to allow, man to develop as a s p i r i t u a l being 
with complete freedom, to seek for trutBj and f i n a l l y to f i n d i t i n a 
w i l l i n g submission to His own w i l l . Hence he argues "The highest 
fitness of man i s to learn how. to accept the discipline of l i f e , and 
walk u t t e r l y by the guidance of duty" ( i b i d p77). In accordance with 
this purpose God has not given an authority claiming complete and 
unquestioning obedience but is content to wait for man's own w i l l i n g 
submission, i n accordance with his own inner consciousness and 
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s p i r i t u a l vision. "The t r u l y marvellous thing i n God's revelation 
of Himself i s not that i t subdues man to His obedience which were 
easy, but that i t makes man free with the l i b e r t y of God's children, 
which i s a d i f f i c u l t y only omniscience could overcome." ( i b i d p91). 
The p o s s i b i l i t y of God's purpose, that is the creation by discipline 
of free s p i r i t u a l beings to enjoy communion with Himself, can be seen 
In t e l l e c t u a l l y by considering man's aspirations, which could not have 
come from his past development only. But f o r f u l l confidence i n 
God's guidance the essential attitude i s that childlikeness which 
Jesus asked of His followers. This means, not dependence on 
authority, but a questioning open mind" .. eager speculation on the 
serious matters of l i f e , eager hospitality to thoughts too vast to be 
grasped and too noble to be dismissed, and a whole-hearted disregard 
to a l l that might turn one aside from the quest ... eagerness to 
learn,' submissiveness to r e a l i t y , unconsciousness of the d u l l 
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formulas which cover ignorance, and the conventions which fear 
investigation. .... i t i s nothing else than a demand that man shall 
follow u t t e r l y the leading of his own s p i r i t u a l insight, and that, on 
the one hand, he shall not use i t merely to see with the eyes of 
other men; and on the other, that he shall not suffer i t to be misled 
by any hesitation or interference within his own soul. Thus i t i s a 
condition not of the subjection, but of the freedom of our s p i r i t u a l 
nature;" ( i b i d p39f). 
Oman did not intend to discard external authority altogether. 
He agreed that every age had need of a prophet; and that freedom i s 
not freedom i n a void but i n relation to others, and at a certain 
place i n the h i s t o r i c a l progress of the race* The insights of 
previous generations were not to be ignored, "To be f a i t h f u l to our 
own s p i r i t u a l insight, i t must be our constant endeavour to be 
f a i t h f u l to our s p i r i t u a l ancestry." ( i b i d p8U). Christ Himself 
has a unique place among the prophets as the only one whose l i f e was 
of a piece.with His teaching. But even He does not claim .absolute 
authority, seeking rather to guide men and waiting f o r them to see 
the t r u t h f or themselves. - Thus, "The man who accepts Christ as 
teacher i s not subjugated to the dominion of absolute t r u t h not to be 
investigated or c r i t i c i s e d but receives i n t e l l e c t u a l emancipation, 
and i s convinced only by the perfection which can bear a l l 
investigation, and which he receives because he has seen, and 
cherishes because he loves." ( i b i d pl07). The Church has taken 
Christ's place as teacher. I t i s the fellowship of those who have 
'the s p i r i t of Christ', and must use His method, and so " ... present 
Christ, not as an imperious ruler breaking what He cannot bend, 
but as| the revelation of a l l t r u t h to the minds that see Him, and 
of a l l power to the hearts that love Him." ( i b i d p26l). 
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I n doing th i s i t i s witnessing to the experience of the; saints, and 
teyond this i t has no authority. 
The Bible i s valuable as the written testimony of those nearest 
to Christ. As such i t i s not open to purely private 
interpretation, nor i s the opinion of the majority necessarily 
correct, but interpretation rests on the proper approach. Those 
who approach i t with the nearest approximation to the apostles 
attitude are i n the best position to interpret i t . So i t i s that, 
"The poet has often been nearer the source than the theologian" 
( i b i d p206). The creeds are also valuable as expressing the 
experience of the saints. But these again are only testimony based 
on experience. He does not want to react against dogmatism so 
viol e n t l y that no certainty i s l e f t at a l l . He believes that there 
can be certainty, the certainty of the slow unfolding of the purpose 
of God. 
Oman i s i n many ways typic a l of those theologians who t r i e d to 
use evolutionary idealism as a vehicle of Christian apologetics. 
This emerges most clearly i n his stress on the individual with his 
freedom and s p i r i t u a l aspirations. For Oman the supreme religious 
fact i s the individual " .. made i n his own degree i n the image of 
God, thinking God's thought, and setting before him as a conscious 
resolve God's purpose, and being led onwards to his share i n God's 
freedom." ( i b i d p88). I t i s seen also i n what appears to be a 
rather naive expectation that, though much of the t r a d i t i o n a l 
religious framework has been shaken, the future holds the prospect 
of almost endless progress, "When a l l our external human authorities 
are disturbed, we are most driven to regard the ultimate Divine 
authority which speaks i n our own hearts; and, though at f i r s t i t 
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may seem that confusion has f a l l e n upon us, we shall see In the end 
that we have found a surer guide to distinguish for us the f l e e t i n g 
from the perennial. And what other authority can stem man's 
passions, correct his w i l l , teach him a higher standard than pleasure, 
and c a l l him to consecrates a l l his powers, not to his own personal 
gain but to the ultimate and general good, i f not that which makes 
him see that God's w i l l i s love, and God's goal freedom." ( i b i d p339). 
A far more stimulating study of the problem, but one which shared 
a good many of Oman's viewpoints, came seven years later, i n J.H. 
Leckie Js 'Authority i n Religion' (1909). Leckie i s as keen as Oman 
to keep the fact of moral freedom, and points out that i n many 
spheres progress i s usually made by thee assertion of freedom by some 
individual who denies accepted laws. But he begins his work with an 
uncompromising assertion of the fact of authority, present i n a l l 
branches of l i f e but especially i n religion, " .. because religion 
i s informed by instincts and emotions that exalt the ideas of 
discipleship, obedience, dependence, humility." (op. c i t . p9) ; 
and he seeks to maintain the element of externality. He defines i t 
as " . „ a power that constrains to belief and action, and i s 
recognised by the individual as existing independently of his own 
thought or w i l l . More shortly wee may describe authority as a power, 
not self produced, which rules belief or conduct." ( i b i d p I f ) . Later 
he gives the organ of authority as the soul i n communion with God; 
of course; the ultimate source i s God Himself. Such communion can 
come, and hence such authority can be expressed, i n a number of ways. 
"Perhaps the position might be tentatively put i n some such way as 
this - Religious authority i s found wherever conviction arises i n 
the soul such as to carry with i t the assurance that i t i s of God. 
This conviction may be created i n three ways: (1) by direct 
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revelation to the individual conscience i n which i t i s found; 
(2) or by a message conveyed to that conscience through a specially 
endowed soul, and recognised by i t as true? (3) or by a deliverance 
of the common religious consciousness, v e r i f i e d i n the individual 
experience." ( i b i d p ° 8 f ) . 
This formulation of the theory makes ample allowance f o r the 
prophets. In fact Leckie emphasises the fact that God's way of 
revelation appears to be by selection of certain gifted souls; 
referred to by Leckie as the aristocrats of the s p i r i t u a l l i f e . 
He can also give some content to the authority of the Church, which 
he refers to as the Christian democracy. This authority i s i n the 
common t r a d i t i o n which i s formed by the message of the aristocrats, 
i s governed by i t , but also interprets i t . As with Oman the 
authority of the Church is only that of witnessing, but the Church i s 
expected to give a rational account of i t s f a i t h . "The process by 
which f a i t h proceeds towards dogma i s a natural and necessary one; 
i t i s the e f f o r t of religion to j u s t i f y and defend i t s position i n 
the reasonable order of things, and cannot be checked or forbidden." 
( i b i d p l 6 l ) . Such symbols of f a i t h as the church may formulate; 
are to be used to guard and guide, not to l i m i t or oppress. 
The uniqueness and authority of Jesus i s safeguarded by the 
argument, " I f the revealing a c t i v i t y of God concentrates i t s e l f i n 
select souls, why should there not be one i n whom i t dwells 
completely?" ( i b i d p97r), together with the fact that Jesus claimed, 
and has always been recognised as having, a unique Lordship over men, 
and a unique relationship to God. 
Leckie has d e f i n i t e l y attempted to give far greater weight to 
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external authority than Oman appears to have done. Nevertheless he 
is equally open to the charge of subjectivism. He sees this and 
tr i e s -io defend against i t . " I t i s never asserted", he writes, 
"that man discovers t r u t h f or himself; but, on the contrary, 
earnestly affirmed that God reveals Himself to the soul, and that 
apart from th i s action of God there could be no religious l i f e or 
knowledge of Him at a l l . " ( i b i d p89f). But, i n the l a s t resort, 
there is no objective standard to which reference may be made i n the 
case of r i v a l claims to communion with God, apart from the message 
of the! prophets and the common Christian t r a d i t i o n . He admits the 
v a l i d i t y of this criticism and answers that the only test i s 
experience. That which survives when tested by experience of l i f e 
i s true, and that which f a i l s men i n l i f e i s false, and always, 
"Whenever a higher message i s given, more suited to the wants of men, 
the lower gospel w i l l lose i t s power and pass away." ( i b i d plOO). 
From this point of view there i s no 'a p r i o r i ' reason why an 
individual should not be independent of the historic revelation i n 
Jesus Christ. So he writes, " I t i s always possible that the 
experience of an individual as to f a i t h and prayer and the culture 
of the devout l i f e may be richer and higher than that of the great 
.common Fellowship of believers, the ancient universal Church -
i t may be, but who shall affirm that i t is? An ordinary person 
may possibly be found who maintains that his relation to God 
is so direct as to render him independent of Jesus Christ and 
superior to His authority; but a claim l i k e t h i s can only be 
si l e n t l y registered, and l e f t i n the hands of Time; i t i s beyond 
the region of debate, because i t soars above the realms of 
actuality." ( i b i d p22£f). 
Both Oman and Leckie begin from a consideration of man as a 
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religious being and move towards thei r idea of authority from him. 
Both exalt Jesus as teacher, and accept Him as more than a teacher, 
and both bring i n the value of the histo r i c testimony of the 
Christian church. But neither are r e a l l y dependent on history. 
In both there i s an optimistic looking forward to a greater 
s p i r i t u a l attainment by man, so neither can lo g i c a l l y give any 
objective f i n a l i t y to the revelation i n Christ. 
Anglican contributions to the discussion are much more 
h i s t o r i c a l i n approach, though i n different ways. They come 
mainly from two writers^ T.B. Strong, whose 'Authority i n the Church' 
was published i n 1903> and A.E.J. Rawlinson, who made several 
contributions, an essay i n 'Foundations* (1912), his book 
'Authority and Freedom1 (1924)» and a further essay i n 'Essays 
Catholic and C r i t i c a l ' (1926). Both stress the Church as an 
hi s t o r i c a l society, both stress the need for authority i n a society, 
and both draw attention to the complete dependence on authority 
which i s natural at an early stage of education. 
From this starting point Strong claims that i n any society 
authority i s founded on a contract between the members of the society, 
but that i t i s not merely negative, restraining wrongdoing f o r the 
general good, but also positive and thus from time to time 
over r i d i n g the wishes of some parties to the contract and imposing 
i t s e l f upon them for a moral end. Turning now to the Christian 
society, the church, he finds two respects i n which i t i s 
different from other societies. F i r s t i t i s founded by the 
hi s t o r i c acts of God i n the ministry of Jesus Christ, and i s now 
ruled by God, who rules w ... not as a remote king over alien 
subjects, but as a Father over men who through absorption i n the 
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Eternal Sonship of Jesus Christ have been adopted as sons" 
(op. c i t . pU6). Secondly, he claims, this rule of God i s exercised 
through divinely appointed persons whose qualification f o r t h e i r 
o f f i c e , at least i n the Acts, was a divine c a l l and the fact that 
they had been witnesses of the original acts. As the church grew 
i t i s clear that acceptance of these facts, and of the 
interpretation of them which i s Christian doctrine, was expected 
of i t s members. Strong points out that h i s t o r i c a l truths are 
always accepted, to some extent at least, on t r u s t , based on an 
assessment of the character of the witnesses. We do not expect 
the witnesses to l i e , and base thi s expectation on our so l i d a r i t y 
with them i n the human racei I n the case of Christians " the 
basis of i n t e l l e c t u a l adhesion i s moral or social; that i s , 
underlying i t i s the relation i n which men stand to Jesus Christ" 
( i b i d p77). I t i s this insistence on the primacy and f i n a l i t y 
of the histo r i c acts of God, i n an assessment of the doctrine of 
authority, which sets Strong's argument apart from that of many 
of his contemporaries, and which i s i t s chief value. 
Rawlinson starts from the same point, the: necessary dependence 
on authority i n education. But his chief interest, at least 
i n 1912, was i n the psychological development of the individual i n 
his relation to authority. After the f i r s t stage of acceptance of 
authority comes a stage of crit i c i s m and the assertion of the 
individual's right to reject what had previously been accepted. 
This should be followed by a stage of free acceptance, voluntary 
assent to authority on grounds arrived at by the free use of reason. 
I t i s only this freely given submission to authority which i s of any 
moral worth. But i t i s i n thee second stage that authority, 
which he defines as " .. expression of responsible and competent 
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opinion" (Foundations. p366), that i s as i n the l a t i n 'auctoritas 1, 
should be operative. Then i t is used as a guide to those 
asserting t h e i r freedom to c r i t i c i s e what had previously been 
accepted. I t s content i s " .. the witness of the saints, 
individually and corporately, to the v a l i d i t y of the s p i r i t u a l 
experience upon which t h e i r lives are based." ( i b i d p378). 
I n this witness the experience of the Apostolic age i s held to be 
normative. This theory is more f u l l y worked out i n 1923 when a 
hi s t o r i c a l survey of various types of authority used i n the church 
since the break down of the medieval synthesis i s given. However 
i n the l a s t resort Eawlinson does not advance on his theory of 
authority as the witness of the saints. 
From this summary of contemporary views certain points can be 
noted as typical of the treatment of this problem i n the entire age. 
Fi r s t , and most obvious, i s the complete rejection of the old idea 
of an oracular authority enshrined i n the Bible or the Church. 
I t i s no longer possible to look for definite pronouncements on 
jarticular situations which w i l l be both authoritative and 
i n f a l l i b l e since they come direct from God. (This of course does 
not apply to the Roman Church). The old t r u s t i n the Bible had 
gone with the s c i e n t i f i c opposition to the Genesis creation 
narratives and the advent of hi s t o r i c a l criticism. Meanwhile 
confidence i n the church had been shaken because of the 
obscurantist defence of l i t e r a l i s m i n some quarters, and because 
of the slackness of the church i n supporting agitation f o r social 
reform, a slackness which sometimes passed into open opposition 
to the growing socialist movement. 
The early stories of Genesis were explained as f o l k lore 
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expressing man's attempt to understand himself and his 
environment. This led to much more of the Bible, especially of 
the Old Testament, being understood i n terms of man's s p i r i t u a l 
aspirations rather than as God's divine revelation. Thus the 
second characteristic element of contemporary approaches to the 
idea of authority, as to many other doctrines, i s that they start 
from man, and from man as an individual. The centre of attention 
i s the individual on his religious side. Stress i s l a i d on his 
free moral w i l l , his a b i l i t y to choose, but also upon his sense of 
'higher 1 hopes and ideals. His history i s seen as a steady 
progress i n morality and s p i r i t u a l discernment u n t i l he has come 
to his present excellence. Proof of this excellence i s seen i n 
the growing awareness of social e v i l s , and the growing interest i n 
and power of democracy, with i t s stress on the worth of 
individuals and the equality of a l l individuals. Jesus, even when 
His deity was accepted i n the most orthodox way, was seen as 
the great moral teacher who had f i r s t grasped these truths and 
t r i e d to teach them to His followers. The purpose of the 
incarnation was to illuminate men's minds, and show them the 
d i v i n i t y within them and shaping the natural order. But the 
working out of Jesus -teaching by St. Paul, and the concepts of sin, 
judgment and redemption, were now considered to be things of the 
past. At best they were to be translated into more palatable 
modern terms, at worst they were to be discarded as Hellenistic 
accretions to the original simple rel i g i o n of Jesus. The 
•History of Religions' school had shown that t h i s simple rel i g i o n 
of Jesus had been overladen with mythology. When i t was 
©discovered and reduced to i t s essentials i t was seen to be.only 
a more advanced form of other religions. Hence a l l who shared 
the ' s p i r i t of Christ' were to be welcomed into a brave new 
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church;. This ' s p i r i t of Christ' within a man, his s p i r i t u a l 
s e n s i b i l i t y and attitude to his neighbours and environment, was 
the real authority. 
With t h i s starting point two other things had to follow, so we 
see that, t h i r d l y , there was a denial of any objective h i s t o r i c a l 
f i n a l i t y . I f man's history is a continuing s p i r i t u a l progress 
to higher things the uniqueness and f i n a l i t y of any past revelation 
i s Impossible. Hence, though many wanted to treat the experiences 
and i n t u i t i o n s of the saints of the past with great respect, 
arguing that the present age must build on what has gone before, 
i t could not be denied that the present more advanced and 
enlightened age had a better grasp on s p i r i t u a l t r u t h . Fourthly, 
a development of the l a s t point, we f i n d that the age i s 
mi 
characterised by a cheerful hopeful opti/sm, looking forward 
confidently to future s p i r i t u a l progress, normally leading to a 
vague pantheistic idealism. A contemporary writer speaks of a 
movement towards " .. a conception that finds i n reli g i o n the 
burgeoning and blossoming of a l l the faculties of man; the l i f e of 
the imagination, the reason, the affections and the conscience at 
their f u l l j taking up into i t s e l f and expressing the secrets of 
poetry and a r t and science and philosophy and sociology, as 
knowledge grows transfigured into reverence, as beauty exhales 
i n worship and goodness becomes the sacrament of the indwelling 
Logos of the cosmos.™ (R. Heber Newton. The Outcome of the 
Theological Movement of Our Age. Hibbert Journal. Vol. 17. 
Oct. l05 - Jun '06. p270). Hence any f i n a l i t y must be at the end 
of the series not i n the middle of i t , and authority can only be 
that which urges submission to this on-going purpose. 
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The result of a l l this is that the concept of f i n a l authority 
as something to which submission must be made i s only found as a 
stage i n education, the f i r s t stage through which men are expected 
to pass. Beyond this stage authority can only be influence. 
In the l a s t resort every man must be true to his own ideals and 
aspirations, and what does not come home to him as true from this 
source is not to be accepted as authoritative f or him. 
I t should be noted f i n a l l y that T.B. Strong stands out from 
tiiis general pattern because of his insistences on the importance 
of h i s t o r i c events, on divinely inspired interpretation of them, 
and on the moral solidarity of the race. He seems to keep some 
idea of static and propositional authoritative;pronouncements. 
i 
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The Doctrine I n P.T. Fdrsyth. 
Though he was w i l l i n g to learn from the la t e s t insights of 
his contemporaries, and i n one sense, his emphasis on the primacy 
of the moral, to go even beyond them, Forsyth i s generally 
reckoned to have been a voice crying i n the wilderness i n his own 
generation. Nowhere i s th i s mone clearly seen than i n his 
teaching on authority. This was a subject to which he returned-
again and again. He repeatedly insisted that i t was the basic 
religious question, and that for the lack of a proper answer 
to i t the church of his time was lacking i n power. As f a r as 
he was concerned the answer was, i n principle, clear and he never 
t i r e d of giving i t . 
Something of the importance which he attached to th i s 
question i s seen by the fact that when he was asked to address an 
international conference of Congregationalists at Boston i n 1899 
he took as his subject "The Evangelical Principle of Authority". 
Six years l a t e r he returned to the subject i n both of the 
addressed which he gave while chairman of the C.U.E.W. Meanwhile 
he had begun to stress i t s importance i n a number of a r t i c l e s . 
Writing i n 190U on "The Need f o r a Positive Gospel" he said 
"There i s one note indispensible to a Positive Gospel, and indeed 
supreme; i t is the note of Authority" (L Q E CI Jan. 1901* p8l); 
and the following year he wrote "There i s no question so deep and 
urgent at this moment as that regarding the seat of Authority and 
i t s nature." (H J 17. Oct. 1905 p63). From this time onward 
his views were settled. There was no change i n t h i s , or for 
that natter any other part of his theology. Whatever the subject 
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there would be some reference to authority, and there i s no book 
i n which he does not refer to i t , w h i l e there are numerous art i c l e s 
devoted to explication and defence of his views, which were most 
uncongenial to the majority of his contemporaries. I n 1913 
these arguments were set out d e f i n i t i v e l y i n his book "The 
Principle of Authority", which includes the substance, and often 
the exact words and phrases, of many previous a r t i c l e s . He 
continued to refer to the question frequently and, i n 1917* his 
theodicy "The Jus t i f i c a t i o n of God" was, i n part at least, a 
re-affirmation of his views i n the l i g h t of a world war. 
In view of the importance which Forsyth attached to the 
subject, as well as the considerable amount of writing he did on i t , 
i t i s , at f i r s t sight, a l i t t l e surprising that the "revival of 
interest i n his work which has taken place during recent years 
has not produced a study of his doctrine of authority. Only 
R.H. Brown anong his interpreters has considered the subject 
worthy of a detailed treatment, and the latest study of his 
theology, though describing "The Principle of Authority" as "The 
longest, most philosophical and most d i f f i c u l t of his books ..." 
goes on to deal with the problem of authority i n l i t t l e more than 
one page. (A.M. Hunter. "Teaching and Preaching the New 
Testament" Pt I I I The Theology of P.T. Forsyth.). However, 
this apparent neglect i s not as serious as i t seems. Forsyth's 
doctrine of authority comes from, i n fact i s part of, his 
Christologyj and, as he often repeats * Christology can only be 
understood as Soteriology 1. I t was his constant aim always to 
'set his compass by the inexhaustible cross 1. A l l his thinking 
was controlled by his view of the cross, and to understand i t one 
i 
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must f i r s t understand this view. 
Forsyth gives us his theology of the cross when he explains 
that the whole purpose of the incarnation was 'to settle In a f i n a l 
way the issue between a holy God and the g u i l t of man'. In thi s 
seminjal phrase, repeated several times i n his writings, we have 
most of the dominant ideas of his thought, including his thought 
on authority. I t w i l l be as well, therefore, to draw out these 
ideas before proceeding. 
Fi r s t , we must notice that his thought i s God centred. He 
himself saw the basic difference between his own theology and that 
of most of his contemporaries as a difference between a Theocentric 
and an anthropocentric theology. At a time when most religious 
thinkers were stressing "the d i v i n i t y i n every man", and cal l i n g 
upon thei r fellow to be true to their "higher aspirations", 
Forsyth spoke scathingly and often of a l l those who began th e i r 
thinking from "that excellent creature man". " A l l the great 
religious teachers", he writes, "take God for granted, and go on. 
A l l bur knowledge arises upon us concretely out of certain actual 
relations i n which r e a l i t y approaches us." (P A pl09). Thus, 
while others spoke of the tremendous value of rel i g i o n and the idea 
of God to humanity, he, while admitting and making use of the 
important place of value judgments i n religious experience, saw 
that the need of the hour was to stress God's i n t r i n s i c worth, 
His value f o r Himself. This meant turning from the idea of 
God as man's friend and a l l y to the much greater idea of God as 
man's maker, redeemer and Lord. 
i 
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Secondly, he sees God as active. God i s not the end product 
of man's religious thought, not an object which i s reached by 
in t e l l e c t u a l speculation at the end of a series of "proofs", or 
posited by deduction from man's religious experience of s p i r i t u a l 
longings. A l l th i s i s far too f l a t t e r i n g to man, and far too 
congenial to his pride. Instead Forsyth proclaims that God i s the 
active subject of Christianity who i s known to men only as He chooses 
to make Himself known by the essentially miraculous act of 
revelation; and this act of revelation was also the act of 
i 
redemption, the cross of Christ. 
However, though he stresses the p r i o r i t y of the act of God, 
both i n the historic sense of the death on Calvary and also i n the 
contemporary sense of the realisation of i t s application by the 
individual believer, he also insists on the need for man's action. 
Christianity, as Forsyth saw i t , could not be understood by 
spectators but only by participants. Saving f a i t h and personal 
experience of redemption were seen as basic requirements f o r an 
understanding of what he called positive theology. 
But i t i s clear that he saw the po s s i b i l i t y of much theology 
and theologising which were not positive and did not spring from 
and depend upon such experience. In this connection he often 
distinguishes between theology as an academic discpline, which may 
be useful or not, positive or not, and reli g i o n . Used i n this 
sense the word "religion" has a very honourable place i n Forsyth's 
vocabulary. Thus he can begin what many consider to be his 
greatest book with the sentence "The root of a l l theology i s real 
r e l i g i o n ... saving f a i t h i n Jesus Christ" (PPJC p3). But he 
can also speak of "mere r e l i g i o n " of "natural r e l i g i o n of the 
cheerful, sunny, young, and American type, which has never 
"descended into Hell" or found the absolute triumph i n the absolute 
tragedy" (LQR CI p6f?.). Similarly his appeal to religious 
experience i s not, as we shall see, an appeal to any vague sense 
of numinous awe} He; can speak, almost contemptuously, of the 
"lower end" of religion " .. the attenuated reli g i o n where a l l men 
are. religious and susceptible to some form of the.: s p i r i t u a l i n 
proportion to i t s lack of moral demand1' (PA p l6 l ) . The r e l i g i o n 
and religious experience to which Forsyth appealed were above a l l 
moral. He quoted frequently and with approval Butler's dictum 
that "morality i s the nature of things", and saw the movement 
towards what he called the moralising of religion as the most 
profitable movement discernible i n recent theology (LQR CXXVUI 
p l6l-7li) . But thi s leads us to the next determinative theme 
in his thinking. 
In no respect does Forsyth appear to be so near to his 
contemporaries as i n his stress on the moral. Like many of them 
he was a Kantian and was convinced that the ethical i s the real and 
that i t i s i n moral experience, particularly i n moral choice and 
obedience to the "ought" of conscience, that man i s i n touch with 
the ultimate r e a l i t y of the world. Thus he i s pleased to see 
the influence which Kantian philosophy was exerting on 
theological thinking, replacing intellectualism by voluntarism. 
"Theology, under Ritschl, has been so far Kantianised that i t has 
become a matter of the practical reason instead of the pure. 
I t has become experimental instead of conceptual or even i d e a l i s t . 
I t has become under Maurice (except for the idealists and the 
mystical i n t u i t i b n i s t s ) a matter of the conscience. In so far to 
Kantianise i s to Christianise. I t i s to moralise. 
Ui 
I t i s even to evangelise." (LQR 0X711 p2). 
In the above quotation what i s denied i s as important as what, i s 
affirmed. Most of Forsyth's more i n f l u e n t i a l contemporaries would 
come under the parenthetical exception as idealists or mystical 
i n t u i t i o n i s t s . Morality i n the hands of such people became sympathy, 
or a weak and sentimentalised conception of love. Forsyth was 
saved from th i s by his determination to begin his thinking with God, 
so that instead of beginning with man's awareness of the claims of 
conscience he begins with God as the absolute moral r e a l i t y . This 
i s not a denial of the love of God or an attempt to move i t from the 
centre of the theological scene. I t i s rather a demand that i t 
should be thought of 'not as love simply, but as holy love'. His 
insistence on the holiness of God i s probably the chief 
characteristic of Forsyth's whole theology, and one of the most 
d i f f i c u l t to grasp. 
To describe God as holy i s much more than to c a l l attention to 
a particular attribute, one among many. Holiness for Forsyth i s 
never a quantitative term, i t describes the whole nature of God i n 
moral terms. I t draws attention to His completeness and 
transcendence, the God who i s "high and l i f t e d up", who, i n one 
sense at least, has no need of man, or of anything outside Himself. 
To describe God as holy i s to describe Him as the ultimate moral 
r e a l i t y . " .. our- practical experience convinces us of the "ought" 
of the moral norm. The ideal i s that that should rule. In God 
such an ideal i s reached ... Absolute being must be identical with 
the Absolute moral norm ... That i s the holiness of God, the 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the moral norm and the ultimate r e a l i t y of the 
world •.. the Holy i s the ideal good, f a i r and true, translated i n 
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our religious consciousness to a transcendent personal r e a l i t y , 
not proved but known, experienced immediately and honoured at sight 
as the one thing i n the world valuable i n i t s e l f and making a 
world" (PA pf>f). This i s the strain i n his theology which has led 
many to c r i t i c i s e Forsyth for having an Old Testament conception of 
God. But those who c r i t i c i s e i n t h i s way often overlook the 
fact that i n ins i s t i n g on the moral nature of holiness Forsyth 
also insists that i t is personal and active, and finds expression i n 
grace. 
Over against this holy God stands s i n f u l man. The emphasis on 
sin i s a direct result of the starting point. As Kant taught that 
morality brought a sense of "ought", so Forsyth taught that holiness 
brought a sense of sin, i n f a c t : i n one place he takes Kant's famous 
apostrophe to duty and applies i t to sanctity. (PA p366). Here 
we see that the apparent s i m i l a r i t y between Forsyth and his 
contemporaries i s only superficial. Where others speak of the 
wonder and n o b i l i t y of the conscience of man, he speaks of i t s 
tragedy and sin; he presses beyond conscience to the g u i l t y 
conscience; beyond man's apprehension and admiration of a moral 
universe, to his deeper awareness of alienation and despair before 
i t s demands. This i s the basic religious problem, as i t i s the 
basic moral problem. "We are religious', he writes 'not as we 
ask "How am I to judge about God?", but as we ask, and are 
answered, "How does God judge about me?" ". (PA 165). At a time 
when sin was being minimised and many of his contemporaries were 
speaking confidently of man's inevitable progress, Forsyth was 
stressing not only sin but g u i l t , and thi s not only as i t affected 
the individual but the race, "Sin i s not an influence which 
affects but a sectional conscience, or troubles but a few members 
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of the race. In so f a r as i t i s real at a l l , i t affects and 
v i t i a t e s the whole conscience, the whole man, that i s , and the whole 
race i n i t s moral aspect and r e l i a b i l i t y . " (PA pkOk). Again and 
again we find him trying to r e c a l l his generation to a realisation 
of the seriousness of the natural man's moral position, and to cut 
through the sentimental ism and optimism of a liberalism which did 
not, indeed could not, deal with the tragic element in human l i f e , 
and which had therefore no answer to ultimate moral problems. In 
this cause he i s willing to enlist any a l l i e s , so that we find him 
writing on "The Pessimism of Thomas Hardy" and' "Ibsen's treatment 
of Guilt" simply because "The whole question of the tragic i s one 
which the present age needs some compulsion to face; yet there or 
nowhere l i e s the solution of l i f e .." (LQR CXVUI pl93). 
Some of Forsyth's finest writing, from a rhetorical point of 
view, i s on the subject of sin and guilt. Yet he never wallowed 
in i t as some others may have done. He always treats i t with 
aweful seriousness; and he does not only describe i t , he offers 
an explanation of i t . The tragic element i n l i f e i s "the issue 
between a holy God and the guilt of man", i t i s , i n other words, 
God's judgment on sin. 
One of the most important aspects of holiness i s judgment. 
A text to which Forsyth continually returns i s "The Lord hath a 
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controversy with His people," and he t e l l s the preachers of his day 
that they lack power because they have not taken the Lord's 
controversy with proper seriousness. By speaking of love 
instead of holy love, by omitting the moral note, they have 
minimised sin, and completely forgotten the wrath of God. Yet 
this wrath i s active i n the wolrld, the reaction of God against the 
sin of man, which expressed i t s e l f , as i t always does, i n pride 
and self-sufficiency, i n the exaltation of "that excellent creature 
man", rather than i n a humble acknowledgment of dependence on God 
and a confession of His holiness. 
The need of the natural man, blighted by sin and facing the 
deserved! judgment of God i s redemption. I t i s pointless to exhort 
him with visions of beauty truth and goodness. For one thing he 
does not choose the highest when he sees i t , but, more important, 
account must also be taken of what Fbrsyth refers to as the legacy 
or entail, of sin. Those who think of man as God's a l l y and 
regard s i n as mere weakness or immaturity which can be outgrown, 
have not yet thought seriously either of the holiness of God or of 
the sinfulness of man, "The disparity of God and man i s not gradual, 
i t i s not a matter of degree .... What a i l s us i s not limitation 
but transgression, not poverty but alienation. I t i s the breach 
of communion that i s the trouble We are not His counterparts 
but His antagonists .... And as a race we are not even stray sheep, 
or wandering prodigals merely, we are rebels taken with weapons in 
our hands. 0 (PPMM p37f). 
In the face of this situation, this gap between holiness and sin, 
this i n f i n i t e qualitative difference between God and man, any 
reconciliation must be from God's side. But i t must be such a 
reconciliation as w i l l maintain His holiness. Merely to forgive^ 
to treat man's sin, his wilful disobedience and proud s e l f -
assertion, as of no account would be immoral. I t would mean that 
the ultimate moral r e a l i t y of the world could no longer be relied 
upon. Hence, though i t i s part of holiness to desire to make 
that which i s unholy holy also, this i s not accomplished by any 
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"cheapo mercy. The need for judgment cannot be overlooked, and 
reconciliation must be based!upon atonement. 
This reconciliation and atonement i s effected in the cross of 
Christ, a l l springing from holiness. By the act of the cross, which 
sums up, or "points" the whole of the incarnation, Christ did two 
things„ He atoned for man's sin by accepting, on man's behalf, 
the judgment of God upon i t ; and He confessed, also on man's behalf, 
the holiness of God and the moral rightness of the judgment. 
He atoned for man's sin by accepting God's judgment upon i t . 
This i s substitutionary atonement. Some who see the grandeur of 
Forsyth's work and welcome the recent revival of interest i n i t , 
draw back from this phrase. But i t must be faced. Jesus was our 
representative, He did, on behalf of the whole race, make 
confession of the holiness of God. But i n order to do that, indeed 
i n doing i t He became our substitute and was condemned in our place, 
thus satisfying God's holiness. 
Forsyth i s not speaking here of any equivalent suffering. 
Neither does he think i n terms of cold and impersonal justice, but 
rather of a personal act. Nor does he think of God's anger as 
arbitrary or petulant, but rather as the necessary reaction of 
holiness to sin. Finally wej are not allowed to think of a just, 
l e g a l i s t i c and rather aloof Father being placated on our behalf 
by the intervention of a merciful, heroic and sympathetic Son. 
God's grace i s not procured by the act of atonement; the act of 
atonement i s provided by God's grace. He points out that,in the 
Old Testament the s a c r i f i c i a l system was not regarded as persuading 
God to be gracious, but rather i t was accepted as the divinely 
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appointed means of perpetuating grace. He i n s i s t s that the cross 
did not change God's attitude to man, but His relation to him. 
God's attitude was the same before and after the cross, what the 
cross did was make possible His expression of that attitude. 
Hence we see that i t was not only an act of judgment but also 
of reconciliation. What was impossible to the natural man, the 
restoration of communion between God and himself and the 
re-establishment of the moral order of the universe, has been 
effected by God's decisive act i n the cross of Christ. I t has been 
effected not only for individuals but for the world, and the f i r s t 
demand on any theory of the atonement i s that i t should do justice 
to the holiness of God. 
However, i t must also affect man. Reconciliation takes place 
between persons. Not only i s God's holiness sa t i s f i e d but man's 
sin i s judged and forgiven, and confession i s made on man's behalf 
of the holiness of God and the Tightness of His judgment on sin. 
Both elements have to be kept, judgment and redemption, 'nothing 
damns l i k e what saves'. 
Concluding this summary of Forsyth's doctrine of the cross we 
must note his insistence on i t s completeness. The issue has been 
settled 'in a f i n a l way', ' i t i s done, i t does not remain to be done'. 
In other words, he takes up and reiterates the Puritan emphasis on 
"the finished work of Christ", insisting that we l i v e j j i a world 
which i s , i n principle, a redeemed world. "The certainty of 
Bvelation and f a i t h i s that i n the universal Christ the world i s 
chosen for salvation, and i s saved in principle, and sh a l l be 
s aved in fact. The l o s t are l o s t by refusing that gospel i n their 
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mysterious and incalculable freedom." (PA p357). Faith i s the 
personal reception of th i s . 
But i t i s important to point out that the doctrine of the cross 
which he presents i s not meant to be presented to the intellectual 
c r i t i c i s m of the natural man, who may then take part of i t and 
leave the rest. I t i s never a thing to be argued over but always 
to be experienced. I t i s not worked out step by step, but 
received by revelation in the act of conversion where both 
judgment and redemption are "effected". Conversion i s a gi f t 
of God which changes man's status vis-a-vis the righteousness of 
God. I t comes by personal experience of Christ which f i r s t judges 
and condemns, and then establishes the believer's footing on the 
Tltiraate moral r e a l i t y of the universe. I t comes to us * ... by 
Christ as the agent of God's self-reparatory holiness ... By means 
best known to God, the giver, we are united to such a holy Christ 
and set for ever inside the Justice of God, which i s no more over 
us, and no more confronts us, but i s within us, and we within i t " 
& A pU3). 
The result of this i s that we can no longer speak i n terms of 
loyalty to Christ, but must speak i n terms of being possessed, of 
being owned by Him who has judged and redeemed us. Here i s the 
basis of Forsyth's doctrine of Authority. I t i s an authority of 
graces an authority based, as a l l his theology i s based, on the 
cross of Christ as the decisive moral act of God. "The grace of 
God i n the historic cross of Christ must be the one source of 
m>rals and seal of Authority for a race that i s redeemed or nothing, 
redeemed or l o s t . " (PA pit02). 
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In what follows we w i l l attempt to discover how Forsyth 
works out his doctrine from this starting point. We must 
examine more closely what he means by 'the evangelical 
experience of salvation', and see how he defends his position 
against the obvious criticisms of subjectivism and how he 
traces this present experience of the believer to the work of 
the historic Jesus. We must consider what he has to say about 
the other traditional sources of authority, the Bible, the 
Church, reason and experience, and also what he has to say 
about freedom. Finally we must attempt to trace any major 
influences i n his thought, and attempt some criticism of i t . 
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Those who approach Forsyth's work looking for a clearly 
w>rked out and coherently stated doctrine of authority, or for that 
matter of anything else, are doomed to be disappointed. However, 
i t would be a mistake to assume from this that he was not clear or 
dogmatic i n his views, for fie was both. The apparent lack of 
system i s due to the subject matter and not to the thinker. Or 
rather i t i s due to the particular approach which this thinker 
believes i t i s right to take to the subject. 
I t i s a firm conviction with Forsyth that any "system" of 
theology i s the result of an imposition of previously held ideas and 
not an'honest reading of the facts. He denies that theology can be 
f i n a l l y systematised. Here i s the difference between a 
philosophic approach and a religious one. Philosophy must be 
systematic and must eventually lead to monism, while religion 
cannot be systematic and monism i s a denial of the basic religious 
fact of the divided conscience. 
Nevertheless his work has an orderliness of i t s own. In fact 
"The Principle of Authority" i s probably the most orderly of a l l his 
books. This orderliness comes from his determination always to 
"set his compass at the inexhaustible cross". The result i s a 
considerable amount of repetition as each new question which i s 
raised i s brought to the cross and seen in the light of the great 
moral act which took place there. 
This i s the key to his epistemology. Following Kant he saw 
the re a l as the moral, and the search for r e a l i t y i n the moral realm 
took the place of the search for abstract intellectual truth. 
He was a voluntarist, not an i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t , and he had l i t t l e 
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time or patience for metaphysical systems. Truth for him had to 
be v i t a l truth, truth i n action, the truth which settled the 
conscience and gave moral dynamic for l i f e . And this was the 
truth of a personal God, expressed i n a personal action, and received 
by a personal act of choice. Therefore, though his work was not 
systematic in the generally accepted sense, he certainly had a 
method of working. "In a Christian f a i t h we descend on creation 
from redemption, we do not descend on redemption from creation, on 
graces from nature, on fa i t h from science. I t i s in the Grace of 
God that a l l our thought begins. In thinking of religion we must 
begin with what makes us Christians, and not simply with what makes 
us religious. The method here, as often elsewhere, i s more than 
half the battle." (PA pl8U). 
We have seen that his concept of authority begins with the 
experience of conversion and regeneration. In this experience the 
believer knows himself to be set right with the moral universe and 
given a footing, a/ certainty, i n his relation with the absolute 
moral r e a l i t y of the world, God. At once we must face the question 
of the v a l i d i t y of such an appeal and the consequences of accepting 
i t . This i s a question to which wee sha l l return, since i t i s one 
that Forsyth touches upon on many occasions. The preliminary 
point which must be dealt with now i s whether or not he i s right to 
take the whole basis of his argument out of the realm of impartial 
s c i e n t i f i c investigation. I s he not guilty of a flagrant 
"petitio p r i n c i p i i " in asserting, as he does assert, that the most 
careful s i f t i n g of the evidence and the most penetrating 
intellectual inquiry can prove neither the truth nor the f a l s i t y 
of his basic premiss? To many of his contemporaries this was 
just about the worst possible crime he could have committed. I t 
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was an,age when intellectual honesty seemed to be synonymous with 
an open-ness to s c i e n t i f i c investigation, so that this high-handed 
procedures at the very beginning of the argument was i n i t s e l f 
sufficient to discredit the whole case, and to disqualify i t from 
serious consideration. 
Forsyth was aware of this argument, but unswerving i n his 
adhesion to his chosen starting point. His argument was that each 
f i e l d of human experience and study had to be investigated by methods 
properjto i t s e l f . This principle i s allowed i n other branches of 
study and must therefore be allowed i n this one. He makes this 
point at some length i n an a r t i c l e which I shall quote at length, 
both because the argument i s put with such c l a r i t y that i t merits 
extended quotation, and also because of i t s fundamental 
importance i n Forsyth's thought, not le a s t i n his approach to 
authority. 
" I t may be found disappointing by some to be told that i t i s 
impossible to prove supernatural truth except to a supernatural and 
superrational experience ... How then do you propose to settle i t ? 
Tou t e l l me you proceed by the canons of reason. You w i l l go by 
those methods which a long and sifted experience has shown to be 
f r u i t f u l i n the religion of research, and especially research 
h i s t o r i c a l and philosophical .... You pursue your inquiry, then, 
on such positive principles. These canons are settled for you 
before: you embark on your search. You w i l l be told that your 
results w i l l be worthless unless you start from them and follow 
them. • Well, what objection do you have to describe these as 
dogmas; given you i n advance of your inquiry, and made obligatory 
in thei Church of science? Who would l i s t e n to a man who 
i 
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abjured the inductive methods of observation and experiment, who 
discarded these dogmas? Tou reply that these principles, these 
formulas, are practical, and are founded on experience long and 
corrected. Tes, but so are the dogmas about the supernatural with 
which we approach supernatural truth. I t was to explain a 
tremendous experience that they arose .... 
"Now i f I took those supernatural principles, and compelled you 
to admit them before I allowed you to enter on physical research, 
you might well complain. Tou might say I was taking the 
principles of one kind of experience and forcing them on a quite 
different kind; that I was treating by the laws of one nature 
objects which have a very different nature - as i f one should test 
music by mathematics, or poetry by logic, or seek l i f e ' s secret 
with a lamp and a lancet. And you would remind me that the true 
fact of science i s to treat each object according to i t s own nature, 
to adjust our method to the difference, say, between a mineral and 
an animal, a fact and a tone ... 
"Tou w i l l not wonder, then, i f I want to apply your principle a l l 
round. The experience of nature (human or other) can never take 
the place of the experience of religion (or more correctly of God). 
Tou w i l l be prepared now to hear me protest against the dogmatism 
with which you want to impose upon my experience of the l i v i n g 
God doctrines which you drew from the treatment of sensible 
nature ... Tou want to subject the person of Christ entirely to 
methods which are very useful when you are testing natural processes, 
or historic documents or their normal characters. But when you 
propose to apply rational principles as f i n a l to the incarnation, 
you are begging a great question. Tou are taking i t for granted, 
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without more ado, that the incarnation was above a l l things a 
rational process. Whereas i t was i n the nature of an act, and, 
an act being an exercise of w i l l and personality, i t i s beyond the 
rationality which explains a process. I t was experience of God's 
and therefore only to be met and owned by an experience of lours, 
i . e . , not by a conviction or a conclusion, but by religion. 
The only real belief i n the incarnation i s not assent, but l i v i n g 
f a i t h . I f you propose to subject i t to a human test, or reduce 
i t to a philosophic process, you are as dogmatic as any Christian, 
lou are worse, because you want to apply to ray experience of f a i t h 
principles and dogmas which you gathered i n a different region 
outside fa i t h . Tou are doing to religion what you f i e r c e l y resent 
that religion should do to art or science. Tou are limiting i t s 
freedom by a foreign dogma." (The B r i t i s h Weekly, Feb. 17, 1910, 
p557. cited by R.M. Brown). 
I f this l i n e of argument i s accepted and we agree to begin with 
Forsyth from the evangelical experience of conversion and 
regeneration, we must go on to ask i n what terms authority comes 
to us i f not i n rational or metaphysical ones. His answer i s 
clear. We must move in the religious realm, not the s c i e n t i f i c , 
and that means in the realm of the moral, or, for Forsyth, the realm 
of ultimate r e a l i t y . For he does not see man's moral sense, or his 
moral l i f e , as one faculty among others. This would be a denial 
of hisi Kantian epistemology. The moral question i s the question 
of the whole man, and i f i t i s to be resolved at a l l i t must be 
resolved i n an experience of the whole man. His whole being i s 
here called into question. 
The revelation of God's graces when i t comes to a man i n the 
experience we are discussing f i r s t shows him the real seriousness 
of his situation. There i s some ambiguity i n Forsyth's language 
on this point. He writes at times as i f the natural man i s able 
to appreciate his position though not able to help himself i n i t , 
or redeem himself from i t . Thus he says, "Conscience which, 
going some way, makes many heroes, going to the end, makes cowards 
of us a l l . I t ends by accusing more than inspiring, and i t cannot 
forgive. I t repents, but the penitent conscience cannot forgive. 
The good man can never forgive himself. Conscience w i l l give us 
sound footing up to a point, t i l l i t rouse the sense of the holy, 
and then i t creates In us the passion for forgiveness as l i f e ' s 
one need. But no conscience of ours can either forgive us or 
assure us of the forgiveness of God, the grace of the Holy." 
(fA pl82). Elsewhere, however, he denies even this , and argues that 
even knowledge of sin and the possibility of repentance are the 
Bsults of God's revelation. We can see, as people l i k e Hardy 
have seen, the tragic and unsatisfactory nature of human l i f e , 
Int not u n t i l we have experienced salvation can we r e a l l y know the 
seriousness of sin. ' I t i s Impossible that the whole dimension and 
heinousness of wickedness, the abysmal perdition of humanity, 
should be grasped by any created soul .... No single soul of us 
escapes from thb e v i l far enough to gauge i t , ..." (JG p31). 
"... sin i s blacker than misery, and guilt i s only revealed by 
grace. No experience of l i f e shows a world so bad, black, 
perverse and hopeless as i t i s shown by the revelation of i t s holy 
salvation" (LQR CXVIII p210). 
He i s clear, however, that i t i s in this moral realm that the 
revelation comes and the authority i s experienced. But, as the l a s t 
quotation shows, the experience i s also, and primarily, an 
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experience of grace through a personal encounter. The question 
which i s forced upon us i s "How do I stand before the Holy God 
who i s my judge?". And with the question comes the answer which 
i s both the assurance of forgiveness and a demand for personal 
commital and obedience, "The answer i s from Godj and i t i s the 
g i f t of Himself, engaged in the act of securing His holy 
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sovereignty in things, making His holiness good for the world, 
and especially i n me. And to such a personal answer our only due 
rejoinder i s personal also. I t i s self-donative. Our certainty 
i s p ractical. Our religion i s absolute s e l f commital ... 
And even that self-surrender i s created by Him." (PA pli2)., 
Though he i n s i s t s that God i s active even in man's response, 
Forsyth keeps the duality of the encounter. He can speak both of the 
power of the experience humbling and overcoming the believer, and 
also of man's freedom to r e s i s t , and even ultimately to refuse to 
enter the relationship. I t i s in this strain of his thinking that 
he uses the word "transaction" to which some c r i t i c s have taken 
exception. He was aware of the possibility of i t s being 
misunderstood, and tried to defend against t h i s "one i s carried 
beyond the idea even of an act to another idea which must not be 
rejected simply because i t has become encrusted, for a business 
people, with commercial associations. I t was a great 
transaction ( i t a l i c s ) . Or we can use the old word of a "covenant", 
i f only we secure the idea of a reciprocity without a bargain" 
(PA p57). 
I t i s probable that the b i b l i c a l word "covenant" conveys his 
meaning more exactly, i n the. sense of the covenant between Tahweh 
and I s r a e l made at Mount Sinai. Not an agreement between equals 
I 
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with similar conditions on both sides, but rather one that has been 
given, almost imposed, by one party upon the other, with grace on 
the side of the giver and willing acceptance and obedience on the 
side of the recipients. Thus he speaks of f a i t h as man's 
self-donation to God's self-donative act in. Christ. 
The result of this encounter i s a sense of certainty and 
assurances I t i s not self-certainty, or confidence of an 
intellectual kind, but what Forsyth refers to as soul-certainty. 
I t s basis i s not i n man's knowledge of God, but i n his confidence 
that he i s known by God and has been given by God a footing i n the 
moral world, the right to which he had forfeited by his rebellion 
and which he could neyer have obtained for himself. This i s a 
tremendous assertion, From being at variance with the moral 
world, and guilty before the Holy God who i s the ultimate moral 
r e a l i t y of that world, the sinful man, by the gracious act of this 
same God, has been placed i n a relationship of communion with the 
moral order and i s held there by God Himself. The act which 
placed him there was the supreme moral act of the cross by which 
God secured not only the sinner's righteousness but also His own. 
Hence the believer's certainty i s part of, and as sure asj God's 
self-certainty, " ... we enter communion with His advances of 
Holy Love. And our certainty i s , by the Holy Sp i r i t , a most 
incredible thing - i t i s a function of the certainty which God 
always has of Himself ... Joined to Christ by faith's comraital 
I am loved in the love that the Father for ever spends on His 
eternal Holy Son. I t i s a tremendous certainty. I t plants us 
in the eternal centre of the world" (PA pp 39, 1*2). 
A necessary correlate of this certainty i s the acknowledgment 
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of the authority of the One who has effected i t , "the crown rights 
of the Redeemer". The authority and the experience are one. I t i s 
not that the experience corroborates the authority, or confirms the 
claim of an authority known i n some other way. I t i s rather that 
the authority i s active only i n the experience. Furthermore, a 
moral act of such magnitude cannot be limited i n i t s application 
or scope to any individual, or even any group. What has happened 
in the cross of Christ affected the whole world. As the guilt of 
sin lays upon "the great solitary human conscience", so the 
redemption effected has been effected for a l l . He never t i r e s of 
saying that the whole world i s i n principle redeemed, whether i t 
believes i t or not, and whether i t l i k e i t or not. 
So much for the experience and i t s interpretation by the 
believer, but such an appeal brings i t s own dangers and d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
There i s f i r s t the obvious danger of subjectivism. How can wegbe 
sure that our own personal experience has any objective reality? 
May we not be deluding ourselves? Or, can we be sure that the 
experience, which i s real enough in i t s e l f , cannot be explained 
in some other way, by psychology for instance? I s there any 
objective r e a l i t y corresponding to the experience? Can a theory 
such as this find any respectable philosophical backing, or i s i t 
l i a b l e to be c r i c i t i s e d on philosophical and logical grounds? 
Finally, and i n a sense most important, why i s this experience 
Blated to the l i f e , workji and particularly death, of Jesus of 
Hizareth, and did He give this interpretation of His own work? 
The l a s t question was particularly important for Forsyth, working 
against the background of the l i b e r a l "Jesus of History" school, 
which, as we have seen, saw Jesus as a teacher of the Fatherhood of 
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God and the Brotherhood of man. 
Forsyth saw these dangers and took account of them. The 
pos s i b i l i t y of the conversion experience, indeed the whole experiences 
of religion, being an i l l u s i o n seems to have been one which was 
presented to him often. No doubt i t was often used i n argument 
a gainst him, but there are passages in his writing which make i t 
probable that he had,felt the force of this particular brand of 
s cepticism for himself. He allows that one possible way of dealing 
with illusionism would be to show that the appeal of revelation 
was answered by some spi r i t u a l "a p r i o r i " i n man, some seed of 
divinity, l i g h t of reason or moral sense. We sha l l return to this 
point l a t e r when considering how the authority i s received. For 
the moment i t must suffice to say that he does not take this, road. 
His own argument i s , f i r s t , to draw.attention to the intensity 
of the experience, i t s strength and importance for the one who 
experiences i t . Once i t has been allowed that morality i s the 
nature of things, then nothing can be as real as a man's personal 
moral experience, and an experience which can bring a radical 
life-change, such as the experience of conversion has been known to 
bring, cannot in the l a s t resort be dismissed as an i l l u s i o n . He 
points out, indeed he often returns to the subject and i n s i s t s , 
that what i s involved i s not a sentimental or aesthetic experience 
which l a s t s for an hour or two and then disappears. Neither i s i t a 
philosophy of l i f e accepted for a time as a working hypothesis, a 
beneficient i l l u s i o n which we persuade ourselves to believe because 
of the comfort and social benefit we hope i t w i l l bring. Rather i t 
i s a pertinacious and compelling sense of restraint, not always 
comfortable. " I t becomes .... masterful. I t contjrols us in 
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everything that we regard as l i f e ' s r e a l i t y , so that i f r e a l i t y be 
anywhere i t must be here. I t turns to our habit and q u a l i t y of 
moral l i f e .... We experience not a novelty, but a regeneration. We 
do not l i v e to ourselves and our experiences, but to C h r i s t . We 
f e e l , moreover, not merely th a t we change, but that we are changed, 
and changed i n one d e c i s i v e way. We l i v e no more to ourselves, but 
we are sent to a great s p i r i t u a l servitude f o r l i f e j ...." 
" ... i f the f a i t h that our experience i s God's v i s i t a t i o n , f i l l , 
f o r t i f y , and s e t t l e f o r l i f e our whole moral personality, we have the 
s u r e s t Escape from the idea that that objective i n our experience 
i s imaginary." (PA pp2U, 28). 
But that i s not a l l . His main l i n e of argument here i s that 
the experience of conversion can be integrated into l i f e i n a way 
which i s impossible with mere i l l u s i o n s . "How do we know when we 
awake," he asks, "that the v i s i o n s of the night are not r e a l i t y ? " 
Not because they did not appear v i v i d a t the time, they may often 
be extremely soj nor because they appeared confused and 
contradictory, s i n c e they are often neither; but because they 
cannot be worked into the whole f a b r i c of our l i f e . "If"„ he 
w r i t e s , "we s a i l through the a i r on a broomstick a t two i n the 
morning, or i n h e r i t a legacy of m i l l i o n s a t f i v e , we cannot s a f e l y 
work the experience into the day's outlook or the day's conduct ... 
The t e s t of a dream i s not to pinch one's s e l f , to get over one 
v i v i d impression by another ... The t e s t i s p r a c t i c e . The dream 
does not work - meaning by that not that i t does not succeed, but 
that i t i s not i n the context of our moral l i f e . Such i s a l l 
h a l l u c i n a t i o n . But r e a l i t y i s i n organic connection with l i f e ' s 
whole" (PA pp l 8 6 f ) . The experience we are here discussing i s i n 
such organic connection. I t places us i n communion with God and 
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i n step with the whole moral order which had previously been against 
TE. "/ilhat we^  cannot do with our dreams of f l y i n g broomsticks and 
l e g a c i e s , we can do with our experience of conversion. We can t r e a t 
i t as r e a l , l i v e our l i v e s from i t , and f i n d that i t works. " ... 
thing which guarantees the r e a l i t y of the content i n experience i s 
t h i s , t h a t i n so t r e a t i n g i t , i n t r e a t i n g i t as r e a l , we acquire our 
souls f o r l i f e " (PA p27). To doubt t h i s would le a d to such inner 
c o n f l i c t and contradiction that nothing could be c e r t a i n a t a l l . 
F i n a l l y he goes behind the experience of the i n d i v i d u a l to the; 
experience of the church, not only the contemporary church but thes 
church through the ages. This, of course, i s not an argument 
p e c u l i a r to Forsyth, but i t i s one that he employs as w e l l as i t was 
ever employed. "No consensus of t r u t h , " he argues, "has ever been 
esta b l i s h e d by such an extraordinary v a r i e t y o f testimony from a l l 
ages, lands, and stations of men, simple and c r i t i c a l , men of a l l 
g i f t s and of none." (PA p2J>). At a time when, democracy, 
i n d i v i d u a l judgment, and the r u l e of the majority, were popular 
watchwords t h i s was a powerful argument. But we s h a l l see l a t e r 
how Forsyth turned i t against those who wished to s e t t l e doctrine 
by a majority vote. 
By these arguments he defends the r e a l i t y of the evangelical 
experience, and h i s method o f starting, from i t . But, as has been 
s a i d , he does not stop with the experience. There must be an 
ob j e c t i v e r e a l i t y corresponding to the subjective experience. I t 
i s not the experience i t s e l f which i s a u t h o r i t a t i v e but that which 
i s experienced. The seat of authority i s the soul. That was a 
commonplace among h i s contemporaries, the soul i n communion with God. 
With t h i s he agrees. I t s seat i s the soul, i s su b j e c t i v e , but i t s 
61. 
seat i s not i t s source. He saw that the source of authority had to 
be outside man, something external to him which made demands upon 
him, and which had a recognised r i g h t to be obeyed. Only so could 
authority be f i n a l l y saved from subjectivism, and man placed on a 
secure moral footing i n r e l a t i o n to the whole moral universe. I n 
other words, i t i s e s s e n t i a l that the b e l i e v e r should be able to say 
of h i s experience of C h r i s t " I am c e r t a i n " , but i t i s no l e s s 
e s s e n t i a l that he should be able to pass beyond t h i s and say " i t i s 
c e r t a i n " . Though Forsyth allows that he may not be able to say the 
second with quite the same force that he can say the f i r s t , i t i s the 
" i t i s c e r t a i n " which i s b a s i c . "The r e a l ground of our cert i t u d e , 
therefore, i s the nature of the thing of which we are sure, rather 
than the nature of the experience i n which we are sure" (PA p£2). 
He summarises the requirements of authority as follows " ... r e l i g i o n 
to our modern soul has two f e a t u r e s . As e t h i c a l i t must be 
e s s e n t i a l l y an act, and not a sentiment only; and as psychological 
i t must be an experience. And to these s u b j e c t i v e experiences of 
r e l i g i o n must correspond i t s object. That must be a person putting 
himself into an act f o r an experience." (PA p63). 
The object of which the b e l i e v e r i s c e r t a i n , and which provides 
the b a s i s of authority i s , of course, God. But, as the above 
quotation has shown, i t i s God conceived not as an object of 
knowledge but as a person. Furthermore He i s conceived, or rather 
received, as a person i n action. I n other words, for Forsyth, 
God i s i n d i s s o l u b l y subject. 
I t i s t h i s which d i s t i n g u i s h e s r e l i g i o u s knowledge from any 
other form of knowledge. P h y s i c a l sciences are, b a s i c a l l y , about 
things. They deal with objects which can be manipulated and observed. 
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The s c i e n t i s t takes the i n i t i a t i v e and approaches the object of h i s 
study. ' He knows them, but they do not know him. The s c i e n t i s t 
i s d i s i n t e r e s t e d , but the r e l i g i o u s man cannot be. 
Philosophy also has a c e r t a i n sphere of action i n which the 
philosopher has the i n i t i a t i v e . I t i s true that here one i s dealing 
not so much with objects as with ideas and p r i n c i p l e s , and c e r t a i n l y 
these things do a s s e r t some influence on the philosopher. But while 
a p r i n c i p l e may compel some measure of i n t e l l e c t u a l assent, i t does 
not compel the surrender of the w i l l , nor does i t recreate the soul. 
I t may impress and demand respect, but i t does not exert a f i n a l 
authority f o r l i f e . Such an authority must be known as a person i s 
known. , 
However, even to r e a l i s e that we have to consider knowledge of 
a person, great advance though i t i s , does not go f a r enough. 
Knowledge of our fellows i s knowledge of persons, y et i t does not 
provide the external o b j e c t i v i t y necessary f o r authority. When 
knowing our neighbour and recognising him as a person we are s t i l l 
keeping ourselves c e n t r a l , beginning from our own s u b j e c t i v e 
experience. This anthropocentric approach i s the fundamental error 
of a l l the various f a l s e conceptions about God, and Forsyth shows 
how Deism, Pantheism and Theism are a l l based on i t . "The common 
vi c e " , he w r i t e s , "of a l l these imperfect forms of r e l i g i o n i s 
that they t r e a t God as an object of knowledge more or l e s s t h e o r e t i c , 
instead of t r e a t i n g Him as the subject of a knowledge, which i s 
inceptive and c r e a t i v e , as searching as i t i s i n f i n i t e , and as 
p a r t i c u l a r as i t i s u n i v e r s a l " (PA pi51). 
God then must be known as a Subject. He does not wait upon our 
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approach to Him, and the important thing about the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s not 
what we know or postulate about Him. Instead He has taken the 
i n i t i a t i v e i n approaching us and knowing us "We f i n d Him because 
He f i r s t f i n d s us, ... the main thing, the unique thing, i n r e l i g i o n 
i s not a God whom we know but a God who knows us" (PA plU9). 
This approach of God to us i s r e v e l a t i o n , and i t comes from outside 
ourselves. I t i s discontinuous with the r e s t of l i f e , i n v o l v i n g a 
confrontation or encounter with God, and i n t h i s encounter i t i s man 
who i s known, and who knows himself, not as a d i s i n t e r e s t e d spectator 
or theoriser' about r e l i g i o n and philosophy, but as an object of God's 
knowledge. He i s known i n a s p e c i a l sense, says Forsyth, i n the 
sense of being chosen for a destiny. I n other words the knowledge 
i s e l e c t i o n and e l e c t i o n to redemption. Once more the argument has 
ueturned to the c r o s s , the f o c a l point of r e v e l a t i o n . \ 
At t h i s point c r i t i c i s m i s possible from two quarters. F i r s t , 
i t may be argued, as exponents of the new science of psychology did 
argue, not only that the experience i n question can be explained 
d i f f e r e n t l y , but also that the laws of thought and l i m i t s of the 
human mind are such as to forbid the r e v e a l i n g authority of a divine 
p e r s o n a l i t y . Secondly, even i f i t i s allowed that the experience 
of conversion i s i n f a c t an experience of confrontation with an 
external subject who may be c a l l e d God, i t i s s t i l l not c l e a r why 
t h i s should be connected with the h i s t o r i c a l person Jesus of Nazareth, 
and more p a r t i c u l a r l y with His death. I t i s c e r t a i n l y not c l e a r why 
t h i s connection should be made i f there i s no i n d i c a t i o n i n Jesus' 
own teaching that He ever intended i t to be made, as many of Forsyth's 
contemporaries would argue. Thus the course of the argument i s 
confused, by the f a c t that Forsyth i s f i g h t i n g on two f r o n t s at once. 
As w e l l as s t a t i n g h i s case to c r i t i c s outside the church, he i s also 
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d i r e c t i n g h i s energies to those within the church who were preaching 
and teaching what he held to be a defective, or at best immature, 
Gospel. 
He saw that the danger of subjectivism i n h i s appeal to 
experience l e d to a r e a l danger of the psychologist becoming the f i n a l 
judge i n matters of r e l i g i o n . Though t h i s was anathema to him he 
would not simply ignore the challenge or deny the r i g h t of the 
psychologist to make the c r i t i c i s m . At the same time he had no 
patience with t r i f l e r s . Thus he writes, " .... the problem i s not 
solved by the hasty heroics which warn c r i t i c i s m o f f the grounds, . ... 
the only warning i n place i s one against ... those d i s c u r s i v e minds 
who, without competent knowledge, demand precedence f o r vagrant 
i n t u i t i o n s or smatterings on matters of so much venerable d e l i c a c y 
and moral d i f f i c u l t y . The r e a l problem i s one of adjustment. 
I t i s to adjust the b e l i e f i n an objective, and e s p e c i a l l y an 
h i s t o r i c a l , authority with the r i g h t s of sound c r i t i c i s m , the r e s u l t s 
of t r a d i t i o n , and the f a c t s of the s p i r i t u a l man.11 (PA p76). 
What had to be held, he argued, was the c e n t r a l i t y of the 
experience of the new creator i n a saved and enlightened conscience as 
the f i n a l source of authority. I f that were to be l o s t then 
C h r i s t i a n i t y would be reduced to one r e l i g i o n among others. But, by 
the nature of the case, i t could not be l o s t . I t was the basic 
datum around which the enquiry revolved. Any form of science could 
examine and even c r i t i c i s e i t , but i t s existence was "given", and by 
no canons of s c i e n t i f i c argument could i t be denied. C r i t i c i s m 
could ornly remove unessential accretions and could therefore do nothing 
but good. 
65. 
The argument that the laws of thought and l i m i t s of the human 
mind are such as to f o r b i d the rev e a l i n g authority of a d i v i n e 
p e r s o n a l i t y did not c a r r y conviction because i t did not take account 
of t h i s "given-ness". The question a t i s s u e i s not what we may 
know, but what we do know; knowledge cannot wait f o r a s a t i s f a c t o r y 
epistemology, "No theory of knowledge., can destroy the f a c t of 
knowledge^ .... the experienced r e a l i t y of r e v e l a t i o n i s the ma t e r i a l 
on which a philosophy of r e v e l a t i o n or of r e l i g i o n must begin to work." 
(PA p92). To deny the existence of the ba s i c datum n u l l i f i e d the 
argument from the beginning. 
I n any case, he argued, the laws of thought have no independent 
hypostatic existence and power of t h e i r own, they are merely our. 
normal way of thinking, any un i t y they possess belongs not to the laws 
themselves but to the thinker. The ground of r e a l knowledge i s 
experience, and i t cannot be bound by a previously worked out and 
"closed" system of thought. Theology must take account of the 
"revelationary and experienced f a c t . " We have, i n f a c t , no forms 
of knowledge which are not ult i m a t e l y based on experience, and there 
i s no such thing as f a i t h or knowledge apart from b e l i e v i n g and knowing 
men. 
I t must be made c l e a r a t t h i s point that Forsyth does not wish 
by t h i s l i n e of argument to deny the value and importance of mental 
categories, but only to argue that "Any conclusion we draw i s c e r t a i n 
only as we?know that the premiss i s given us i n the very f a c t and act 
of concrete l i f e " (PA p98). To ignore the experience which gives 
r i s e to the thought i s to claim the thought as ours and not "given", 
while to ignore the mental processes of thought i s merely to 
accumulate experience external to ourselves. The influence of Kant 
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i s r a r e l y more obvious than when he speaks of the unifying of 
the observations we make, by the s e l e c t i v e and co-ordinating a c t of 
judgment, working from a tendency or an i n s t i n c t which demands that 
t r u t h s h a l l r e f l e c t the unity of the moral persona l i t y " (PA pl03). 
Turning to the connection between the experience of conversion, 
and indeed the tfiole of contemporary C h r i s t i a n i t y , and the h i s t o r i c 
f i g u r e of Jesus of Nazareth, he makes great play with Lessing's 
dictum that "The ac c i d e n t a l truths of h i s t o r y can never become proof 
f o r the necessary truths of reason". He di s t i n g u i s h e s between the 
f a c t s of h i s t o r y and the c r e a t i v e h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n . The former, 
he agrees, can be viewed as i f from a distance and c r i t i c i s e d ; but 
we are a l l part of the l a t t e r , involved i n the t r a d i t i o n and unable 
to step back from i t and view i t from outside. I t i s c l e a r that 
he had no f e a r of B i b l i c a l c r i t i c i s m of a h i s t o r i c a l nature. 
The d e t a i l e d f a c t s he was w i l l i n g to l e t go and to argue that 
the core of the f a i t h , redemption and recreation, was unaffected. 
Tie d e t a i l s had t h e i r place, they were sacramental, conveying the 
grace of God i n redemption, but were not themselves to be i d e n t i f i e d 
with that grace. Hence scepticism regarding the h i s t o r i c a l 
accuracy of the d e t a i l s need not l e a d to ultimate doubt of the 
r e a l i t y of s a l v a t i o n , ••'The author of our new; creation cannot be 
dssolved by c r i t i c a l science, though the source of a sacramental 
impression may. The man who was the sacrament of our regeneration 
may f a l l i n t o soul-collapse without e n t a i l i n g mind; but the Saviour 
who was the Creator of i t cannot, without involving me i n the debacle" 
(PA pll3). I t i s not c l e a r how f a r Forsyth was w i l l i n g to go with 
t h i s h i s t o r i c a l scepticism. I t appears a d i f f i c u l t and dangerous 
road to follow, and we must return to t h i s passage when we come to 
make some c r i t i c i s m s of h i s whole position. 
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For the moment, however, i t i s c l e a r that he did not consider 
i t was necessary to go as f a r as he was apparently w i l l i n g to go. 
The c e n t r a l h i s t o r i c f a c t s of the gospel are, he be l i e v e s , secure 
against h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m . From t h i s point he proceeds by the 
same method of argument that he adopted with the psychologists. 
That i s , he i n s i s t s that i t i s necessary to take account of the 
f a c t concerned before d i s c u s s i n g how c e r t a i n events can be 
experienced long a f t e r they have happened and what authority such 
experience can have. The f a c t concerned here i s th a t the h i s t o r i c 
person Jesus of Nazareth has founded an absolute f a i t h , and that we 
can only speak of Him as a f a c t with an aura of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the New Testament and the C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n . 
C h r i s t i a n c e r t a i n t y i s not based simply on the h i s t o r i c f a c t of a 
h i s t o r i c person, but on the h i s t o r i c f a c t of C h r i s t as i t appears 
within the t r a d i t i o n . "The great f a c t i s the h i s t o r i c phenomenon, 
Jesus, plus i t s "meta-historic" Word, the f a c t a c t i v e only i n i t s 
Word, acting therefrom always as l i v i n g , l i f e - g i v i n g S p i r i t . " 
(PA p l l S ) . L i g ht i s thrown on Forsyth's understanding of t h i s by a 
r a r e d e f i n i t i v e footnote w r i t t e n the previous year, • .... when I 
speak of the Word .. I do not i d e n t i f y i t with the Bible, with the 
Canon. The Word i s man's responsive and i n s p i r e d act of confessing 
the Gospel as the new c r e a t i v e a ct of God. I t took e f f e c t f i r s t 
i n the Apostles, and then i n the continuous and manifold 
pu b l i c a t i o n of t h e i r message by the Church. And by the S p i r i t i s 
meant not simply God's presence i n the world He made, nor even His 
presence i n History by the h i s t o r i c Son and His posthumous e f f e c t , 
but God's presence i n the Church i n an E t e r n a l Son and a Holy S p i r i t 
Who not only f i l l s the Word but mediates i t to the s o u l " (FFF p I n ) . 
I t i s , of course, always open to the c r i t i c s to claim that the 
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t r a d i t i o n i s mistaken, that the simple Jesus of h i s t o r y has 
been l o s t beneath a welter of wrong in t e r p r e t a t i o n , f o r which there 
i s no foundation i n His own teaching and understanding of Himself; 
and th a t i t i s necessary to choose between Jesus and Paul, the 
simple preacher of the synoptic t r a d i t i o n or the eschatological 
C h r i s t of the e p i s t l e s . Many of h i s contemporaries saw;the i s s u e 
i n t h i s way, but Forsyth was able to show tha t t h i s view, was not 
supported by the New Testament. Quite apart from the i m p o s s i b i l i t y 
of getting behind the synoptic t r a d i t i o n to the supposedly simple 
r e l i g i o u s teacher s a i d to be hidden there, there i s not r e a l l y the 
d i f f e r e n c e between the sources that t h i s theory suggests. 
I n h i s C h r i s t o l o g i c a l work "The Person and Place of Jesus 
C h r i s t " , he answers t h i s c r i t i c i s m a t length by drawing out the 
p i c t u r e of Jesus which i s a c t u a l l y presented by the synoptic 
Gospels, and showing that i t i s not the p i c t u r e of a simple moral 
teacher that many supposed. I t i s c l e a r that Jesus thinks of 
Himself as being i n a category d i s t i n c t from other men. Where 
He was, there He taught, s a l v a t i o n was. And He asks f o r devotion 
not to His teaching, not to a s e t of p r i n c i p l e s , but to His person. 
He c a l l e d men, not to martyrdom f o r a cause, but to s e r v i c e and 
s a c r i f i c e f o r His own sake and the Gospel's, and there were no l i m i t s 
to the devotion He claimed, a l l human r e l a t i o n s h i p s must be 
subordinated to the r e l a t i o n s h i p to Himself. C l e a r l y He thinks of 
Himself as standing between men and God, not with men before God. 
A l l t h i s i s expressed most c l e a r l y i n the crowning synoptic t e x t of 
Matthew 11:27 "No man knoweth the Son but the Father, n e i t h e r knoweth 
any man the Father but the Son, and he to whom the Son w i l l e t h to 
r e v e a l Him." Here i t i s c l e a r that Jesus i d e n t i f i e s Himself with the 
Son r e f e r r e d to, otherwise His own r e l a t i o n to such a Son must have 
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been part of His personal p i e t y and He confesses to no such 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . Thus He i s claiming f o r Himself, not only a uniqueness, 
but a f i n a l i t y , there i s no thought of another coming a f t e r Him to 
complete His work, the S p i r i t applies i t to i n d i v i d u a l s but the 
atoning redeeming work i s His alone and i s undertaken and f i n i s h e d 
by Him. Surely t h i s i s best explained as a claim to d i v i n i t y . 
Though, Forsyth suggests, perhaps i t was only a f t e r the great 
redeeming aclbs of death and r e s u r r e c t i o n were over that Jesus Himself 
was able f u l l y to understand i t s meaning. 
I n any case i f He was so quickly and so r a d i c a l l y misunderstood 
by His e a r l i e s t and c l o s e s t followers, His teaching could hardly 
have had the s i m p l i c i t y now being claimed f o r i t . This, claims 
Forsyjbh, should be enough to s i l e n c e t h i s p a r t i c u l a r objection, 
though i t leaves out of account any m i n i s t r y of the Holy S p i r i t 
to guide, and i f necessary to correct, the B i b l i c a l w r i t e r s , and the 
f a c t that the B i b l e has i n f a c t produced r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . We s h a l l 
return to these points when considering what Forsyth has to say 
about the authority of Scripture. 
At the moment we must pass on to another problem. I f i t i s 
granted that the authority of C h r i s t i a n i t y i s the authority of a 
redeemei* and i s only recognised by those who have experienced His 
redeeming a c t i v i t y , we must s t i l l go on to ask how. such people 
recognise t h i s authority when i t comes to them. What i s i t that 
makes, or allows, men to respond to i t ? Does there not have to 
be some "a p r i o r i " i n man which judges the r e v e l a t i o n , or some point 
of contact to which i t makes i t s appeal? And i f there i s , i s not 
t h i s "a p r i o r i " i n men the r e a l b a s i s of the authority, that which 
gives the r e v e l a t i o n i t s r i g h t to command? 
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Had Forsyth answered l e s to these questions he would have 
f a l l e n i n l i n e with those who began t h e i r thinking with "that 
e x c e l l e n t creature man" and h i s "higher a s p i r a t i o n s " . L i k e them 
he could have spoken of man's need to choose the highest when he 
sees i t . The notion of morality would have been present, and so 
would the Kantian i n s i s t e n c e on the "ought" of conscience; but 
the centre of g r a v i t y of h i s po s i t i o n would have been changed. 
Religion would have become j u s t another i n t e r e s t of humanity such 
as science a r t or e t h i c s , whereas he i n s i s t s that i t i s more a 
^natter of choice and freedom than these, i t i s l e s s a e s t h e t i c 
aid has i t s own authority. Religion, he writes, "... places us, 
as these other i n t e r e s t s do not, before an object where we are 
c h i e f l y concerned not with knowing, but with being known, not with our 
c e r t a i n t y of God but with God's c e r t a i n t y of us, which to share i s 
to own the Authority E t e r n a l . " (PA pl 6 7 ) . 
Nevertheless he allows the j u s t i c e of the demand f o r some form 
of "a p r i o r i " i n the sou l . But he maintains the Theocentricity 
of h i s argument by i n s i s t i n g that t h i s "a p r i o r i " i s found i n the 
region of the w i l l and not that of the i n t e l l e c t . This, a f t e r a l l , 
i s a l l of a piece with h i s v o l u n t a r i s t epistemology. Yet he refuses 
to lapse into i r r a t i o n a l i t y and to deny thought completely, 
'We think of God', he wr i t e s , nwe ente r t a i n the idea of God, as we 
think anything e l s e that i s reasonable. But what everything turns 
on for the t r u t h of the notion i s the discovery of a r i g h t and a 
claim i n i t .... Everything turns therefore on the decision with which 
our w i l l owns the claim s e t upon us by that idea i n i t s exigent t r u t h 
and r e a l i t y . " (PA pl 0 2 ) . Hence our response i s not bl i n d or 
mechanical, i t does involve a judgment, but "The v e r d i c t i s i n the 
response, not before i t . I t i s the v e r d i c t of the w i l l i n f a i t h , 
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not of i n t e l l i g e n c e . The v e r d i c t i s f a i t h , i t i s not a p r i o r 
condition of f a i t h . The judgment i s l a t e n t i n the a c t of f a i t h , 
i t does not precede i t . " (PA plU6). The "a p r i o r i " i n men does 
not judge the r e v e l a t i o n , but i s judged by i t , and recognises i t s 
judgment as j u s t . So we do not measure i t by the best i n man, 
but recognise i t as i t judges and redeems h i s worst. Once more 
Forsyth i s i n s i s t i n g on the e s s e n t i a l l y miraculous nature of 
r e v e l a t i o n . I t i s the approach to man of the God who i s the 
supreme moral r e a l i t y of the universe, and i n face of such an 
approach man i s i n no p o s i t i o n to c r i t i c i s e , argue or suggest terms. 
"My response", says Forsyth, " i s but to confess, obey, t r u s t and 
worship,, And i t is not e l i c i t e d , as i f i t were ray native best, but 
i t i s created i n me by the very power which reveals my worst. The 
supreme Authority of His grace creates a response of f a i t h which His 
holiness alone would awe and benumb. When a l l i s s a i d , the reason 
why we b e l i e v e i n the miracle of Grace i s a miracle. I t i s not 
of ourselves, i t i s the g i f t of God." (PA pl69). 
Thus the only "a p r i o r i " i n men which he i s w i l i n g to allow i s 
the existence of a responsible moral w i l l which i s able to acknowledge 
what i t ought to prefer even when i t i s unable a c t u a l l y to p r e f e r i t . 
The experience of conversion i s the acknowledgment at once both of 
judgment and forgiveness. Not acknowledgment of s i n from which one 
looks for forgiveness, nor a conception of the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
forgiveness which one can appraise c r i t i c a l l y with a view to 
accepting or r e j e c t i n g i t . The cross i s seen as the r e v e l a t i o n of 
both the majesty and the mercy of God, His goodness and s e v e r i t y a t 
once. We have returned again to the inexhaustible cross. 
There remains one f u r t h e r sphere, and that a very important one, 
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w i t h i n which we must consider the question of authority. We have 
seen that Forsyth i n s i s t s on the need f o r an o b j e c t i v e act of 
authority i n h i s t o r y ; now we must consider the r e l a t i o n between 
authority and the general idea of h i s t o r y . This was a question 
which the h i s t o r i c a l events of Forsyth's own l i f e - t i m e forced upon 
h i s attention with p e c u l i a r force. 
The question i s , i s there a meaning and purpose i n h i s t o r y 
or i s i t simply a b l i n d succession of meaningless events? I f there 
i s such a meaning and purpose, then that must be our authority and 
guide i f we are to l i v e happily i n h i s t o r y . But how are we to f i n d 
t h i s meaning, and what i s i t s r e l a t i o n to the Holy, the moral absolute 
a t the heart of things? Forsyth d e a l t with t h i s question on se v e r a l 
occasions, and h i s w r i t i n g on t h i s subject i s as relevant today as 
anything he ever wrote. 
He distinguished two methods of approach. F i r s t there i s the 
inductive method. Here one surveys the whole f i e l d of human h i s t o r y 
aid t r i e s to make judgments and assess values according to general 
d r i f t s . Secondly there i s what he r e f e r s to as "the method of 
valuation", here one takes a luminous point, or points, and uses i t , 
or them, to l i g h t up the vhole. 
I t was the f i r s t which was most popular i n h i s day. We have 
seen that the theory of evolution had been taken from i t s o r i g i n a l 
s c i e n t i f i c context and made into a general p r i n c i p l e of human progress. 
The Kingdom of God was looked upon as the goal of the ever mounting, 
ever advancing evolutionary trend, to the understanding of which the 
general s p i r i t u a l consciousness supplied the key. Thus the values 
which emerged from man's history, and which were seen to be able to 
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stand the t e s t of time, were the true ones. A l l that was needed was 
a s u f f i c i e n t l y d e t a i l e d study of the h i s t o r i c a l events to enable the 
beholder to see the general pattern and to e x t r a c t these values. 
The pattern to emerge, so i t was held, was one traceable to the 
workings of a moral providence. 
Forsyth did not completely r e j e c t t h i s approach. He described 
S c h i l l e r ' s phrase 'History i s the true c r i t i c i s m and l a s t judgment 
of the world 1 as • ... one of the most valuable g i f t s of l a s t century 
to the conception of h i s t o r y ..." (JG pl99). Such an outlook did 
e t h i c i s e h i s t o r y and introduce the element of judgment, and, i n i t s 
day, i t was a necessary protest i n the i n t e r e s t of moral realism 
against an other-worldly view of judgment. But, by i t s e l f i t was 
not enough. I t gave the impression that mere s u r v i v a l or e f f i c i e n c y 
i s the t e s t of r i g h t , that what survives i s good and that what f a i l s 
i s n e c e s s a r i l y e v i l or f a l s e . I t does not take account of the t r a g i c 
element i n h i s t o r y or of the genius misunderstood by h i s 
contemporaries. To these points Forsyth devotes considerable 
attention. For him i t was the recognition of the gravity of the 
human s i t u a t i o n , of the seriousness of s i n , which distinguished 
C h r i s t i a n i t y from the general modern at t i t u d e . Account has to be 
taken o£ man's moral f a i l u r e s and of the apparent triumph of e v i l 
a t so nany points. I t i s of no a v a i l to compare the amount of good 
and e v i l i n the l o r l i at any time, what i s needed i s to know which i s 
destined to win. 
Furthermore, though i t may be that i n h i s t o r y so f a r there appears 
to be a gradual triumph of the moral, t h i s , of i t s e l f , i s no 
guarantee that the future w i l l witness the same progress. I f t h i s 
method of empirical h i s t o r i c a l observation i s to y i e l d a true 
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p i c t u r e of h i s t o r y as a whole, from which conclusions are to be 
drawn concerning the power c o n t r o l l i n g i t , then at l e a s t i t must 
te demanded that the whole of h i s t o r y should be observed. C l e a r l y 
t h i s i s impossible. Man may study such h i s t o r y as has preceded 
h i s own l i f e , but he has no means of knowing what proportion of the 
whole i 3 there involved. Subsequent h i s t o r y may be much more 
extensive, and may show d i f f e r e n t general d r i f t s . 
I t was because he had himself taken account of the element of 
tragedy and s i n i n h i s t o r y and i n human nature, and had not 
followed the general l i n e applauding man's moral evolution, that 
Forsyth did not have to change h i s theology of h i s t o r y when .Europe 
was plunged into the f i r s t world war i n the summer of 19l!i. This 
catastrophe which served, or should have served, to sound the death 
k n e l l of much ' l i b e r a l ' theology, was merely a grim and t r a g i c 
v i n d i c a t i o n of h i s p o s i t i o n . He did not have to r e v i s e h i s teaching 
but simply to underline parts of i t . This he did i n h i s book 
"The J u s t i f i c a t i o n of God" (1917), s u b - t i t l e d "Lectures f o r War-time 
on a C h r i s t i a n Theodicy". Here he argues that we can not believe 
i n God because we can t r a c e the ways of His providence i n h i s t o r y . 
I t i s r a t h e r that because we are made to b e l i e v e i n God by some other 
means we accept His providence as an a r t i c l e of f a i t h and may see 
some evidence of i t from time to time. Such times, he argues, are 
the c r i s e s of h i s t o r y . For the man of f a i t h these are signs of 
God's judgment, they are to be expected, indeed i t would be more 
d i f f i c u l t f o r the C h r i s t i a n to explain t h e i r absence i f they did not 
occur than to account f o r t h e i r occurrence, but since judgment i s a 
sign of concern they can be taken as a source of comfort. However, 
without p r i o r f a i t h they are i n e x p l i c a b l e , and not only do they not 
provide grounds f o r f a i t h , but must, uninterpreted, l e a d to despair. 
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•We cannot", he writes, "discover a God of holy love i n the career 
of history so f a r as gone, nor i n the principles of a rational 
idealism; ... Our belief in God, historic as i t i s , i s a belief in 
spite of history. Those who draw their belief from God's treatment 
of them or their time must collapse in the black hour* (JG pl°2). 
Rather than trying to s i f t a meaning from an analysis of emgirical 
h i s t o r i c a l events Christian f a i t h asserts that meaning has been 
imposed upon history, and that this meaning i s given through the 
redemption effected by the cross. 
We see then that of the two methods mentioned e a r l i e r Forsyth 
has taken the second. He has taken a luminous point i n the light 
of which history i s viewed. This he claims i s necessary i f there 
i s to be any standard by which judgment of history i s to be made. 
I t i s also, and this i s more important, the B i b l i c a l method. The 
Bible sees history as a succession of saving crises or judgments 
(for salvation and judgment are seen as different sides of the 
same coin - cp. Rom l : 1 7 f ) , leading to the greatest c r i s i s of a l l 
the cross of Christ. In the cross, interpreted by the Apostles, 
i s the Christian teleology of history. Here we see the f i n a l triumph 
of God; and the f i n a l judgment of man's sinj for here the power of 
e v i l did i t s worst at the point where i t found God at His weakest 
±i Jesus the suffering servant, but i t was defeated. We have then 
a fact, or point, which i s both within history and the key to history, 
since i t i s the point where God has declared Himself and established 
His own reign for ever. 
From this point Forsyth goes on to enjoy himself i n propounding 
in different ways the paradoxical fact that the Last Judgment i s 
already past. I t i s not waiting in some distant future too far 
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away to cause concern; i t i s past, effected at Calvary. Yet i t i s 
not past i n the sense that we have no further need to worry about 
i t . I t i s past i n principle. The world has been judged and 
redeemed. Bnt this i s a fact v i s i b l e only to faith. The world 
goes on, man's pride s t i l l rules and i s s t i l l judged. Such judgment 
was present in the war, but this, terrible though i t was, and Forsyth 
saw the h o r r i f i c and tragic side as deeply as most, was no more than 
a particularly virulent manifestation of the e v i l that was always 
present i n man and in the world. "After a l l , the present cataclysm 
i s an acute condensation of what has been going on in nature, human 
and other, for milleniums. 8 (JG pl29). The Christian seeing i t a l l 
with the eye of faith, could accept i t as judgment and trust God i n 
spite of i t . 
R.M. Brown suggests that Forsyth's theology of history could 
almost be reduced to two B i b l i c a l assertions, 'We see not yet a l l 
things ... but we see Jesus' (Heb 2:8f) , and the words of Jesus, 
'Be of good cheer; I have overcome the world' (John 16:33). (R.M. 
Brown: P.T. Forsyth: Prophet for Today, plk9). While taking f u l l 
account of a l l that i s e v i l and unsatisfactory in world history and 
in the human situation - and i t should be emphasised here that 
Forsyth was never glib i n this respect, he never suggested that war 
was any l e s s e v i l because i t could be interpreted as divine judgment -
the Christian can s t i l l be of good cheer because Christ has overcome 
the world, and because his fai t h does not depend on history and 
cannot be shaken by i t . "With this security," says Forsyth, "we can 
s i t loosely to many anomalies which seem to rule God out of the 
course of things. Our fa i t h did not arise from the order of the 
worldj the world's convulsion, therefore, need not destroy i t . 
Rather i t rose from the sharpest c r i s i s , the greatest war, the 
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deadliest death, and the deepest grave the world ever knew - in 
Christ's Cross ... The Church i s not there to exhibit progress and 
i t s optism, but to reveal Christ and His regenerating power." 
(JG P57). 
Clearly this i s an evangelical view of history and the cross, 
not a philosophical answer to the problem of e v i l . l e t this i s 
what we should expect from Forsyth, i t i s of a piece with the rest 
of his theology. There are no complete and no easy answers, and 
Christian f a i t h i s no source of smug complacency. Such answers, 
or such underlying principles to answers, as there are, are 
revealed by God to those who are committed to Him i n faith, not 
to i n t e l l e c t ual spectators. The authority of grace must be known 
by experience in l i f e , not c r i t i c a l l y examined in a s p i r i t of 
philosophic detachment. However there are particular media by 
which this experience of authority comes, and certain spheres within 
which the experience normally takes place. We must now turn to 
examine these. 
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Forsyth deals with four organs or vehicles by means of which 
Christians may expectbthe authority of the Gospel to come to them -
Church, Bible, Reason and Experience. In each case he i s careful to 
i n s i s t that they are channels and only authoritative in so f a r as they 
make clear the Gospel of Grace. Their authority i s not their own, 
i t i s not resident i n them, i t i s rather the authority of a witness 
or a servant. He sees that so often in Christian history the 
qualified nature of this authority has not been clearly recognised, 
so that each one of these media has been taken as authoritative: 
in i t s e l f to the detriment of the Gospel. Thus on i t s "catholic" 
wing the church has been tempted to exalt i t s e l f and i t s traditions 
f i r s t to a position of equality with the Gospel, and then to a 
superiority over i t ; f a i t h in the church has replaced fa i t h i n the 
Gospel. Much protestantiSBi, on the other hand, has replaced an 
i n f a l l i b l e church by an i n f a l l i b l e book, and been led into an 
obscurantist Biblicism. On both sides Dogmatic Theology, whether 
i n the form of Thomist philosophy or Reformed Confessions of Faith, 
has given r i s e to a hidebound orthodoxy; and, as a protest against 
this P i e t i s t s and Evangelicals have over emphasised the value of 
the conversion experience. 
In the case of each of these Forsyth believes himself to be 
dealing with misunderstandings of proper organs of authority. His 
task therefore i s to show that i t i s the Gospel mediated through 
them which i s the f i n a l authority, not the organs themselves. But 
he realises that the exponents of these views do claim, to a greater 
or lesser extent, that they have to deal with an external objective 
authority. I t was not so with many others. 
There were many who believed that the Reformation had released 
i 
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them from any authority apart from their own private judgment and 
religious experience. To such people the appeal to reason was not 
an appeal to Christian thinking about revelation, and the appeal to 
experience was not to experience of Christj they were rather 
appeals to the enlightened modern i n t e l l e c t and sp i r i t u a l 
apprehension. Furthermore, they would claim that there was no 
warrant for saying that any man's opinion was of greater weight 
i 
than any other man's> this would be cramping to human freedom of 
thought and the "right" of the Individual. I f a higher judgment 
was ever needed i t could be reached by a democratic vote. Before 
proceeding to Forsyth's discussion of the organs of authority 
mentioned above, i t i s necessary to consider b r i e f l y his answer to 
this sort of argument. 
F i r s t he points out that a claim to this sort of freedom 
can not be based on the teaching of the Reformers; i t owes more 
to the Renaissance. The Liberty of the Christian Man i s a g i f t 
of Godj not a "right" of man, and i t i s the gift of a personal 
responsible freedom before God, not of unrestrained licence. I t 
i s freedom from an institution, the Roman idea of the church, but 
not freedom from God. "When Luther spoke of Christian freedom he 
had no idea of the rights of man or of classes. ... in the s t r i c t 
Christian sense religious l i b e r t y means freedom before God, i n God, 
•no condemnation', freedom of intercourse with God, unhampered by 
guilt and the demands of a law which God has now made His own charge 
and become responsible for i n Christ. I t i s the sonship of faith, 
the being at home, not i n society, but i n the Father's house and 
kingdom.n (FFF p200f). The Reformation was an appeal back to 
the Bible, and for the Bible man can never be completely free, he 
can only have freedom from one thing, and for another, and the 
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Christian i s free from sin and the law for the Gospel. 
Neither i s the Christian made free from the necessity of 
listening to the expert. 'The Reformation, i f i t destroyed the 
hierarchy of the Church, did not destroy the hierarchy of competency, 
sp i r i t u a l or i n t e l l e c t u a l . 1 (PA p283). The most ignorant believer 
i s free to confess his f a i t h and experience, but he i s not free, 
without training, to enter the region where preaching becomes 
•teaching, and confession of f a i t h becomes the theology of the 
Church. In this realm, as i n others, the amateur must make way 
for the s p e c i a l i s t and expert. He remains free to make himself an 
expert, but unti l he has done so he can not claim an equal weight for 
his own opinions as for the opinions of those who are expert. 
Forsyth obviously had a deep seated loathing for amateurs who 
dabbled i n theology. 
Secondly he argues (rightly or wrongly), that as a matter of 
hi s t o r i c a l fact democracy has flourished most under the influence 
of Calvin and his disciples. This i s because in the Calvinistic 
system authority has meant responsibility and order. The strong 
have been restrained, and the weak supported and given a limited 
freedom, based on a proper regard for authority. 
Thirdly, in part an extension of the l a s t point, he points out 
that authority i s necessary to progress, whether the progress of a 
child being trained for i t s place i n adult l i f e , or that of a 
nation which i s to make the best use of the f r u i t s of c i v i l i s a t i o n . 
At f i r s t the Tightness of the authority i s not seen and i t has to 
be accepted passively, but even when i t i s seen submission i s s t i l l 
required. Far from being an interference with the development of 
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free individual personality, as i t was charged with being, authority 
i s necessary for the development of moral personality in which 
freedom i s only one part. 
Similarly, authority was accused of hampering free thought. 
But Forsyth points out that thought i s rarely free, and that many who 
a s s a i l the tradition of the past do so as representatives of the 
inferior tradition called fashion. In fact those who ask for 
freedom so vehemently have not stopped to think what they are asking. 
"Nothing worse could happen to man than that he should be absolute 
lord of himself and a l l beside* (PA p322). He tends to see the 
current claim for freedom of thought and the "rights" of the 
individual as mere egoism, self assertion leading to the rule of the 
strongest or largest number. 
Thus, fourthly, he distrusts the appeal from the expert to the 
majority opinion i n any context, and considers i t completely out of 
place in the Church. The Church i s always wrong to think i n terms 
of publicity, vote catching and majorities. In spiritual matters 
•faere are points not open to public debate, matters to be faced which 
would not attract publicity or benefit by i t . But these matters are 
matters of revelation on whose truth the church depends. 
"Christianity i s not a religion of polity any more than a mere cult 
of conduct, tout i t i s a religion of truth, and of the kind of faith 
that involves truth: and i t s Church, as i t arose, so stands or f a l l s by 
some theology; which, being involved i n God's gif t of Himself in 
revelation, cannot depend on any majority." (PA p233). But, he 
goes on to ask, even i f there was to be a vote on some point of 
doctrine who would vote, and how would the value of the votes be 
assessed? Would any account be taken of the Christian dead, s t i l l 
I 
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members of the Church of Christ, and what would be the voting power 
of Christ Himself in such a poll? Of course such questions are 
merely rhetorical. As far as Forsyth was concerned such questions 
could not arise i n the Christian Church. "The Church i s not a 
democracy. I t s native s p i r i t i s not the s p i r i t of a democracy. 
I t s assemblies are not public meetings where each stands on his equal 
right. ... The Church i s a Theocracy. I t s gatherings are meetings 
of those who own a common worship and obedience. One stands in the 
midst, before whom our conscience has neither rights nor merits. 
He i s an absolute King, and not an elected president.' (CGS p73). 
But i t was the f i f t h point, the reference to revelation already 
hinted at above, which he f e l t must f i n a l l y silence the appeal to 
freedom and democracy. The state may be organised as a democracy 
because the state i s not bound by any past once-for-all event 
which makes i t what i t i s ; the church i s so bound. In the l a s t 
resort i t can never be a democracy for i t has an absolute King who 
not only claims the loyalty of his subjects, but who has re-made 
them for Himself as His own possession. Such was the claim of the 
Apostolic Christ, and the rejection of this Christ un-churched the 
group that made i t . 
In a rare personal aside Forsyth i l l u s t r a t e s this point. "An 
eminent but orthodox and puzzled Congregationalist layman once said 
to me that i f a Church became unanimous i n rejecting an historic 
Christ, or an apostolic Gospel, i n favour of "the s p i r i t of Christ," 
it was d i f f i c u l t to see how i t could be shown to have ceased to be 
Congregationalist. ... The answer was that i t had not ceased to be 
Congregationalist, as the Unitarians have not; i t had ceased to be 
a church." (PA p2h9). His point, the centrality of Christ the 
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Redeemer, i s clear, though he could have allowed that the assembly 
i n question remained a Congregationalist Church but not a Christian 
Church. This does not mean, as we shall see, that he allowed no 
variation of theological opinion on matters further from the centre, 
but he was clear that the act oif redemption was f i n a l and 
constitutive for Christianity. I t was thus an authority which could 
not f i n a l l y be questioned. He described i t as "... a Word that 
stands over the Church within i t ; and, so long as the Bible, with 
i t s creative record, i s not wiped from the historic consciousness of 
the race, i t stands fast i f every vote i n a church or council turned 
f a l s e . " (PA p2£lf). I t i s only as they express this Word that 
Church, Bible, Reason and Experience have authority, and we must now 
return from this digression to consider their authority. 
I t has become fashionable to speak of Forsyth as a High Churchman, 
indeed he himself wrote 0 Congregationalism at l e a s t i s High Church 
or nothing" (FFF p21f>). But "High Church" i s a vague and 
question-begging term, and the meaning which Forsyth would have 
intended, i n the context of a discussion on the relations between 
church and state, i s not always, indeed not oftem, intended by i t s 
general use. A good deal of exposition and qualification i s 
necessary before i t can be allowed to stand as a description of his 
doctrtoe of the Church. 
Certainly he considered the Church to be very important. He 
saw the creation of the Christian society to be, his t o r i c a l l y , the 
f i r s t result of the Work of Christ, and so he had no patience with 
those who thought of i t as a fraternity of philanthropists, or a 
club f o r the s p i r i t u a l l y minded. 'The great Church", he wrote, 
I s primarily the result of an act of God. I t i s primarily a divine 
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creation and not a voluntary association. I t i s not of man nor of 
the w i l l of man. I t was called and created by, a divine Act of the 
Holy, which i s continued by the Church i n a mystic Gospel of moral 
action, and not in a sacrament." (CS p60). Since i t i s this 
same divine act of the Holy which j u s t i f i e s man i t i s not surprising 
to find him continuing a few pages later, «To be i n Christ i s in the 
same act to be in the Church. Anything we do i n the way of joining 
the Church by a confession of fai t h i s only making explicit in the 
statement what i s already Implicit in the fact." (CS p62). So no 
Christian can ignore the Church or s i t loosely to i t . 
But i t i s also very important to see what Forsyth denies about 
the Church, since here he touches upon doctrines, or theories, upon 
which excessive claims for authority have frequently been made. He 
was not happy with the term "Body of Christ", though of course he 
acknowledged i t s scriptural nature, since i t s unqualified use by 
many representatives of the "catholic" wing of the Church did not 
do justice to the essential difference between Christ and the Church 
which i s kept in other, equally scriptural, metaphors, such as "The 
Bride of Christ". Forsyth always insisted that Christ was important 
for those things i n which He differed from us more than for those 
which He shared with us, and A.M. Hunter's comment "Call i t the 
Bride of Christ or the Body of Christ, i t was one as the vis-a-vis 
of the one Redeemer• (op. c i t . pl67), glosses over an important 
theological point. For the same: reason he w i l l not allow, the term 
"prolongation of the incarnation", either of the Church or of the 
Sacraments. I t obscures thfiijC fact that the Church i s a creaifcure 
and Christ i s not; more important i t leaves out the reciprocity of 
•foe relation between Christ and the Church which i s the result of 
moral regeneration, and obscures the finished nature of Christ's 
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work. He points out that at the incarnation Christ passed into a 
flesh d i s t i n c t from Himself, and at the proper time He l e f t i t and 
i t became a corpse. The Church i s distinct from this flesh in that 
i t i s capable of a moral reciprocity of which the incarnation body 
was noti I f i t i s argued that i t i s human nature i n i t s 
psychological sense that i s the Body of Christ this leaves but the 
need for a regeneration of human nature. The Christian Church 
consists of regenerated souls, but Christ himself needed no such 
regeneration. Further he will not allow that "... the c r i s i s of 
His death, resurrection and l i f e i n the S p i r i t made no greater change 
in human history than i s expressed in such a word as prolongation." 
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This i s not to b e l i t t l e the importance of the Church, but to 
attempt! to do justice to i t s origin and to i t s present relation to i t s 
Lord in virtue of which i t can s t i l l claim to be, i n a sense, His 
externalisation, "To express this second form of His outward 
presence, the Church, we need some other word than the prolongation 
of the Incarnation, and one that does more jus t i c e to the 
c r u c i a l i t y of the Cross and the r e a l i t y of the New Creation. ... 
Only by experience of Redemption has (the Church) a religious 
knowledge of what incarnation means. And i f the meaning of 
Incarnation i s only to be understood by the Church after passing 
through a moral c r i s i s , then i t s i n t r i n s i c nature must be moral; 
i.e. i t i s not continued in the Church as a process, but reflected 
by the Church as an act. The Church i s not the continuation of 
Christ,, but His creation and His response." (CS p8l-3). 
I f t his c r i t i c i s m be allowed to stand, then the Church cannot 
claim for i t s e l f and i t s own words the direct Authority of Christ. 
But there i s another way i n which this claim i s made, that i s by 
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recourse to the doctrine of Apostolic Succession, understood as the 
tactual transmission of grace by episcopal ordination. Forsyth 
denies the basis of this theory. The Apostles were unique, and, 
in any case, they did not claim to pass on any authority, or indeed 
to have any, apart from the Gospel which they preached. What they 
did leave behind them was the New Testament as a standard by which 
future preachers were to be judged. Forsyth i s not here 
c r i t i c i s i n g episcopacy as such. He sees i t as a possible means 
of Church government, but hot a necessary one and not one that can 
claim to be Apostolic, at lea s t not as i t i s generally understood. 
I t i s the New Testament which i s the real successor to the 
Apostolate. 
The Church therefore gets i t s authority, not from the Apostles 
direct, but from the Apostolic Gospel which i t holds in trust. 
This i s not to deny the authority of the Church, but rather to 
magnify i t by showing that i t i s not dependant on man but on the 
act of God, whose Sp i r i t activates and honours the preaching of the 
Gospel. However, there i s also a limiting of Church authority 
here, for the S p i r i t temains independent of the Church as Lord 
over it;, and i s free to work outside the normal sphere of Church 
influence. Failure to recognise this independence i s the chief 
heresy of Roman Catholicism. 
I t must also be recognised that the Church i t s e l f i s subject to 
the authority of the Gospel. No statement of the Church i s f i n a l 
and i n f a l l i b l e . Neither i s any period of Church History, even the 
sixteenth century, to be made normative. The Reformation was the 
recovery of the Gospel as a l i v i n g force, and the true heirs of the 
Reformation are not those who idolise Luther and Calvin and settle 
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down into Protestant Orthodoxy, but those i n every age who submit 
their Church l i f e to the criticism of the Gospel. "... the proper 
treatment of the Reformation i s to finish i t - to reform and complete 
i t . ... to-reform i t by i t s own i n t r i n s i c principle of fa i t h . We 
are but half way through the Reformation. So mighty was that 
conversion of Christianity, that second birth of the Gospel. 
Remember i t was in i t s nature the Church's reforming of i t s e l f . 
So i t goes on as the self-reformation of the reformed Church. 9 
(PPMM pl09). The Church could only claim to be i n f a l l i b l e i f the 
Gospel could be exhausted by doctrinal statements and f a i t h 
reduced to intellectual assent, as Rome claims. Where this i s done 
the personal element i s omitted or obscured and the Church, ias 
institution, has intruded between Christ and the individual soul 
and assumed the prerogative of Christ. The religion which results 
i s not truly called Christianity, 'For Christianity i s an absolutely 
personal fa i t h . That i s to say, we are judged and saved eternally 
not by our relation to the Church but by our relation to Christ the 
Redeemer. In the l a s t resort this Christ i s the authority to pur 
soul as directly as He i s to the Church. ... The function of the 
Church i s to introduce Christ and the soul, that He may do for that 
soul His work for every soulj i t takes no responsibility for the 
soul, which i s the prerogative of Christ alone 1 1 (PA p317). 
This centrality of the Gospel limits the Church also in i t s 
E l a t i o n to the state. To many in his own denomination and 
theological tradition Forsyth appeared to be inconsistent on this 
point. His insistence on Theocentricity seemed to many to point 
lo g i c a l l y to a Theocratic state. We have seen that to exponents of 
democracy in the Church he argues strongly that the Church i s 
Theocratic. But he does not extend this idea to cover the state. 
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Yet this i s quite consistent. The state i s certainly not beyond 
the control of God, and thus should not be beyond the concern of the 
Church. But the Church, as we have seen, consists of those who 
have responded i n fa i t h to the preaching of the Gospel. The 
ordinary citizen, qua citizen, has not, and though i t i s true that 
Christ died for him and that he too i s , i n principle, redeemed, 
he i s free i n his incalculable freedom to reject that redemption. 
In any case, he can not be made to see his redemption by despotic 
action of a church-state. " A l l talk of a theocracy which should 
draw the secular power under the s p i r i t u a l i s foreign both to the 
Gospel and to true Catholicism. The Church has been at i t s best 
when i t did not mix with p o l i t i c a l transactions i n the way of 
ruling prerogative or direct control. I t s true influence i s that 
of i t s apostolic Word and i t s moral character. When i t sought 
f i r s t the righteousness of the Kingdom i t had a l l that i t needed of 
other things in t a i l * (CS p78). 
But i f he had a low opinion of a church-state, he appears to 
have had an even lower one of a state-church. Even i n an attempt 
to maintain unity a state church appeared to him to be an anomaly. 
Whereas Rome was wrong to r e s t r i c t the freedom of the Holy S p i r i t 
to a professional hierarchy, an established church has gone further 
and sacrificed i t s autonomy to secular authorities, not 
necessarily even Christian. (This i s the Low-Church attitude 
which Forsyth c r i t i c i s e s ) . Against both of these he claimed that 
Non-Conformity, despite i t s mistakes, has neither usurped the 
authority of Christ for i t s own priesthood, nor relinquished i t s 
own proper authority to the state. I n this way i t has at l e a s t 
been i n a position to exercise i t s proper function towards the 
state, which i s not control, service or neutrality, but guidance. 
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He did not claim that i t had f u l f i l l e d this function. 
At this point i t must be noted that Forsyth always writes on 
this subject as i f the established church i s teetering towards i t s 
f a l l and cannot hope to survive for long, while the real hope for 
renewal of the Church iri England l i e s with a federation of Free 
Churches. The forty years since his death which have proved him 
so right in so much that he said which was unpopular i n his own day, 
have proved him no less decisively wrong in both of these 
pro gno s t i c a t ions. 
Though he does not allow the claims for the ministry which the 
•catholics" make, he was far from satisfied with the attitude to i t 
and to i t s authority which he found i n much popular protestantism. 
The minister was often reduced to a chairman, organiser, or leader 
in social functions. For Forsyth the true minister i s a 
sacramental man, equipped by the Sp i r i t and only recognised by the 
Church. His authority does not come from the Church but from the 
Gospel he preaches, the church merely provides the opportunity for 
this preaching. Though not of the Apostolic Succession through 
tactual transmission of grace, the preacher of the Gospel does 
stand in the true Apostolic Succession. "The Apostolic Succession 
i s the Evangelical succession. I t s continuity l i e s not i n a due 
devolution but i n a common inspiration, a common ministration of 
God's grace as mercy. I t i s (so to say) not a ve r t i c a l continuity 
descending i n a line, but a solidary, spreading through a raassj 
not a chain on which the Church i s hung, but a nervous system 
pervading i t and, by the Word, continually creating i t " 
(CS pl39f). 
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I t i s almost impossible to exaggerate the importance and 
authority which Forsyth gave to the ministry as a preaching ministry. 
For him preaching i s a sacramental act, indeed the sacramental act, 
and the whole of Christian history i s seen as a struggle between 
pulpit and altar , preacher and priest. "The f i r s t Apostles were 
neither priests nor bishops. They were preachers, missionaries, 
heralds of the Cross, and agents of the Gospel. The Apostolic 
succession i s the evangelical. I t i s with the preachers of the 
Word, and not with the prie s t l y operators of the work, or with i t s 
episcopal organisers. ... The sacrament which.gives value to a l l 
other sacraments i s the Sacrament of the li v i n g Word." (PPMM pU). 
This i s not to deny the value of the sacraments of Baptism and Holy 
Communion, indeed Forsyth valued both highly, but they arei merely 
tangible modes of conveying the Gospel which i s audible in 
preaching, and just because they are tangible and material they 
are open to misunderstanding and abuse, either being given 
superstitious reverence as possessing magical powers i n themselves, 
or being dismissed as mere symbols and ceremonies. In them the 
moral element can easily be obscured or l o s t . But the true 
sacrament i s i n holy personality. 
He develops this theme in relation to two "catholic" claims 
for the Mass. F i r s t , while denying the transubstantiation of 
the elements, he speaks of the transubstantiation of the person. 
True of every Christian man thi s should be true i n a special sense 
of the preacher. Such a claim, though emphatically not merely a 
play on words, has at least the appearance of a debating point -
and Forsyth delighted in the unusual use of words as well as i n 
the use of unusual words. But he goes on to claim that preaching 
i s , what the Mass claims to be, a reproduction of Christ's work, 
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or a part of the action of Christ. What he denied to the Church 
as an i n s t i t u t i o n , the continuation of the work of Christ, Forsyth 
asserts of the work of the preacher. 'The preacher, i n reproducing 
t h i s Gospel word of God, prolongs Christ's sacramental work. 
The r e a l presence of Christ c r u c i f i e d i s what makes preaching. ... 
We do not repeat or i m i t a t e t h a t Cross, on the one handj and we 
do not merely state i t , on the other. I t re-enacts i t s e l f i n us. 
God's l i v i n g word reproduces i t s e l f as a l i v i n g act." (FPMM pf>5). 
Thus, i n t h i s sense he would allow the same to the Church as a 
preacher or apostle, f o r he i s clear t h a t the ch i e f work o f the 
Church i s preaching. 
This then i s the a u t h o r i t y of the Church, and, f o r Forsyth, a 
very r e a l a u t h o r i t y . The a u t h o r i t y of the Gospel, an a u t h o r i t y 
which he feared the church of his own generation was i n grave danger 
of l o s i n g or of allowing to go by default. I t was l o s i n g i t 
because i t was looking f o r i t s a u t h o r i t y i n the wrong places and 
was expecting i t to be e f f e c t i v e i n a wrong way. I t was wrong f o r 
the Church to t r y to gain prestige f o r i t s e l f , even i f i t intended 
to use t h a t prestige i n a s o c i a l l y useful way. I t was also wrong 
f o r the Church to t r y to w i e l d an a u t h o r i t y which would change 
©cial or p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s . The Church was t r y i n g to be an 
au t h o r i t y f o r society without r e a l i s i n g what was the a u t h o r i t y f o r 
i t s e l f . For t h i s reason Forsyth i n s i s t s t h a t the Preacher's 
primary f u n c t i o n , and thus his f i r s t use of au t h o r i t y , i s to preach 
the Gospel to the Church. He does not deny t h a t there are other 
functions which a mi n i s t e r o f the Gospel should f u l f i l . He l i s t s 
three others, pastoral work, l i t u r g i c a l work and social and 
philanthropic work. I n these respects, especially i n the matter 
of worship, he saw t h a t there w.as a secondary a u t h o r i t y i n t r i e d 
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p r a c t i c e and custom. But he deprecated the f a c t t h a t so many 
preachers and so many churches were g e t t i n g so l o s t i n these things 
t h a t they were neglecting the f i r s t task o f preaching the gospel. 
He saw i t , therefore, as one of his own prophetic tasks to r e c a l l 
the Church to a proper use of i t s r e a l a u t h o r i t y , which involved 
r e c a l l i n g i t to i t s Charter - the Bible. 
To make an appeal f o r a re t u r n to the Bible at the time Forsyth 
made i t c a l l e d f o r some explanation; and especially when, as i n t h i s 
case, what was intended was a r e t u r n to the Apostle Paul. J.K. Mozley 
gives as the f i r s t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the theological climate o f the 
time i t s i n t e r e s t i n B i b l i c a l analysis, especially the "higher" 
c r i t i c i s m of the New Testament. (Expositor Feb 1922 p 6 7 f f ) . For 
generations the Bible had been taken as Word o f God without f u r t h e r 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n . The actual words of s c r i p t u r e , whether they were 
found i n l e g a l codes, the oracles o f prophets, the evangelists or the 
l e t t e r s of Apostles were taken as the actual words of God to the 
Christian reader. Such an approach had now been shown to be 
impossible and the pendulum had swung completely i n the opposite 
d i r e c t i o n . I t was now fashionable to see the Bible, especially the 
Old Testament, as no more than an i n t e r e s t i n g c o l l e c t i o n of 
documents i l l u s t r a t i v e o f man's s p i r i t u a l evolution. I t might be 
allowed t h a t the o r i g i n a l w r i t e r or speaker had some a u t h o r i t y f o r 
his own age, but he had none f o r the present; and i n any case i t 
was d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible, to f i n d out what his actual words 
were. The important t h i n g was the l i f e example and teaching of 
Jesus as found i n the synoptic gospels unencumbered by theology. 
As f o r Paul, when he was not r e v i l e d as a charlatan his work was 
dismissed as a perversion o f the simple gospel of Jesus, owing more 
to Greek mystery r e l i g i o n s than to the teaching of the prophet o f 
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Nazareth. We have touched b r i e f l y on Forsyth's a t t i t u d e to a l l 
t h i s before, now we must re t u r n to examine i t a l i t t l e more closely. 
F i r s t i t must be c l e a r l y stated t h a t Forsyth d i d not wish t o 
retu r n to the p r e - c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e to s c r i p t u r e . He d i d not 
believe i n the verbal inerrancy o f the Bible, and d i d not wish to 
"defend" i t against the attacks o f l i t e r a r y or h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m . 
I n f a c t he considered t h a t the r e s u l t s of such c r i t i c i s m were 
b e n e f i c i a l and l e d to a b e t t e r understanding of the Bible. 
•Modern scholarship", he wrote, 'has made of the Bible a new Book. 
I t has i n a c e r t a i n sense re-discovered i t . ... We have, through 
the labours of more than a century of the f i n e s t scholarship i n a l l 
the world, come to understand the Bible, i n i t s o r i g i n a l sense, 
as i t was never understood before." (WOC p33f). A.M. Hunter 
has shown tha t he was w e l l aware of the work th a t was being done, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the New Testament f i e l d , and th a t , on a number of 
points he had already a r r i v e d a t positions which were considered 
"modern" some t h i r t y years l a t e r , (op c i t pplU7ff). 
However, he d i f f e r e d from many of his contemporaries i n t h a t 
he d i d not regard the work of B i b l i c a l c r i t i c i s m as the main task 
of theology, though he hints i n one place t h a t i n his e a r l i e r years 
he had done so. (PPMM pl92). As f a r as he was concerned such 
work was never more than a "handmaid", a clearing o f the ground 
to make way f o r the work of dogmatics, and to help the preacher. 
The c r i t i c i s m of the actual t e x t o f the Bible did not, f o r him, 
a f f e c t i t s a u t h o r i t y , since he had never found i t s a u t h o r i t y i n 
the t e x t i t s e l f . He d i d not believe t h a t revelation came i n the 
form of a series o f propositions, thataras a Roman view. For him 
Bvelation was a personal disclosure of God i n action, i t was i n 
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f a c t the Gospel. I t was therefore beyond the scope of s c i e n t i f i c 
c r i t i c i s m o f the Bible, j u s t as the Gospel i t s e l f was an a u t h o r i t y 
beyond the Bible. So, as early as 1905, we f i n d him w r i t i n g 
"The Higher C r i t i c i s m has been a great blessing, but i t has gone 
too f a r alone, i . e . , without f i n a l reference to the highest, the 
synthetic standard of the Bible - the Gospel of Grace. What we 
need, to give us the r e a l h i s t o r i c contents of the Bible, i s not a 
History of the Religion of I s r a e l , but of Redemption - w i t h a l l 
the l i g h t the Higher C r i t i c i s m can shed on i t , and much more tha t 
i t cannot. 1 1 (COS p69). 
From t h i s i t might appear t h a t he regarded the Bible e i t h e r as 
merely the record of the Word of God, or as containing, but not 
i t s e l f being t h a t Word. Both of these views had t h e i r exponents, 
and i t i s not impossible to hold both together. I n f a c t , however, 
he took neither. For the f i r s t he argued t h a t the Bible was not 
a h i s t o r i c a l record and was not intended to be such a record. 
Even the Gospels, he asserts, were w r i t t e n "from f a i t h to f a i t h " , 
and are more i n the nature o f sermons than h i s t o r i c a l records. 
This i s why a biography of Jesus i n the normally accepted sense 
of the word i s not possible. As f o r the idea t h a t the Bible 
contained the Gospel, he argued t h a t i t would be more tr u e to 
reverse i t and say t h a t the Gospel contained the Bible. The 
Bible was not the f i n a l and complete r e v e l a t i o n , and thus the f i n a l 
a u t h o r i t y , of Godj but i t i s part.of t h a t r e v e l a t i o n and an 
essential p a r t , the r e v e l a t i o n i s not complete without i t . 
He was w i l l i n g to agree wi t h those who said t h a t the r e v e l a t i o n 
was Christ Himself, but he i n s i s t e d t h a t t h i s i s only t r u e i f i t 
refers to the whole Christ, not merely the pious teacher whom 
some found i n the synoptics. The whole Christ included the 
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Apostolic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , without which the h i s t o r i c a l Jesus i s 
i n e f f e c t i v e . Here, as elsewhere, he would f o l l o w Kant and accept 
the dictum th a t " f a c t , without i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i s b l i n d . " 
The Gospel, he pointed out, was preached by the Apostles 
before i t was w r i t t e n by the evangelists, and t h i s preaching was 
par t of the Gospel, i t was the d i v i n e l y i n s p i r e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of the t o t a l event of Jesus. The Gospels were w r i t t e n l a t e r to 
.support the preaching, not the preaching to explain the gospels. 
He argued t h a t i t i s quite beyond reasonable doubt t h a t Jesus 
promised His d i s c i p l e s f u r t h e r i l l u m i n a t i o n or exposition of the 
fac t s which they had witnessed, a f t e r His own death. Nor i s i t 
open to question, to an unbiased reader of the New Testament, th a t 
the Apostles believed themselves to be possessed of a special 
i n s p i r a t i o n by v i r t u e of which they were able to i n t e r p r e t the 
events of Jesus' l i f e and death to the church, or rather through 
which the r i s e n and ascended Christ was i n t e r p r e t i n g Himself. 
These things being so, to deny the a u t h o r i t y of the Apostles i s 
equivalent to saying t h a t Jesus f a i l e d to do what He had promised 
to do. I t i s also to deny the v e r d i c t of the New Testament 
Church, f o r there, c l e a r l y , the Apostles were accepted on t h e i r 
own estimate of themselves as men who stood w i t h God f a c i n g the 
Church, not with men fa c i n g God. 
But, i t i s necessary to go even f u r t h e r than t h i s . Just as 
the a u t h o r i t y of the Apostles cannot be denied, i t cannot be 
avoided or superseded. They d i d not merely c a l l a t t e n t i o n to 
experiences which they had enjoyed or theories which had seemed 
good to themselves. They claimed to be prolonging and completing 
the Gospel act by means of an a u t h o r i t a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
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They can not be treated, says Forsyth, i n the way the Samaritans 
treated the woman who had met Jesus at the w e l l (Johmkik2). 
Later ages can not claim t h a t they have had the same experience 
as the apostles, or tha t they have had other experiences or 
revelations which go beyond those o f the Apostles i n such a way 
as to leave the Apostolic teaching behind. The Apostles allowed 
t h a t the Church might grow i n t h e i r teaching, but they did not 
allow t h a t i t might grow out of i t . Their experience was not 
given them f o r t h e i r own s a n c t i f i c a t i o n or e d i f i c a t i o n , but i t was 
to be a u t h o r i t a t i v e f o r the Church f o r a l l time, t h e i r teaching 
and experience are included i n the Gospel f a c t as the experiences 
and teaching of l a t e r ages i s not. "This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e i r s , 
t h i s exposition o f Christ, was a p r o v i d e n t i a l , i n t e g r a l , and, we 
might say, polar part o f the action o f the t o t a l f a c t i t s e l f , and 
not a searchlight thrown on i t from without. Christ's f i n a l i t y 
functioned through the Apostles i n s e l f - d e s c r i p t i o n , as i t d i d not 
through the Fathers. "The Lord i s the S p i r i t " The whole 
revelationary act included the manifestation and i t s posthumous 
s e l f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n included them i n a polar u n i t y . The f a c t 
Christ could act only by having a c e r t a i n meaning, which was 
guaranteed as i t s own meaning by His own action i n the Apostles." 
(PA p01). Elsewhere the same view o f script u r e i s stated more 
succinctly, "The New Testament i s not the f i r s t stage of the 
evolution but the l a s t phase of the revelationary f a c t and deed." 
(PPJC pl52). 
This i s a view of sc r i p t u r e which i s f a i r l y f a m i l i a r today, 
but unusual when Forsyth stated i t . He d i d i n f a c t state i t many 
times. But he had i n i t strange inconsistencies. He d i d not 
assert, did not need to assert, t h a t every view o f the Apostles, 
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erery statement they made, was necessarily t r u e . The standard by 
which they are to be judged i s t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o the central theme 
of Redemption, whatever i s required by t h e i r preaching of redemption 
i s t o be accepted, but other matters, matters f u r t h e r from the 
centre, need not be accepted I n the same way. Clearly t h i s 
a t t i t u d e i s going to run i n to d i f f i c u l t i e s about what i s and what 
i s not required by the Apostles doctrine of Redemption, and who i s 
to decide? 
Forsyth himself i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s d i f f i c u l t y by reference to 
the question of the V i r g i n B i r t h . This, he argues, i s not an 
issue which can be s e t t l e d by the h i s t o r i c a l or l i t e r a r y c r i t i c s 
acting purely as c r i t i c s , "The r e a l settlement o f the question 
l i e s f a r t h e r w i t h i n t h e o l o g i c a l t e r r i t o r y . I t i s r e a l l y a, 
theological question and not a c r i t i c a l , ... The V i r g i n B i r t h i s 
not a necessity created by the i n t e g r i t y and i n f a l l i b i l i t y o f the 
B i b l e j i t i s a necessity created ( i f at a l l ) by the s o l i d a r i t y 
of the Gospel, and by the requirements o f grace. ... I f i t was 
essential to the perfect holiness o f Christ's redeeming obedience, 
... then i t must stand, whatever the c r i t i c s say. I am not here 
ca l l e d on to decide t h a t question. I only quote i t as an 
i l l u s t r a t i o n of method, to show what i s meant by saying t h a t there 
i s a dogmatic c r i t i c i s m o f the Bible higher than what i s c a l l e d 
the higher" (PPMM pl3f). Elsewhere however he does give decisions, 
deciding t h a t Paul was mistaken on anthropology, no doubt a reference 
to Romans 5 (PPJC pi55), and the nearness of the Parousia (PA pl32). 
I t i s clear t h a t he has i n mind Luther's dictum t h a t the Bible 
i s to be accepted as a u t h o r i t a t i v e as f a r as i t 'plies C h r i s t 1 , 
a phrase which he quotes on a number of occasions. However, he 
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c r i t i c i s e s Luther f o r h i s a t t i t u d e to the e p i s t l e o f James, saying 
t h a t Luther approached i t w i t h a pre-conceived idea of a Pauline 
Christ,. But i t could also be argued t h a t Forsyth has come to 
sc r i p t u r e w i t h his own view of what i s important. Many would 
argue today t h a t the Parousia i s a more important topic than 
Forsyth seems to allow, and, i f Paul was mistaken about i t , t h i s 
would be very embarrassing f o r Forsyth's view of the a u t h o r i t y o f 
sc r i p t u r e . 
He has a considerable defence against t h i s s o r t of c r i t i c i s m , 
or at l e a s t a standpoint from which to view i t , i n his view of the 
work of the Holy S p i r i t i n the appropriation of sc r i p t u r e by the 
believer. He i s aware t h a t many exalted the m i n i s t r y of the 
S p i r i t at the expense of the Word, and against such people he takes 
what he r e f e r s t o as a Lutheran, as opposed to a C a l v i n i s t , view 
of the r e l a t i o n between the two. He i s anxious to guard against 
the f a l s e mysticism which separates the two. This, he says, 
comes from Calvin. "Calvin keeps d i s t i n c t , though inseparable, 
the e f f e c t of the i n s p i r e d Word and the complementary action of the 
S p i r i t as r e a l l y decisive, t r u l y inward, and heart-opening. 
The l a t t e r i s something added to the former rather than produced 
by i t . " (FFF p39). From t h i s point of view i t i s possible 
to speak of a second r e v e l a t i o n to the i n d i v i d u a l , separate from 
the Word. He i s keen to say tha t Calvin himself d i d not f a l l 
i n t o t h i s e r r o r , but he d i d make i t possible f o r others to do so. 
Luther, on the other hand, makes the i n t e r n a l witness of the 
S p i r i t more organic and immanent to the Word. "The action of 
the S p i r i t i s immediate to the soul yet not unmediated by the 
Word. The S p i r i t when He had set the Word down i n h i s t o r y 
d i d not abdicate f o r i t and i t s r i c h posthumous e f f e c t s . He i s 
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sLways there, personally w i t h and over i t . " (FPF p29f). I t i s 
as i t has t h i s present s e l f - a u t h e n t i c a t i n g witness of the S p i r i t 
working w i t h i n i t t h a t s c r i p t u r e has a present a u t h o r i t y f o r us. 
From t h i s i t i s easier t o see why he i s so fond of the term 
sacramental i n r e l a t i o n i to s c r i p t u r e , and can take so apparently 
cavalier an a t t i t u d e to the actual h i s t o r i c a l accuracy of the 
documents. I t i s undoubtedly true t h a t i n the l a s t resort the 
a u t h o r i t y o f s c r i p t u r e cannot be proved from h i s t o r i c a l methods, 
i t must be e x i s t e n t i a l l y s e l f authenticating; to the reader, and 
an a t t i t u d e o f f a i t h i s needed i n approaching i t . However, 
even when t h i s has been allowed, Forsyth ^sometimes uses extreme 
language i n speaking of his in d i f f e r e n c e to h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m . 
Ultimately C h r i s t i a n i t y must r e s t on f a c t s . Forsyth, of course, 
saw t h i s and believed t h a t the h i s t o r i c a l evidence was strong, 
so t h a t he d i d not have to go so f a r wi t h h i s h i s t o r i c a l 
scepticism as he said he would be w i l l i n g to go. Probably had 
he not been so sure of the h i s t o r y , he would have been less 
emphatic i n denying i t s value. 
This c r i t i c i s m notwithstanding, i t i s clear t h a t Forsyth gave 
to the Bible , or rather saw i n the Bible, a very high a u t h o r i t y 
jadeed. I t was a part of the Gospel which was the f i n a l 
a u t h o r i t y . I n practice i t i s clear t h a t he valued i t highly. 
He bemoaned the decay of devotional Bible reading by the l a i t y 
and urged i t strongly upon the m i n i s t r y . Speaking to men 
preparing f o r the m i n i s t r y he said " I do not believe i n verbal 
i n s p i r a t i o n . I am with the c r i t i c s I n p r i n c i p l e . But the 
true m i n i s t e r ought to f i n d the words and phrases of the Bible so f u l l 
of s p i r i t u a l food and f e l i c i t y t h a t he has some d i f f i c u l t y i n not 
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b e l i e v i n g i n verbal i n s p i r a t i o n . " (PPMM p26). F i n a l l y , h i s 
views on t h i s subject are probably best expressed i n the w e l l 
known passage i n which he speaks of his own experience o f Bible 
reading, * I read the story of the Father who beseeches Christ to 
heal h i s son. I hear the answer of the Lord, " I w i l l come down 
and heal him." "HimI" That means me. The words are l i f e to 
my distempered soul. I care l i t t l e f o r them (when I need them 
most) as a h i s t o r i c i ncident of the long past, and element i n the 
discussion of miracles. They do not serve t h e i r d i v i n e s t 
purpose t i l l they come to me as they came to t h a t f a t h e r . They 
(come w i t h a promise here and now. ... I do not ask the c r i t i c s 
f o r assurance t h a t the incident took place exactly as recorded. 
I w i l l t a l k of t h a t when I am healed. I t i s a question f o r 
those who are t r y i n g to frame a biography of Jesus, or discussing 
the matter of miracles. ... I was not i n the thought o f Jesus 
when He spoke themj neither was I i n His thought upon the cross. 
But by the witness of the S p i r i t to my f a i t h they come, as i f they 
were said to no one else. I was i n His Gospel. They come to 
me as they are i n God. And I l i v e on them f o r long. And the 
Bible i s precious f o r t h e i r sake. And I wait by t h e i r hope, 
and i n the strength of t h e i r l i f e I go many nights and days t i l l 
I come to another mount of God, and the same Gospel speaks and 
restores me from another holy h i l l " (CGS pl27). 
Turning now t o his views on the a u t h o r i t y of reason, or of 
theology, we f i n d two s u p e r f i c i a l l y opposed strands i n h i s w r i t i n g s . 
On the one hand there are passages where he appears to deprecate 
reason and the pu r s u i t of Theology and i n s i s t s on the primacy 
of the experience of redemption i n a way t h a t leaves a l l else out 
of account. But elsewhere he speaks very highly o f Theology, 
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i n s i s t i n g t h a t i t i s a necessity f o r the Church and severely 
c r i t i c i s i n g those who are i n d i f f e r e n t to i t , or who take an h o s t i l e 
a t t i t u d e t o i t as useless word-chopping keeping the church from 
i t s proper task. I n f a c t he i s not being inconsistent i n h i s 
thought, though he i s i n his language. I t i s necessary f i r s t to 
see t h a t he uses the word "Theology" i n two d i s t i n c t senses, so 
that i n f a c t he distinguishes i n practice between good and bad 
Theology. Secondly, i t i s necessary to see t h a t even good 
theology has no f i n a l a u t h o r i t y of i t s own. Like the Church and 
the Bible i t only has the a u t h o r i t y of a witness to the Gospel. 
The theology which he c r i t i c i s e d was t h a t which began from 
man and sought to explain everything i n r a t i o n a l terms, ending 
wit h a p e r f e c t l y consistent and coherent monistic system. Such 
an approach owed more to Hegel than to the Bib l e . I t d i d not 
take account of the f a c t s of the case, either o f man's sinfulness 
or of the grace of God i n redemption. I t reduced Theology to a 
deductive system, the ex p l i c a t i o n of an idea. The r e s u l t might 
w e l l be an admirable i n t e l l e c t u a l system but i t would not, i n 
Forsyth's judgment, be true Christian Theology because i t was not 
based on r e a l r e l i g i o n , saving f a i t h , and d i d not set i t s compass 
by the Cross. 
Here as elsewhere Forsyth begins from the experience o f 
ademption, "Our theol o g i c a l c a p i t a l " , he w r i t e s , " i s not ideas 
we a r r i v e at but experience we go through ...» (PA p93). Theology 
was not meant to be used as a means of proof but rather as an 
account of f a i t h . He defined i t as "... the i n t e l l i g i b l e content, 
the i n e v i t a b l e statement (spreading out to the elaborate 
exposition), of the act and person given i n a h i s t o r i c r e v e l a t i o n " 
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(PA 212). I t was imperative t h a t i t should not be cut away 
from t h i s h i s t o r i c base. Understood i n t h i s way theology i s a 
necessary f u n c t i o n o f the church, so necessary t h a t r e l i g i o u s 
c e r t a i n t y i s not possible without i t . I n other words i t i s 
necessary to go beyond mere confession of personal f a i t h i n the 
"testimony meeting" t o make some attempt at i t s e x p l i c a t i o n . 
"Theology", he says, * i s the expression or the exposition of the 
Church's fundamental consciousness of what makes the Church the 
Church. And the Church's c e r t a i n t y i s c e r t a i n t y of i t s theology, 
and not of something else by the remote aid of i t s theology. 
I t i s c e r t a i n t y of salvation - a word which has no meaning but a 
theolo g i c a l one f o r the soul." (PA p3l4-f>). I n t h i s expression 
of f a i t h the church would n a t u r a l l y c a l l upon i t s experience, 
but i t would not be l i m i t e d to i t . Theology must go beyond 
subjective experience, even the experience of redemption, to the 
objective f a c t s i n which t h a t experience i s grounded. 
I t i s important to notice t h a t here Forsyth i s speaking o f the 
Church. I t i s the Church th a t must have a theology, not 
necessarily the i n d i v i d u a l believer. Theology belongs to the 
Church, i t i s the Church's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 'With p r i v a t e members 
of a Church i t does not much matter whether they have a theology 
or not, so long as they are respectful to those who do. I t does 
not matter whether Messrs. X, T or Z, have a theology or not -
except i n so f a r as they may cease to be merely Messrs. X, I 
or Z, and become teachers of the Church, use i t s prestige, and 
voice i t s Gospel" (PA pZlk). This raises the question of what 
i s meant by asking Messrs. X, I , and Z to be respectful to the 
experts. I t would presumably be possible to r e s p e c t f u l l y 
disagree with the experts, to refuse to accept t h e i r opinions. 
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tould t h i s put Messrs. X, Y, and Z outside the Church? 
I t seems here th a t Forsyth i s i n danger of going back to the 
o l d Orthodoxy, which, as we s h a l l see l a t e r , he greatly admitted, 
and demanding assent to c e r t a i n d o c t r i n a l propositions as a 
condition o f Church membership. However he d i d not do so. He 
saw here the danger of giv i n g way to the "cat h o l i c " tendency, 
present also i n Protestantism, and obscuring the Gospel. Yet he 
cannot allow t h a t Messrs. X, Y and Z, are free to concoct t h e i r 
own version of C h r i s t i a n i t y . What he does i s to d i s t i n g u i s h 
between primary and secondary l e v e l s of theology. Primary 
theology i s the basic fundamental statement of the h i s t o r i c 
r e v e l a t i o n , while secondary theology i s the exposition of t h i s 
fundamental statement i n d i f f e r e n t terms according t o d i f f e r e n t 
h i s t o r i c a l , c u l t u r a l , or i n t e l l e c t u a l frameworks, (see PA p213n). 
Later he developed t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n and spoke of three d i f f e r e n t 
l e v e l s of b e l i e f , which he refe r r e d to as Dogma, Doctrine, and 
Theology. 
Dogma i s the most basic of the three. I t i s the i r r e d u c i b l e 
minimum of b e l i e f , the b e l i e f t h a t i n the cross of Christ God acted 
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i n such a way as to reconcile the world to Himself and tha t 
Christian b e l i e f i s the reception o f t h i s by the i n d i v i d u a l . 
R.M. Brown has suggested t h a t the word "Kerygma" i s the nearest 
equivalent i n modern theological language to what Forsyth has i n 
mind by Dogma, (op c i t pU5). Shading o f f from t h i s i r r e d u c i b l e 
minimum, are Doctrine, which i s a more s c i e n t i f i c elaboration of 
Dogma, and Theology, which i s a more t e n t a t i v e groping towards 
Doctrine. Of these three he believes that adherence to the f i r s t , 
Dogma, should be made a condition of Church membership. Doctrine 
i 
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i s the corporate possession of the Church, while Theology may be 
practised by an i n d i v i d u a l . I t i s possible t h a t i n the p r a c t i c e 
of the t h i r d the i n d i v i d u a l may stray from the accepted paths of 
orthodoxy, but there i s room I n the Church "... f o r a heterodoxy 
which yet maintained the evangelical c o n t i n u i t y , and which declared 
the r e a l i t y of a h i s t o r i c and moral redemption of the race i n 
the Cross of C h r i s t ' (PA p220). 
I t i s clear from t h i s t h a t he has moved a long way from the 
o l d orthodoxy and i t s t a l k o f saving t r u t h s . Indeed he goes so 
f a r as to say •There i s then no a u t h o r i t y f o r mere theological 
knowledge or statement. There are doctrines of salvation, 
but no saving doctrines. I n a s t r i c t use of words, there i s no 
such t h i n g as saving t r u t h " (£$& 17 1905 p68). But i t i s also clear 
t h a t he i s not w i l l i n g to relapse i n t o the vague creedlessness th a t 
i s the bane o f his denomination. He i n s i s t s t h a t i t does matter 
what a man believes, and t h a t some confession of the Apostolic 
f a i t h i s essential f o r Church membership. 
He c e r t a i n l y has no objection i n p r i n c i p l e to the idea of a 
c reed, but he c r i t i c i s e s the so called Catholic creeds f o r being 
unbalanced. He.often speaks of the need f o r a creed which w i l l be 
b u i l t around the act of redemption and which w i l l makes that c e n t r a l . 
I t i s from t h i s p o s i t i o n t h a t he c r i t i c i s e s the three t r a d i t i o n a l 
creeds. The Athanasian Creed does not mention redemption and 
forgiveness at a l l ; the Nicene Creed mentions the remission of sins 
l a t e and i n a passing way, and so does the Apostles Creed. 
H i s t o r i c a l l y considered t h i s i s q u i t e understandable. The early 
creeds were drawn up more as a defence against heresy than as an 
attempt to proclaim the t r u t h , and i t was i n respect of the 
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aoctrir.es of the T r i n i t y and the Person of Christ, rather than 
the Work o f Christ, t h a t such defence was needed. I t could even 
be argued t h a t the very paucity of references to redemption and 
forgiveness i s testimony to the f a c t t h a t the early church was 
agreed o n i t h e i r importance. But Forsyth i s concerned, not 
wi t h the h i s t o r y of the matter, but w i t h t h e i r present usefulness 
and the place which they give, or rather f a i l to give, to the 
i r r e d u c i b l e minimum of b e l i e f which he refers to as Dogma. 
Bora t h i s point o f view he pours scorn on them, "What wonder t h a t 
the moral a u t h o r i t y of the church has proved such an unstable 
t h i n g i n the course of h i s t o r y when her ecumenical symbols 
not only do not s t a r t from the r e a l source of a u t h o r i t y i n 
C h r i s t i a n i t y , but scarcely allude to i t . I mean, of course, 
redeeming grace. I t was i n e v i t a b l e , i f C h r i s t i a n i t y was to 
survive, t h a t these archaic symbols, w i t h t h e i r tremendous 
missing of the Christian p o i n t , should be replaced by the profound 
and accurate Evangelical Confessions of the Reformation" (CGS pl2U). 
I t i s not that he wishes to re - i n s t a t e these Confessions, but he 
i s sure t h a t they have pierced to the heart o f the matter i n a way 
i n which the creeds have not. The task of the theologian i s 
to do f o r his own day what these Confessions d i d f o r t h e i r s . 
And i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t of course th a t they should be ca l l e d 
Confessions. For Forsyth, as f o r the Reformers, the task of 
theology i s to confess the Apostolic Christ, i t i s only as they 
do t h i s t h a t t h e o l o g i c a l statements have any a u t h o r i t y f o r 
the Church. 
His stress on the experience of redemption might lead us to 
expect th a t he would make the f o u r t h a l t e r n a t i v e , r e l i g i o u s 
experience, the chief media o f aut h o r i t y , and, i n a sense, he does. 
i 
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He welcomed the powerful movement which was current i n his time 
to appeal to the a u t h o r i t y of experience rather than to the more 
s t a t i c a u t h o r i t y of Church, Bible o r Confessions. He saw i t as 
an immense step forward and described Schleiermacher, to whom 
above a l l the movement was indebted f o r i t s o r i g i n , as 'the great 
regenerative genius o f modern theology'. I n the realm of 
Christian experience a l l are laymen, and Forsyth r e j o i c e d i n the 
thought t h a t the simplest believer had an equal r i g h t to speak on 
the c e n t r a l issue of C h r i s t i a n i t y as the most able and 
sophisticated theologian. 
l e t as early as 1906 he saw the dangers of r e l y i n g on mere 
r e l i g i o u s experience as a f i n a l a u t h o r i t y . I n tha t year he t o l d 
his f e l l o w Free Churchmen, •There are many who f e e l t h a t the 
Churches most dominated by the experimental method, though they 
have gained i n force, are not gaining t o the same extent i n the 
power which sustains the force. They can carry an e l e c t i o n w i t h 
men easier than r e s t i n an e l e c t i o n of God ... The inner c e r t a i n t y 
i s not what i t was. The objective s e c u r i t y i s not what i s was. 
The note o f a u t h o r i t y i s not what i t was." (The Place o f 
S p i r i t u a l Experience i n the making o f Theology; a paper read t o the 
National Council o f the Evangelical Free Churches at Birmingham, 
as reported i n "The Christian World P u l p i t " , 21st March 1906, 
published HON p68ff). Later i n the same paper he speaks of the 
need to correct Schleiermacher by R i t s c b l , and, years l a t e r , we 
f i n d Mm correcting R i t s c h l also. He never retracted h i s own 
stress on experience, but he d i d q u a l i f y i t considerably. 
Part o f his c r i t i c i s m of those who asked f o r assent to 
do c t r i n a l statements as a condition f o r Church membership was t h a t 
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they were making C h r i s t i a n i t y both too i n t e l l e c t u a l and too easy. 
A man might be able t o handle doctrine, even the doctrine of 
redemption, w i t h great s k i l l but never know the meaning of i t f o r 
himself. Perhaps Forsyth remembered tha t he had been such a man 
i n his e a r l i e r years. Actual experience of redemption involved 
a f a r more rigorous struggle, and at a f a r deeper l e v e l o f 
experience, than d i d i n t e l l e c t u a l understanding of theories o f 
the atonement. I t was because o f the emphasis which he wished to 
place on t h i s element o f personal conviction and inner struggle 
t h a t Forsyth welcomed the increased a t t e n t i o n being paid to 
experimental theology, and not because he saw the experience i t s e l f 
as being a u t h o r i t a t i v e . 
As has been explained e a r l i e r , Forsyth emphasised the content 
rather than the mere f a c t of r e l i g i o u s experience. And i t was on 
t h i s p o i n t t h a t he wanted to c r i t i c i s e many who appealed t o the 
experience i t s e l f . He saw many deficiencies i n t h i s l a t t e r view. 
I n the f i r s t place there was the danger of beginning from "that 
excellent creature man", and making his experience the f i n a l 
a u t h o r i t y or judgment bar at which the Gospel was t r i e d . This 
would be to forget t h a t man's r e l i g i o u s experience i s subject to s i n 
wi t h the r e s t of his nature. There must be no suggestion of the 
experience being an a r b i t e r over the claim of the Gospel. 
•Experience i n t h i s region does not mean a p r i o r standard i n us by 
which we accept or r e j e c t the Gospel's claims. I t does not mean 
that the Gospel submits to be t r i e d by the code we have put 
together from our previous experience o f nat u r a l things, even i n 
the r e l i g i o u s sphere I t creates assent rather than accepts 
i t . " (PA P333). 
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An even worse danger i s that the experience might d r i f t away 
irom the h i s t o r i c base of rev e l a t i o n a l l together. One would 
then f i n d , as was current i n Forsyth's day, a general appeal to a l l 
the vaguely s p i r i t u a l emotions of the ages, where a l l t a l k of 
f i n a l i t y was dismissed as i n t o l e r a n t and outmoded dogmatism. 
Such an appeal might appear very urbane, s o p h i s t i c a t e d , and 
l i b e r a l , but i t could not, as Forsyth saw and as the f i r s t world 
war was t o prove, sustain those who held i t i n times of tragedy. 
I t was an a t t i t u d e which a man might hold, but i t could not hold 
a man, much less a church. The r e l i g i o u s experience which 
Forsyth advocated was d i s t i n c t i v e l y Christian experience, based 
on r e v e l a t i o n . Even here he had to go f u r t h e r and i n s i s t t h a t 
the r e v e l a t i o n meant redemption and not mere pious impression. 
With these very necessary q u a l i f i c a t i o n s we can assert t h a t 
f o r Forsyth a u t h o r i t y came i n experience. I t was not drawn by 
deductive reasoning from the experience, nor d i d the experience 
coming l a t e r corroborate a claim to a u t h o r i t y which had been 
recognised e a r l i e r , but the a u t h o r i t y came i n the experience. 
The experience i n question i s a moral experience of the whole 
man i n which his whole being i s c a l l e d i n t o question and he i s 
wholly committed i n a venture of f a i t h . I t i s not an experience 
iWhibh comes to order to the dabblers i n mysticism, or to the 
impressionable who are seeking a comfortable f e e l i n g of 
e x a l t a t i o n or i n s p i r a t i o n from a consideration of the grandeur 
of the h i l l s or the broad expanse of the ocean. I t comes to 
those who are i n earnest, and i t comes as a converting over-
mastering consciousness of having been re-created, re-born. 
He does not say tha t t h i s experience must come quickly, i n 
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a way t h a t can be dated, i n what i s known as a " c r i s i s " conversion. 
Indeed he sometimes appears to be doubtful about the permanence of 
such conversions, and c r i t i c i s e s those who t r y to forde "decisions" 
f o r Christ. But he c l e a r l y regards the experience i t s e l f , 
however i t comes, as a necessity f o r any r e a l l y deep understanding 
of C h r i s t i a n i t y . That there are those i n the church who have 
never had such an experience he admits, and he does not suggest 
t h a t they should be un-churched or t h a t they are not Christians, 
but he i n s i s t s t h a t t h e i r grasp on the f a i t h i s less secure, and 
t h e i r p r a c t i c a l usefulness to others i s much le s s , than t h a t of 
those vho have reached Christian m a t u r i t y by a long and deep 
struggle. On the difference between the two types he w r i t e s , 
•There are men and women whose f a i t h from t h e i r early years i s 
simple, ready, and sure. They are not the victims of a deadly 
struggle. I t i s not t h e i r s to clear a path w i t h s p i r i t u a l agony 
from darkness i n t o l i g h t , and r i s e from despair i n t o f a i t h and hope. 
But t h a t i s the heavy destiny of many another, who only comes to 
the s i m p l i c i t y of t r u s t i n his l a t e r years, and only gains the 
peace of confident love a f t e r he has been exercised and 
strengthened by the searching c o n f l i c t of many a s p i r i t u a l f i g h t 
I s the f a i t h of the twice-born worth no more than t h a t of the 
once-born? Surely no. He who has fought_his way to l i g h t has 
a grasp and sinew denied to the other's gentle t r u s t , and a power 
to l i f t others to his side. He knows the ground he has 
t r a v e l l e d w i t h armed v i g i l a n c e as the cheery t r a v e l l e r does not. 
He has a power of sympathy w i t h other serious wayfarers which i s 
absent i n those to whom the burden was l i g h t . And to the f a i t h 
of the warrior a whole world of deep significance and r i c h 
association l i e s open, where the more c h i l d l i k e mood f e e l s but 
a vague s p i r i t u a l presence and a dim sense of voiceless balmy 
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breath; f l (CP p83). The r e s u l t , or reward, of the struggle i s 
an experience of life-change, and to the one who has experienced 
i t i t i s the t r u e s t t h i n g he can know. 
Once more, then, we are driven back to the Gospel of God's 
Grace as the f i n a l a u t h o r i t y . I t i s mediated through the Church, 
the Bible, t h e o l o g i c a l Confessions and Christian Experience, 
but i t i s not dependent on any of these things f o r i t s v a l i d i t y . 
I t s essential nature, as Forsyth never t i r e s of asserting, i s 
miraculous. I t comes to man by revel a t i o n , and i t s objective 
source i s the inexhaustible Cross of Christ. 
I l l 
I t i s a standard c r i t i c i s m of a theological p o s i t i o n which 
stresses grace, s i n , and the sovereignty of God t h a t i t provides 
f o r personal salvation but not f o r any social e t h i c . I t i s apt, 
say i t s c r i t i c s , to provide plenty o f i n t e l l e c t u a l excitement and 
st i m u l a t i o n f o r those who l i k e i t , and can f o l l o w i t , but i t 
provides no guidance i n the p r a c t i c a l business of l i v i n g C h r i s t i a n l y 
i n t h i s present world. While i t may be very w e l l to c r i t i c i s e 
the vague i d e a l i s t s , s o c i a l reformers and mere p h i l a n t h r o p i s t s f o r 
having no adequate; theo l o g i c a l basis f o r t h e i r p o s i t i o n , i t i s also 
necessary f o r those who make t h i s c r i t i c i s m to show tha t t h e i r own 
more l o f t y theological p o s i t i o n gives some d i r e c t i o n and guidance 
f o r s o c ial action. I f they cannot do so, and must relapse i n t o 
e t h i c a l quietism, they can hardly expect much of an audience from 
those who are t r y i n g to come to grips w i t h the actual human and 
s o c i a l problems which are the concrete evidence of t h a t state o f 
sin about which the neo-orthodox theologian can theorise i n calm 
academic detachment. 
Forsyth, however, was not an academic recluse. Furthermore 
he had personal experience of the pathetic circumstances i n which 
many of his fel l o w s l i v e d . His own home background had been poor. 
Since then he had been pastor to f i v e d i f f e r e n t congregations, no 
doubt meeting the normal s o c i a l and e t h i c a l problems o f the day, 
aid when he went i n t o academic l i f e there i s no reason to suppose 
t h a t he f o r g o t h i s past or l o s t i n t e r e s t i n p r a c t i c a l social and 
e t h i c a l problems. Speaking as chairman of the Congregational 
Union of England and Wales, the highest p o s i t i o n his denomination 
could o f f e r , he was able to say, 'Do not take my arm and lead me 
away to the dwellings of the pound-a-weeks and the nothing-a-weeks 
and t e l l me i f I want r e a l i t i e s to consider there. Long ago I 
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was there, and worked there, and considered there, and have been 
considering ever sin c e . 9 (CGS p96). I t i s necessary f o r us to 
t r y to f i n d out some of the r e s u l t s o f t h i s considering, f o r ethics 
i s , i n a sense, the reverse side of aut h o r i t y . 
Christian ethics as a d i s t i n c t d i s c i p l i n e i n i t s own r i g h t 
i s not de a l t with i n Forsyth's w r i t i n g . There i s a book on 
Marriage, another on Socialism, and a number of a r t i c l e s and 
sermons on r e l a t e d subjects, but there i s no systematic work on 
Christian Ethics or attempt to give a b l u e - p r i n t f o r a Christian 
Society. This i s p a r t l y due to the generally "ad hoc" nature of 
his w r i t i n g . Most of his books began as series of lectures 
given f o r a special purpose. He never wrote or attempted a 
Church Dogmatics, though i f he had done so there would doubtless 
have been a section on t h i s subject. I t i s also due to the f a c t 
t h a t he d i d not believe i t was possible t o speak of ethics without 
theology. For him ethics had to be theol o g i c a l or nothing. 
And, of course, the theology he had i n mind was the theology o f 
s i n , grace, and the Cross of Christ. 
This was an unusual p o s i t i o n then, as i t i s now, and needs 
explanation i f not j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The study of ethics i s 
normally taken t o mean the formulation of a number of ru l e s , or at 
le a s t p r i n c i p l e s , by which l i f e i s to be l i v e d . Christian ethics 
i s popularly supposed to d i f f e r from non-Christian i n t h a t the rules 
are taken from the teaching of Jesus, or sometimes from the whole 
of the New Testament or of the Bible. I n e i t h e r case i t i s 
generally supposed th a t what i s at stake i s what a man does, more 
than what he believes, or what he i s . For the Christian l i b e r a l i s m 
of Forsyth's day t h i s meant i n t e r p r e t i n g the Kingdom of God as a 
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s o c i a l organisation and quarrying a code of e t h i c a l behaviour 
and s o c i a l reform from the Sermon on the Mount. Forsyth 
considered such an approach to be b a s i c a l l y wrong. 
I n the f i r s t place i t i s making Christ a l e g i s l a t o r as Moses 
was, and assuming th a t He would say now eacactly what He said two 
thousand years ago. I t i s a relapse i n t o Pharisaism. This was 
not the way the early apostles understood Jesus' purpose. They 
made l i t t l e d i r e c t use of His e t h i c a l teaching, and i t was not the 
teaching t h a t founded the church. 'The r e s u l t of h i s l i f e and 
teaching was t h a t they a l l forsook him and f l e d ; but the r e s u l t 
of his cross, resurrection, and glory was to r a l l y them and create 
the Church i n which he dwells. 1' (PPK326). Clearly i t was not the 
high moral tone of His precepts which re-made them. More than 
t h a t was needed. 
This i s the second e r r o r which he pointed out i n the 
conventional understanding of ethics without theologyj i t assumes 
t h a t men are able to change, and that they w i l l n a t u r a l l y desire 
the highest when they see i t , or have i t shown to them. The 
f a t e of Jesus Himself shows t h a t t h i s i s not so. Forsyth 
points out on several occasions that i t was the good and r e l i g i o u s 
element i n Judaism t h a t brought about the t r i a l and c r u c i f i x i o n 
of Jesus. I t was always the s i n of the good people th a t troubled 
Jesus most, and those who occupy themselves i n framing plans f o r 
s o c i a l Improvement are, of course, the good people. But the 
trouble i s they are consciously good, they are s t r i v i n g f o r 
p e r f e c t i o n i n t h e i r own strength, and are o f f e r i n g others schemes 
by which they can reach the same high standards. 
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The r e s u l t of a l l t h i s must be the triumph of Romanism, f o r 
t h i s i s the Roman view of Christian Perfection. I n an ea r l y 
sermon he wrote, "As soon as you p a r t w i t h the idea t h a t our 
perf e c t i o n i s i n our f a i t h and not i n our conduct, you have taken 
the t r a i n f o r Rome; and I urge you to get out at the f i r s t stop 
and go back to another platform.' Later i n the same sermon he 
goes on, "Our chief danger today i s not the ceremonial r i t u a l , 
but the moral and s o c i a l r i t u a l . I t i s the idea t h a t men are 
to be saved by well-doing, by i n t e g r i t y , by p u r i t y , by generosity, 
by philanthropy, by doing as Christ did rather than t r u s t i n g what 
Christ d i d , by l o v i n g instead of t r u s t i n g love." (GHF pp 121, 128). 
What i s missing i s the r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t the reformer i s under the 
judgment of God as w e l l as the people and the s i t u a t i o n t h a t he 
i s t r y i n g to reform. 
The root trouble i s a f a i l u r e r e a l l y to face the f a c t s . He 
accuses those who speak often of the f a c t s of poverty, slums, vice 
and commercial or i n d u s t r i a l e x p l o i t a t i o n , of f a i l i n g to face up 
to the r e a l f a c t of moral s i n , and he means s i n which l i e s as a 
curse upon the whole race-} not on p a r t of i t only. By dwelling 
on the obvious and surface sins they are b l i n d i n g themselves to 
the underlying sinfulness which i s t h e i r ultimate cause. -"The 
grace of God i n the h i s t o r i c Cross of Christ must be the one 
source of morals and seal of a u t h o r i t y f o r a race t h a t i s redeemed 
or nothing, redeemed or l o s t . The greatest f a c t i n so c i a l ethics 
i s also the most formidable and i n t r a c t a b l e ; i t i s the f a c t of 
si n and the sense of g u i l t . A l l morals are academic which f a i l 
to recognise t h i s - the r e a l r o y a l t y of the moral, i t s actual 
wreck, and i t s imperative redemption." (PA pli02f). I t i s because 
by His death He has dealt i n a f i n a l way wi t h t h i s sinfulness t h a t 
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Christ i s the f i n a l a u t h o r i t y i n the realm of ethics. 
The t r u l y moral man i s the one who has recognised t h i s and 
accepted the salvation and forgiveness wrought by Christ f o r himself. 
I n other words one does not become a Christian by doing good, but 
having become a Christian one does good. There i s not only a 
change i n order but a change i n a t t i t u d e to moral l i v i n g and i t s 
problems i f one begins from the f a c t o f redemption. The Christian 
believes he i s l i v i n g i n a redeemed world, the issue between good 
and e v i l has been s e t t l e d , and t h i s lends a more confident note 
to his approach to social problems than i s possible f o r the non-
Christian s o c i a l reformer. The l a t t e r i s s t r u g g l i n g against 
powers which must of t e n appear insuperable t o those who see the 
t r a g i c note i n human existence, but the former i s applying a f i n a l 
v i c t o r y already won. 
Thus, f o r Forsyth, the Christian ethic i s not the appl i c a t i o n 
of a set of rules, but the proclaiming of redemption and the 
working out of a p r i n c i p l e . Such an a t t i t u d e may s t i l l , a f t e r 
any amount of theological argument, appear d o c t r i n a i r e and remote. 
He was aware of t h i s , but was s t i l l sure t h a t i n theory the 
Christian can go no f u r t h e r . He cannot, th a t i s , work out a 
Christian e t h i c a l system which i s always applicable. However, i n 
practice he can go f u r t h e r , and Forsyth urged his fellow Christians 
to do so. 
I t was not, i n his view, the Church's task to make far-reaching 
pronouncements i n the f i e l d s of economics or i n d u s t r i a l organisation, 
but i t was the Church's task to produce men who might be able to do 
so, or xjho would at l e a s t be able to act C h r i s t i a n l y i n t h e i r own 
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s i t u a t i o n . While denying t h a t the Church could be permanently 
associated w i t h any p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l party or economic 
programme he i n s i s t e d t h a t i t was a Christian duty to be concerned, 
informed, and active i n such a f f a i r s . Behind t h i s was the b e l i e f 
t h a t Christ had redeemed a l l men and the whole o f society. 
For himself Forsyth seems to have been very active i n the 
p o l i t i c a l and social l i f e of his day. He was a keen c r i t i c of the 
Lib e r a l party, and concerned himself with such current problems as 
the Education Act, the conditions of Chinese labour i n the 
Transvaal, the growth of organised labour and i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
capitalism, and the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the community to the 
i n d i v i d u a l member. The great questions which were burning issues 
to him, and on which he wrote and spoke w i t h considerable 
vehemence, are often, i n p r i n c i p l e at l e a s t , s e t t l e d today. 
But t h i s i s as he would have expected i t to be. A Christian ethic 
of the conventional sort would have become outmoded, but h i s 
diagnosis of the e t h i c a l disease and his p r i n c i p l e s f o r e t h i c a l 
action have not. 
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Sources and Influences. 
On several occasions a t t e n t i o n has been drawn to the 
differences between Forsyth's thought and t h a t of his contemporaries. 
I t has been noted t h a t he thought of himself as a prophet, and as a 
l o n e l y prophet. This estimate was endorsed by his contemporaries 
and by l a t e r students of h i s work. Time and again he contrasts 
the l i b e r a l theology of his day with the more p o s i t i v e gospel 
which he seeks to proclaim. Many of his most i n f l u e n t i a l 
contemporaries thought of him as something of an i n t e l l e c t u a l 
oddity, or even an obscurantist, and i t must be allowed t h a t his 
rather pungent s t y l e , and the sharp c r i t i c i s m he would t u r n on those 
wi t h whose opinions he disagreed would not have endeared him to a l l . 
The speed with which his work was f o r g o t t e n , at l e a s t generally, 
f o l l o w i n g his death i n 1921, supports the theory t h a t he was very 
much a voice i n the wilderness. Nevertheless, even when 
allowance has been made f o r t h i s loneliness or i n d i v i d u a l i t y , 
i t i s reasonable to suppose t h a t there were influences on his 
thought, and some attempt must be made to mention at l e a s t the 
more important. 
Two d i f f i c u l t i e s are apparent at once. The f i r s t i s purely 
p r a c t i c a l . Forsyth himself r a r e l y indicates any sources, or 
mentions any influences on h i s thought; none of h i s books has an 
index, and he makes l i t t l e use of footnotes. This i s not because 
he was l o a t h to give c r e d i t where i t was due, but arises mainly 
from the nature of h i s work. Most of h i s books o r i g i n a t e d as 
lectures where frequent references to sources or quoting of 
a u t h o r i t i e s would have been out of place, though W.L. Bradley 
asserts t h a t B ... there are occasions when he paraphrases 
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sentences, paragraphs, or even pages of German theologians w i t h 
a bare reference to the f a c t t h a t he i s indebted to the author 
f o r t h a t p a r t i c u l a r theme." (W.L. Bradley:" P.T. Forsyth, 
the Man and his Work p.90). Forsyth admits t h i s , however, 
w r i t i n g i n one place, " I n c e r t a i n moods, as one traces back the 
o r i g i n of some l i n e s of thought or even phrases of speech, the 
words come to mind, "What have I t h a t I have not received"" 
(PPJC Preface p v i i i ) . 
The second d i f f i c u l t y i s greater. I t i s r a r e l y possible to 
say t h a t any p a r t i c u l a r l i n e of thought i n Forsyth's w r i t i n g came 
from any p a r t i c u l a r source, because by the time i t appears i n p r i n t 
he has made i t h i s own and adapted i t t o his own purpose. He does 
not use the method, common i n theological w r i t i n g , of l i s t i n g h a l f 
a dozen theories on a p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t and then s e l e c t i n g what he 
considers to be the best parts of each to present the r e s u l t as h i s 
own system. I t was not his i n t e n t i o n to w r i t e systematic theology 
of t h a t s o r t , he preferred rather t o unfold his own p o s i t i o n , always 
r e f e r r i n g back to the cross but wi t h a minimum of quotation. I t 
must also be remembered t h a t he was over f i f t y when his most 
serious w r i t i n g began, an age when the economic and s p i r i t u a l 
struggles of his e a r l i e r years had perhaps engendered a c e r t a i n 
confidence^himself and i n his own grasp of his subject which d i d 
not need to be buttressed by frequent reference to other divines. 
This i s not to say t h a t he was i n d i f f e r e n t to other men's ideas, 
f a r from i t , but rather t h a t he was not l i m i t e d by h i s sources. 
He gives his own a t t i t u d e to the question i n the f o l l o w i n g words 
'Much of our work has been to s t e a l . That does not matter i f i t 
i s done wisely and g r a t e f u l l y . When a man gives out a great 
thought, get i t , work i t ; i t i s common property. I t belongs 
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to the whole world, to be claimed and assimilated by whoever 
s h a l l f i n d . *» (WOC 66). This was his own way, but before 
mentioning some of the men whose ideas he worked and assimilated 
mention must be made of his own s p i r i t u a l experience. I t i s 
probable t h a t his own experience was an influence upon his work 
been 
which has^much under-valued. 
I t i s a rather remarkable f a c t t h a t the Forsyth who came to 
'set h i s compass by the inexhaustible cross 1, and to contrast the 
p o s i t i v e gospel w i t h the popular l i b e r a l i s m of h i s day, had 
himself once been an ardent exponent of t h a t l i b e r a l i s m of which 
he was l a t e r so trenchant a c r i t i c . I t would have been d i f f i c u l t 
f o r him to have avoided i t s influence completely, but at one time 
he had not only been influenced by i t but had aspired to lead i t s 
crusade. W.L. Bradley gives the t e x t of two l e t t e r s which he 
wrote to the English Independent ,in 1877 while he was minister of 
the Congregational Church at Shipley, which contain many of the 
sentiments of l i b e r a l i s m which he l a t e r attacked. He appeals 
f o r comprehension and open communion on the basis of common 
" s p i r i t u a l sympathy", rather than orthodox doctrine, and sees 
true Christian d i s c i p l e s h i p as l o y a l t y to the character of Jesus, 
" ... s h a l l we not gain v a s t l y * he wrote then, 'by l e t t i n g i t 
be openly known t h a t our Church means a l l who love the Lord Jesus 
Christ, a l l who revere the character as supreme, ...". Later he 
w r i t e s , *We are, i n the long run, ruled more by our ideals than 
by our defined b e l i e f s . Christ has done more f o r C h r i s t i a n i t y 
as a moral and s p i r i t u a l i d e a l than merely as the centre of a 
system of f a i t h . ... Call a l l who worship the goodness of 
Christ members of Christ. I t i s only so t h a t we s h a l l develop 
those deeper foundations of Supreme goodness which make i t the 
120. 
r e v e l a t i o n and very presence of God.9 (W.L. Bradley, op. c i t . 
p280, 282). Such sentiments may have been i n his mind over 
t h i r t y years l a t e r when he wrote, •Granting t h a t many today are 
moved by the f i g u r e of Christ, by the p i c t u r e stepping out o f 
i t s s c r i p t u r a l frame on them, can they stop there? Can such an 
impression carry the weight o f l i f e and conscience to the end" 
(LQS CXVI p20O). His answer was t h a t i t d e f i n i t e l y could not. 
I t i s i n the second of the quotations given above t h a t we 
hear the r e a l Forsyth, but c l e a r l y a r a d i c a l transformation has 
taken place, the "sunny l i b e r a l " has become the theologian of 
the cross. This r a d i c a l transformation, the evangelical 
experience o f conversion, was basic to a l l t h a t Forsyth was to 
w r i t e i n the f u t u r e , and was c l e a r l y a f a r more important influence 
on h i s thought than the work of any theologian whom he may have 
read. Commenting on Forsyth's death, Thomas Yates, President 
o f the Congregational Union o f England and Wales i n 1922, said 
• I t was a profound experience of grace t h a t made Dr. Forsyth the 
great Doctor of the Church th a t he was." ( c i t e d R.M. Brown p l 3 ) . 
That Forsyth had such an experience i s beyond reasonable doubt, 
but i t i s d i f f i c u l t to give i t a date, or to say any more about i t s 
nature. I n the short memoir of her father which i s p r i n t e d as a 
preface to the second e d i t i o n of "The Work of Christ", Forsyth's 
daughter suggests t h a t i t was the sermon "Holy Father", preached 
at the Congregational Union meetings held i n Leicester i n 1896 
which f i r s t suggested to his contemporaries t h a t there had been a 
r e - o r i e h t a t i o n i n his thought. But she denies t h a t t h i s was a 
sudden change. 
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At t h i s period of h i s l i f e Forsyth was a sick man. When, 
i n 189k, he was called from a s i x year m i n i s t r y a t Clarendon Park, 
Leicester, to the pastorate of Qrmanuel Church, Cambridge, he was 
4 
oblijed to ask f o r three months complete r e s t before taking up 
his new charge. The r e s t does not appear to have had the desired 
e f f e c t . He a r r i v e d at Cambridge s t i l l very i l l , and a week 
a f t e r h i s a r r i v a l his f i r s t wife, upon whom he had previously 
depended g r e a t l y but who had recently become an almost helpless 
i n v a l i d , died suddenly. His f i r s t three years at Cambridge were 
a time of loneliness and s u f f e r i n g . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to 
speculate t h a t i t may have been during these years t h a t Forsyth 
himself learned the basic importance of t h a t t r a g i c note i n 
human a f f a i r s , to a consideration of which he repeatedly c a l l s 
a t t e n t i o n , and the answer to which he found i n the cross. I t 
would be f i t t i n g t h a t the sermon "Holy Father", sounding a s . i t does 
so many of his c h a r a c t e r i s t i c thsmes, should have come from such 
a period. 
However, ten years l a t e r , Forsyth himself gave a d i f f e r e n t 
answer to the question o f his conversion, though one which does not 
preclude the speculation above. He t o l d an audience o f men 
preparing f o r the m i n i s t r y t h a t i t was the seriousness of the 
minister's work, and the need f o r confidence and assurance i n his 
pastoral duties, which f i r s t shook his l i b e r a l i s m . This 
e x i s t e n t i a l concern l e d him to the Bible and the great theologians 
to b r i n g about h i s complete conversion. This i s one of the few 
personal passages of any length i n Forsyth's w r i t i n g , and gives 
his own testimony to the influences to which he was indebted; 
i t must therefore be quoted at length:-
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"There was a time when I was interested i n the f i r s t degree 
w i t h purely s c i e n t i f i c c r i t i c i s m . Bred among academic scholarship 
of the classics and philosophy, I ca r r i e d these habits to the Bible, 
and I found i n the subject a new fa s c i n a t i o n , i n proportion as the 
stakes were so much higher. But, f o r t u n a t e l y f o r me, I was not 
condemned to the mere scholar's c l o i s t e r e d l i f e . I could not t r e a t 
the matter as an academic quest. I was kept close to p r a c t i c a l 
conditions. I was i n a r e l a t i o n o f l i f e , duty, and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
f o r others. I could not contemplate conclusions without asking 
how they would a f f e c t these people, and my word to then% i n doubt, 
death, g r i e f or repentance. I could not c a l l on them to accept 
my v e r d i c t on points t h a t came so near t h e i r souls. That i s not 
0 ur conception of the mi n i s t r y . And they were people i n the press 
and care o f l i f e . They could not give t h e i r minds to such 
c r i t i c a l questions Yet there were Chr i s t i a n matters which men 
must decide f o r themselves, tr a i n e d or not. Therefore,- these 
matters could not be the things which were at issue i n h i s t o r i c 
c r i t i c i s m taken alone I t also pleased God by the r e v e l a t i o n 
of His holiness and grace, which the great theologians taught me 
to f i n d i n the Bible, t o bring home to me my s i n i n a way t h a t 
sibmerged a l l the school questions i n weight, urgency aid poignancy. 
1 was turned from a Christian to a believer, from a lover o f love 
to an object of grace. And so, whereas I f i r s t thought t h a t what 
the Churches needed was enlightened i n s t r u c t i o n and l i b e r a l 
theology, I came to be sure t h a t what they needed was 
evangelization, i n something more than the conventional sense of 
th a t word. 
" I withdrew my prime a t t e n t i o n from much o f the scholar's 
work and gave i t to those theological i n t e r e s t s , imbibed f i r s t 
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from Maurice, and then more mightily through Ritschl, which come 
nearer to l i f e than science, sentiment, or ethic can ever do. I 
immersed myself i n the Logic of Hegel, and corrected i t by the 
theology of Paul, and i t s continuity i n the Reformation, because I 
was a l l the time being corrected and humiliated by the Holy S p i r i t " 
(PPMM p!92f, 19^). With the addition of Kant and the Puritans 
we have here the main influences on Forsyth's thought. 
The impression given by such a personal testimony is of a 
struggle i n which he f e l t his soul was at stake. This idea i s 
re-inforced by his frequent use of the idea of wrestling as an 
analogy of the s p i r i t u a l l i f e , particularly i n his smaller 
devotional works, (cp Escott pi*). His own struggle came from a 
growing sense of the holiness of God, and of the sinfulness and 
unworthiness of man before Him. A broken relationship which, 
apart from the grace of God, must have meant the annihilation of 
man. The theologians and other thinkers who helped him were those 
who helped him to understand and express this situation i n the 
great themes of holiness, sin, and active grace received i n 
experimental religion. In other words i t was not the other men's 
work as such, but their ideas as illuminating his own 
experience and understanding of the situation that helped him. 
i 
I t i s i n this way, I think, that the influence of F.D. Maurice 
must be understood, at least as far as Maurice's influence was 
permanent and is found i n the late r books. At an early stage this 
influence appears to have been very great. I t came to Forsyth 
not only through Maurice's books, but through the personality of 
one of his greatest admirers, J. Baldwin Brown, to whom Forsyth 
acknowledged a great debt. The greatness and importance of 
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Maurice was that, at a time when theology was coming to be 
considered an adjunct of philosophy, or of a general world view 
tending to social improvement, he remained a theologian and 
always wrote and spoke as a theologian. 
Maurice stressed the moral content of Christianity, and the 
idea of the Holiness of God to which man should respond i n moral 
obedience. These are strains of thought which appear also i n 
Forsyth. But what i s not so clear i s that Forsyth got them from 
Maurice, or, i f he did, that the late r Forsyth remained so heavily 
indebted to the older man as i s often supposed. Generally 
speaking Maurice was an eclectic thinker, gathering together the 
best parts of many systems. Forsyth on the other hand was, or 
certainly became, a man dominated by one controlling concern, to 
set his compass by the cross. I t i s not l i k e l y that Forsyth 
would have accepted the Maurician axiom that men are normally 
r i g h t i n what they assert and wrong i n what they deny. This i s 
too near the genial toleration which he so much opposed. 
Certainly i n "The Principle of Authority", i t i s Mauricers 
personal holiness and seriousness vis a vis the things of God 
which are commended, not his theology. I t i s also worth noting 
that Newman is commended i n the same passage. (PA p306). 
The theme which he i s generally thought to have taken from 
Maurice i s the conception of the solidarity of the human race. 
Certainly the fact that, i n an age when the stress i n religion was 
normally placed on individualism, both should have thi s theme 
makes i t l i k e l y that Forsyth should have taken i t from Maurice. 
W.L. Bradley shows that i n the two l e t t e r s to the 'English 
Independent', mentioned earlier, probably the earliest of Forsyth's 
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writing to be printed, a number of Maurician themes, including this 
one of r a c i a l solidarity, can be found. However i t must be noted 
that Forsyth presents i t in. a completely different way. Maurice 
begins his thinking on thi s theme from the incarnation, Forsyth 
from the atonement. This can be seen i n the different ways they 
treat the subject of baptism. For Mautice i t i s "... the sign 
of admission into a s p i r i t u a l and universal kingdom,, grounded upon 
our Lord's incarnation, and ultimately resting upon the name of 
the Father, the Son, and the Holy S p i r i t , ..." (The Kingdom of 
Christ, vol 11 pl7. cp vol 1 pp279 ) j while for Forsyth i t i s the 
sacrament of Regeneration. There is no reason why Forsyth 
should not have taken the Idea direct from Paul, especially from 
Romans 5. 
On the subject of authority the two differed considerably. 
Maurice's thinking ran on the more i n s t i t u t i o n a l lines typical 
of a 'High Church' Anglican. I t i s best to see Maurice's abiding 
influence:: as inspirational rather than formative. 
The influence of Ritschl however was much greater and more 
permanent, both f o r what he himself provided, and for the other 
influences which came to Forsyth, i n i t i a l l y at least through him. 
In the Memoir previously referred to Forsyth's daughter says that 
her father himself described the semester spent at Gottingen as the 
most important i n t e l l e c t u a l factor i n his experience. Not only 
did he learn a l o t from Ritschl, but he also acquired a f a c i l i t y 
and fluency i n German thought and language which he retained for 
the rest of his l i f e . He was thus able to read and make use of 
German theology long before most of his contemporaries, and he had 
a great admiration for i t . I t was a sources of some regret to him 
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that most of the German theological work made available to English 
readers was of an extreme, and often destructive nature, (PPJC v i i i ) 
and when he died about one t h i r d of the books i n his l i b r a r y were 
i n German. Ritschl was the f i r s t , and probably the greatest, 
influence from this source. 
Something has already been said about Ritschl's system i n 
the introductory section. From him Forsyth took a number of 
points which are basic to his whole theology. When the theology 
of Schleiermacher had emphasised religious experience practically 
to the exclusion of a l l else, i t was Ritschl who insisted that the 
Christian religion must have, and i n fact did have, an objective 
h i s t o r i c a l base. This base was i n the person and work of Jesus 
Christ. He did not deny the value and importance of religious 
experience, but for him theology did not rise within experience, 
but simply makes i t s appeal to, and i s recognised by, experience. 
The Gospel would be true whether or not i t was experienced. 
This i s also Forsyth's position. 
I t was Ritschl also who stressed the importance of 'value-
judgments'. That i s , the believer must make an act of obedience 
and personal commitment when he asserts that Jesus work was done 
for him. I t i s not enough sjmply to assert, or even to believe, 
that i t took place objectively i n history, an act of involvement 
i s necessary. Here again we have Forsyth's stress on man's 
"self- donation to the donative grace of God", and here we are 
coming to the heart of Forsyth's doctrine of authority, 
(cp "The Place of Spiritual Experience i n the Making of Theology" 
RON pp 68-80). 
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In several respects Forsyth became c r i t i c a l of Ritschl. 
Chiefly i n his Christology, his doctrine of Atonement, and his 
famous description of Christianity as an ellipse with two f o c i , 
the cross and the Kingdom. But of greatest importance i s his 
complete acceptance of Ritschl's emphasis on the moral note, 
and his Kantianism. I t may have been i n Gottingen that Forsyth 
himself f i r s t adopted his Kantian epistemology, but certainly 
he l a t e r spoke of the Kantianising of Christianity as Ritschl's 
great work, (LQR CXVH p2). 
For Kant himself, and his philosophy, Forsyth had the 
greatest possible respect, and this i s at the very heart of his 
doctrine of authority, for i t was from Kant that he learned, as 
Ritschl. had learned, the primacy of the moral. He saw that i t 
was Kant who had broken the hold of rationalism and metaphysics 
on theology, and he was thankful for such a service. "With 
Kant", he says, •came a new order of things. The ethical took 
the place that had been held by the i n t e l l e c t u a l . The notion 
of r e a l i t y replaced that of trut h . Religion placed us not i n 
l i n e with the r a t i o n a l i t y i n the world but i n rapport with the 
r e a l i t y of i t . And the ethical was the real. ... The Christian 
religion at least involves i f not the solitude at least the 
primacy of the ethical. I f r e a l i t y i s to reach us i t must be 
thus. And what Christianity means by the holy i s best expressed 
i n ethical terms as the absolute moral r e a l i t y . 9 (PA pU). 
Time and again he returns to Kant's axiom at the outset of his 
metaphysic of ethic "There i s nothing conceivable i n the world, 
or out of i t , which can be called good without qualification 
except a good w i l l " . When using i t as a standard to judge 
history he writes "This might equally well be called the method 
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of revelation as di s t i n c t from induction. I t makes a clear 
di s t i n c t i o n between the natural l i f e process, however rarefied 
or s p i r i t u a l , and the action of the moral consciousness. I t 
presents us, i n the good w i l l , i n the development thereto of the 
moral personality, with a standard by which to assess the value of 
everything, either done or proposed." (PA p201). To Kant he 
frequently gives the t i t l e "The Philosopher of Protestantism", 
and though he f e l t i t was necessary to go beyond him to revelation, 
i t was Kant who had made the new developments possible by which 
revelation and the response to i t could be expressed. 
Matching the positive influence of Kant i s what might be 
called the negative influence of Hegel. Forsyth seems to see 
Hegel as the arch-enemy, the apostle of a speculative and 
ra t i o n a l i s t philosophy. I t was Hegel after a l l who had provided 
the philosophical j u s t i f i c a t i o n for doctrines of Divine Immanence 
and ideas of inevitable process and progress/ ideas which ruled 
out Forsyth's belief i n an objective and f i n a l authority at a set 
point within history. Thus he refers to Hegel's idealism as a 
Theosophy (PA p213), and c r i t i c i s e s i t s theological exponents f o r 
preaching a gospel of man's adjustment to his fate instead of a 
reconciliation between persons. "The Gospel of Christ speaks 
otherwise. I t speaks of a God to whom we are to be reconciled 
i n a mutual act which He beginsj and not of an order or process 
with which we are to be adjusted by our lonely act, or to which 
we are to be resigned." (WOC p7U). 
But, as he says, i n his case Hegel's philosophy was corrected 
by the theology of St. Paul arid i t s continuity i n the Reformation. 
Forsyth was thoroughly Pauline i n his outlook. We have seen that 
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i n his treatment of the Bible he re-acted v i o l e n t l y against the 
"Jesus of History" movement with i t s simple moral teacher, and 
which claimed to begin from the synoptic gospels. His own thinking 
began from the proclamation of the Gospel, the earliest preaching, 
and i t s expression i n the Pauline epistles. He anticipated the 
results of a l o t of l a t e r discussion by denying that there was any 
radical difference between the different New Testament writers, 
or that a different picture of Jesus is to be found i n the synoptic 
gospels from that i n the epistles. Nevertheless he finds the 
gospel i n i t s purest form i n the writings of St. Paul. I t i s from 
Paul that he takes his insistence on the conversion experience 
as the basis of authority. 
I t i s naturaly, therefore, that he should be influenced by the 
Reformers and their re-discovery of St. Paul. This influence grows 
i n his l a t e r work. No doubt he found i n Luther and his intense 
inner struggle to reconcile his own sense of g u i l t with the grace 
of God i n Christ an analogy to Paul's experience, and parhaps also 
to his own. Like Luther he saw that Christians are at the same 
time j u s t i f i e d and sinners, and he frequently quotes Luther's 
saying that "Theology makes sinners". In the realm of authority 
he took from Luther the principle of finding authority i n that 
which K p l i e d Christ", and he uses that principle i n his treatment 
of the authority of the Bible, the Church and christian experience. 
Similarly he follows Luther i n the question of Religious l i b e r t y , 
claiming that i t i s freedom from g u i l t , l i b e r t y of conscience 
before God, not the ri g h t of unlimited individual choice. 
Luther would appeal to Forsyth because of his stress on 
experience and probably because of a s i m i l a r i t y i n temperament. 
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But, as a theologian Forsyth i s nearer to Calvin, particularly 
i n his l a t e r works. W.L. Bradley considers, "There i s a trend 
i n his writings away from Luther (where he began with Ritschlianism) 
towards Calvin and the Puritans, so that by the time of his 
publication of- "Faith, Freedom, and the Future, he is laying the 
greatest stress upon Calvinism as tempered by the B r i t i s h mind." 
(Bradley op. c i t . pl08). For Forsyth Calvin was the father of 
democracy, and he was so, paradoxically, because of his insistence 
on the majesty and freedom of God. I t was i n Calvin, chiefly, 
that he found the insistence on "the Crown Rights of the Redeemer", 
and the Theocentric as opposed to anthropocentric basis of 
theology. "What was i t " , he asked, »that made the tremendous 
strength of Calvinism? What makes some form of Calvinism 
indispensable and immortal? I t was t h i s , that i t cared more to 
secure the freedom of God than of man. That is what i t found i n 
the Cross. ... The Calvinistic doctrine of predestination was the 
foundation of modern public l i b e r t y ; and, deeply, because i t 
was an awful attempt to secure God's freedom i n Grace at any cost." 
(PA p255). 
From Calvin i t was natural that he should turn to the English 
Puritans, the founding fathers of his own denomination. He 
approached them c r i t i c a l l y , and was w i l l i n g to f i n d many faults i n 
thei r position. Their attitude to the Bible and i t s authority 
was too s t a t i c . I n many of them the dynamic s p i r i t of Calvinism 
had become fossilized, and i n others swamped by the spiritualism of 
anabaptism. So there was no false hero worship i n Forsyth's 
approach. Xet, i n spite of a l l , i t is probable that they are 
quoted more frequently than any other source. Forsyth's long 
t i t l e s , and perhaps even his d i f f i c u l t style, are reminiscent of 
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the Puritans; and Baxter, Owen, Robinson, and, above a l l , Goodwin, 
(cp FFF pp 116-9) are given the rare honour of being mentioned 
by name. 
The reason f o r his high regard of the Puritans i s not hard to 
fin d . Given the fact that his denominational background would 
lead him to them, having once arrived Forsyth would fi n d himself 
on familiar ground. Their major interest, and their understanding 
of the human situation and i t s resolution by the active grace of 
God, was the same as his own. Whatever criticisms might be made 
of thein, i n his opinion, the i r basis was ri g h t . I n one of his 
addresses as President of the Congregational Union of England and 
Wales, he expanded this point at length. 'The old orthodoxies can 
never again be what they were; but one thing i n them draws me 
and sustains me amidst much that is hopelessly out of date. And 
i t i s t h i s , that they had a true eye for what really mattered i n 
Christianity; and especially that they did grapple with the f i n a l 
facts of human nature, the abysses of moral experience, the 
wickedness of the human heart, and i t s darling self- w i l l . They 
closed with ultimates. They did not heal l i g h t l y the wound of 
the people. They did confront the l a s t riddle' of the world, 
the l a s t tragedy of the conscience, the l a s t c r i s i s of the soul. 
They did not toy with the human curse. ... with a very c r i t i c i z a b l e 
theology, they stood at the centre of things with t h e i r religion 
of the moral Atonement, of a free but most costly Gospel.n 
(CGS pl21f). 
Several students of Forsyth have drawn attiention to the fact 
that he knew and quoted the works of Kierkegaard long before^ 
the Danish philosopher was widely known i n this country. But here 
132. 
again, I think, i t i s wiser to say that the Dane's influence was 
inspirational rather than that Forsyth actually took any major 
ideas from him. , I f , as has been suggested several times above, 
Forsyth had experienced intense s p i r i t u a l struggles himself, he 
would have found i n Kierkegaard an a l l y and fellow sufferer. 
I t is i n t h i s vein, as an example of the seriousness of man's 
condition and his relation to God, that Forsyth quotes him, 
* There is no greater division within religion than that between 
Emerson and Kierkegaard, between a religion that but consecrates 
the optimism of clean youth, and that which hallows the tragic 
note, and deals with a world sick unto death. We choose the 
l a t t e r . Every form of re l i g i o n i s less Christian as i t retires 
from that centre where g u i l t and grace meet i n an eternal and 
regenerative world-crisis i n Christ* (PA p203). Kierkegaard had 
grasped the fact that man must be active i n the Divine human drama. 
Nietsche i s mentioned i n the same way, •Nietsche f e l t as 
millions f e e l , that l i f e culminated i n i t s tragic experiences, 
and that whatever solved the tragedy of l i f e solved a l l l i f e . 
He was not a spectator but an actor i n this tragedy, so much so 
that i t unhinged his mind." (JG p210). But i t i s probable that 
Forsyth had learned his * existential" note from Paul and the 
Reformers. The philosophers would merely underline and support 
what he had already discovered, or worked out, for himself. 
In any case, Forsyth goes beyond "angst" to a sober confidence and 
joy, which Nietsche apparently did not conceive possible, and at 
which Kierkegaard only occasionally hinted. 
These then were the main influences on Forsyth, at least as f a r 
as his thinking on authority i s concerned. But there are many others 
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who, though perhaps less i n f l u e n t i a l , nevertheless made some 
contribution. I n his early years he was -wery much influenced 
by A.M. Fairbairn. He records his thanks to Fairbairn for 
helping him to understand Hegel, (PPMM pl9!?n), and, when he had 
become Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford, described him as 
"... the one powerful teacher among us whose theology had the 
(cosmopolitan note." (FFF pl78). Dale and Denney he knew 
personally, and i t i s probable that he was influenced by both. 
He thought that every minister should have studied McLeod Campbell 
on the Atonement, (WOC pll;9), and there are close s i m i l a r i t i e s 
between his own work and that of McLeod Campbell, especially i n 
the stress which they both l a i d upon the holiness of God. 
Among non theological writers, he speaks often of those who 
stress the element of tragedy i n human a f f a i r s . As well as Hardy, 
to whom we have already seen several references, he refers i n this 
vein to, Shakespeare, (JG p213), Matthew Arnold (CGS plOO), 
George ELiot and Tennyson (TLN p9 f f ) , and has a lengthy a r t i c l e 
on Ibsen (HJ Vol lU p 105-22). 
But, when a l l these influences have been considered, i t must be 
repeated that Forsyth was an independent thinker. He no doubt 
learned from the best sources available, but he also c r i t i c i s e d 
those from whom he learned most, and went beyond the positions 
he received from his teachers to produce something d i s t i n c t i v e l y 
his own. As W.L. Bradley remarks i n concluding the relevant 
section of his book, i t i s perhaps for that reason that Forsyth 
i s now being read again while the others have for the most part 
been relegated to mere h i s t o r i c a l study, 
i 
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CONCLUSION 
Two matters remain to be discussed. F i r s t , some attempt 
must be made to assess Forsyth's work, as far as i t concerns the 
doctrine of authority, and make certain criticisms of i t . 
Secondly we must consider what a renewed interest i n his work 
might be able to contribute to modem theological thinking. Is he, 
as has been claimed, a prophet for today who i s relevant to the 
church i n the nineteen sixties; or was he merely a prophet to his 
own day, ahead of his own time but behind ours? Alternatively, 
was he re a l l y the obscurantist that some of his contemporaries 
thought he was, vainly trying to stem the tide of theological 
progress and return to a restricted and outdated orthodoxy? 
The f i r s t thing to be noted i s that he was w i l l i n g , i n spite 
of unpopularity, to stand out against the popular thinking of his 
day. Denney apart, there seems to have been no other theologian 
of the front rank who held the fundamentals that Forsyth held. 
That he should have been w i l l i n g to hold them i n spite of 
misunderstanding, and i n spite of the fact that his own earlier 
liberalism must often have risen i n his mind, demands respect. 
But more important is the fact that he appears to have been 
proved correct. 
Liberal Protestantism, at least i n the form that Forsyth knew 
i t , f a i l e d , and chiefly because i t lacked the note of authority, 
and thus of certainty. I t s easy toleration of any movement of 
the human s p i r i t was necessarily shallow and superficial, and 
necessarily opposed to f i n a l i t y and authority. Forsyth saw the 
need to pierce through this s u p e r f i c i a l i t y to fi n d a firm rock on 
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which to take his stand. Like his Puritans he sought to deal with 
ultimates, with the result that his work remains, while that of most 
of his 1 contemporaries is forgotten. 
Secondly, and of the greatest importance, i s the fact that his 
thinking was thoroughly B i b l i c a l . We have seen his dependence on 
Paul and the re-discovery of Paul i n the Reformers. When James 
Penney asked him for a statement of the theses underlying 'Positive 
Preaching and the Modern Mind' he replied, • I f there be anything i n 
the book which St. Paul, as the supreme devotee, organ, and 
expositor of Christ, would not have passed or paralleled, that I 
would at once withdraw and lament, whether i t were i n matter or tone" 
(The B r i t i s h Weekly, Oct 31, 1907, p83. cited R.M. Brown op c i t pUO), 
and no doubt he would have said the same for any of his books. 
This appeal to St. Paul i s sometimes contrasted with an appeal 
to the Synoptic Gospels, and this i s certainly how i t was seen by 
his contemporaries. In 1908 the Hibbert Journal produced a 
supplement contrasting the Jesus of the Synoptics with the Christ of 
Paul. At times Forsyth himself seems to accept th i s dichotomy, but 
in fact he sawwthat i t was false, that the simple Jesus of the 
Gospels was not to be found there. Ahead of his time as a New 
Testament Scholar he insisted that the writers of the New Testament 
knew only the Christ of the epistles and the apostolic preaching, 
and that acceptance of Christ as Redeemer was a pre-requisite f o r 
the f i r s t readers of the Gospels. He had used the word 'kerygraa' 
fo r the core of the early church's preaching twenty three years 
before Dodd's 'Apostolic Preaching and i t s Development' had made 
i t common currency. (PA pi27.)^ 
(''"A.M. Hunter has given further evidence of his anticipating 
the results of la t e r N.T. Scholarship i n E.T. LXXHI plOOff 
and Teaching and Preaching the New Testament ch 21). 
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Nevertheless, i t was from St. Paul that he chiefly drew his 
inspiration. 
From St. Paul came his doctrine of authority as an authority 
of experienced graces i n conversion. When faced with questions 
demanding authoritative guidance i n the church at Corinth, the 
apostle's f i r s t step was to direct the attention of his readers 
back to t h e i r experience of conversion. He reminded them of the 
blessings they had received by the "calling of Christ", and set the 
foolishness of preaching above a l l worldly wisdom simply because 
i t had worked for the Corinthians. I f i t had not done so, that 
i s i f the Corinthian Christians could have denied his basic premiss, 
then Paul's whole argument would have fa l l e n to the ground. As 
the epistle proceeds every question raised by the Corinthians i s 
referred back to thei r experience of redemption, which i s i t s e l f 
dependent on the historic facts of the primitive kerygma outlined 
i n 1 Cor l£: 1-8. (cp R.R. Williams "Authority i n the Apostolic 
Age, pp. 12-30). 
This is Forsyth's method exactly. With the Apostle he 
insisted on the primacy of the conversion experience, the f i n a l i t y 
of the objective redemptive acts i n history, and the importance of 
preaching without concession to the wisdom of this world. 
Underlying a l l this i s the belief that redemption i s an act of Godj 
an insistence throughout on the divine i n i t i a t i v e , or " l e t t i n g 
God be God"; i n fact the Theocentricity which distinguished his 
thinking from that of those who began with "that excellent 
creature man". 
From thi s the t h i r d and fourth points emerge. He has a very 
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r e a l i s t i c view of the state of man. The near deification of 
human nature favoured by immanentalism did not r e a l l y do justice 
to the complexity of the human situation. I t could not support 
i t s adherents, or at least not many of them, through the horrors 
of a world war. But, as we have seen, Forsyth did not have to 
change his theology to explain that tragedy. Not committed to 
the thesis that day by day i n every way man was growing better and 
better, he was not so severely shaken when i t was clearly shown 
to be wrong. Indeed, he could j u s t l y have argued that he had 
attempted on many occasions to draw attention to the tragic 
element i n human affa i r s which the war exemplified. 
The fourth point i s his insistence on revelation and his 
understanding of revelation. He was ahead of his time i n 
realising that revelation was not necessarily the revelation of 
truths i n propositional form. He saw clearly that i t was a 
moral and personal encounter, the revelation of a Person acting 
upon another person. This i s the "existential" note i n his 
thinking which i s much more commonplace today than i t was when 
he was writing. Nothing i s more noteworthy i n his thought 
than the realisation that the whole of a man1s l i f e must be, 
effected and judged by the divinely inspired recognition and 
response to revelatiaa. But he saves himself from the 
abstraction and unreality of some ex i s t e n t i a l i s t thought by his 
stress on the need to integrate the conversion experience with the 
rest of l i f e . 
Finally Forsyth is worthy of.commendation for the rigour 
and honesty of his thinking. In his cr i t i c i s m of shallowness and 
s u p e r f i c i a l i t y he did not f a l l into the same errors himself. 
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He does not oppose one set of clear ideas by another. This i s 
not to say that his own thinking i s not clear, i t i s , however, 
he does not allow a t h i r s t f o r c l a r i t y , or even easy 
i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y to smooth out any d i f f i c u l t i e s i n his way. 
He sees clearly that the conversion experience and the teaching 
of the New Testament, from which he starts, do not lend 
themselves to easy explanation. Thus he is w i l l i n g to assert 
paradoxes when the occasion demands. But, on the other hand, 
one is not l e f t with the impression that this i s a glib appeal 
to mystery. I t does not even appear to be a particularly reverent 
drawing back from things too high or too sacred for human 
comprehension. He has merely pursued his attempt to understand 
and explain to the point where the paradox i s inevitable, and 
having reached that point he states the paradox. But even thea he 
does not suggest that the matter i s now for ever closed, but rather 
that this i s as far as he i s able to go at present. 
I f these points are put down to the credit of Forsyth, as I 
believe they must be, i t is necessary next to ask what criticisms 
can be made of his position. In describing him as a prophet, or 
as a voice i n the wilderness, i t i s easy to assume that he must have 
been r i ^ h t and his contemporaries wrong. Such an assumption, i f 
unexamined, would of course be too g l i b . Neither must i t be 
assumed that his c r i t i c s did not include serious and sincere 
thinkers who understood him but, having understood, preferred to 
d i f f e r from him. Writing of the renewed interest i n his work and 
the re-issue of many of his books, A.J. Gossip has written of him 
"He did not impress everyone. For, while some hailed him as a 
veritable and indubitable prophet, ... others, and among them 
minds not to be l i g h t l y dismissed, were l e f t l i t t l e affected by 
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him, or even stone coldj i r r i t a t e d by his mannerisms, and 
untouched by his message, and his way of stating i t . " 
(P.T. Forsyth E.T., March 19U9, p l l i 8 ) . 
The reference to his mannerisms and way of stating his 
message raises the question of his l i t e r a r y style, which has often 
been discussed. He seems to delight in odd words and unusual 
grammatical constructions which, added to the willingness to 
assert paradoxes mentioned above, can lead to d i f f i c u l t y in finding 
his meaning. Gossip, in the a r t i c l e mentioned, goes on to quote 
Sylvester Home's description of his writing as 'Fireworks in a 
fog'. Forsyth himself denied that his style was unusually 
complicated and i t i s probably simplest to see i t as part of the 
man himself, something over which he had no control, and which he 
could not have altered had he wished to do so. The problem i s of 
a piece with the lack of indices and footnotes, he often appears 
to make allusions, or to assume a familiarity with certain l i n e s 
of thought which i s not always j u s t i f i e d . The result i s that 
often there are too many thoughts packed into each sentence for 
easy reading. At other times however he can give the impression 
of passing over a d i f f i c u l t point in a flow of rhetoric. His 
daughter suggests that the real d i f f i c u l t y was the idiom of his 
mind rather than of his pen, and points out that most of his 
students, and most of. those who begin with a sympathy for his 
starting point, do not find him unbearably d i f f i c u l t . Criticism 
of his style may frequently cover a distaste for his theology. 
A more d i f f i c u l t problem, as far as his mannerisms are 
concerned, i s his apparently harsh attitude towards theological 
amateurs. The hard and dogmatic strain which gives strength and 
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v i r i l i t y to his writing, appears to refl e c t a hardness i n his 
character which was manifested as an intolerant, or even 
contemptuous, attitude to those who differed from him, or who 
could not, or would not, follow his arguments. Though i t i s only 
f a i r to add that some of his sermons and addresses, to his students 
have a deeply sympathetic pastoral tone. (cp Escott Pt 8, and 
HON passim). 
More important for the present purpose are possible criticisms 
<£ his message, particularly as i t effects authority. A number of 
these arise from the fact that he was writing for his own age. 
The chief complaint made about him i s that he concentrates so much 
on the cross that he ignores the l i f e of Jesus. I think this i s a 
f a i r criticism. He was definitely correct to place the emphasis 
on the cross, and to claim that i t was the cross and not the 
teaching and example of Jesus which brought man's redemption, and . 
which had been the message with which the apostles had turned the 
world upside down. But so great was his emphasis that the l i f e 
and ministry of Jesus are v i r t u a l l y overlooked. I t i s 
indicative i n this respect that he seldom uses the name 'Jesus', 
preferring the t i t l e 'Christ'. 
However, though this criticism must be allowed to stand, i t 
cannot be counted such a damaging one when one considers the 
background against which he was working. He could j u s t l y have 
replied that most of his contemporaries were overlooking the cross, 
and that the sympathetic and humane side of Jesus' ministry had 
been stressed to the point of sentimentality. In any case he had 
taken account of the humanity of Jesus in his Christology, and had 
shewn there that He had been a much more demanding teacher than was 
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usually allowed by those who wished to see Him as merely a teacher. 
Furthermore the main point of His teaching had been Himself and the 
act He was about to perform. The criticism of ignoring the l i f e 
and teaching then, i s not so severe a criticism as some have made i t 
out to be, but we shall have to mention i t again. 
A similar l i n e of defence can be taken against those who 
c r i t i c i s e his doctrine of apostolic inspiration, though, I think, 
this i s a more serious criticism. We have seen that he believed 
the apostolic witness was 'part of the revelationary fact and deed', 
but he i s not clear how much of the apostolic writing i s to be 
included i n that witness. His intention seems to be to use 
Luther's maxim of accepting that which 'plies Christ'. However, 
for him, this seems to become 'plies the Cross'. Thus we have 
seen that he i s rather casual about the h i s t o r i c i t y o? the purpose 
of the virgin birth stories, and he appears to reject both the 
apostolic doctrine of original sin and also the expectation of the 
Parousia as being 'farther from the centre'. I t could be argued 
that the B i b l i c a l language about these matters i s i n some sense 
mythological; but even mythological language expresses something, 
and Forsyth appears to make no attempt to find and state i t . 
I t does not follow from this, as i t may at f i r s t sight seem, 
that, on these principles, any other reader of the New Testament 
could form his own idea of what was central to the f a i t h and then 
accept as much of the New Testament as f i t t e d that theory, 
rejecting or ignoring the rest. Forsyth has not approached 
scripture with preconceived ideas. He rather uses the Gospel 
which has come through the scripture and brought salvation, to 
interpret the scripture which has borne i t . Further he shows on 
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c r i t i c a l grounds that any honest reading of the New Testament must 
show up the centrality of the cross and the preaching of redemption. 
Nevertheless, there are other points, not far removed from the 
centre, which are also obvious i n the New Testament, and to which 
he does not appear to have given their proper weight. Chief of 
these i s the expectation of the Parousia, which i s , i n part at 
least, the f i n a l assertion of the authority of God i n Christ. l e t 
this doctrine i s strangely absent from Forsyth's writing. Even in 
the Justification of God, where one might expect i t to be 
introduced, he does not speak of the New Testament expectation of 
the prsonal return of Jesus Christ in Glory. Neither does he 
make i t clear that he has demythologised this element of New 
Testament faith. 
Rather similar i s the lack of stress on the Ascension. He 
acknowledges the ascension and the present reign of Christ, but he 
does not use i t as he might have done in speaking of authority. 
The result of this i s found in the tone of his work rather than i n 
any particular strands of teaching. He i s confident, but his 
confidence comes from his certainty that the world was redeemed by 
the act of the cross. This i s good, but i t tends to have a 
certain harshness about i t which i t might not have had i f the 
present reign of the ascended Jesus had been more prominent i n his 
thinking. While i t i s always necessary to stress as he did the 
tragic element in human experience, that i s , to take sin with 
proper seriousness, and this I w i l l suggest i s s t i l l a relevant 
note, i t i s also important to affirm that Jesus reigns i n spite 
of that. The human situation i s black enough, but perhaps not 
as black as i t might otherwise have been. Forsyth does not 
11*3. 
always seem to remember t h i s . 
I t must be admitted, then, that Forsyth's stress on the cross, 
good and necessary though i t was in his own day, led him to 
overlook or minimise, other equally B i b l i c a l points. As far 
as the doctrine of authority i s concerned this i s seen most 
obviously in his neglect of the ethical teaching both of Jesus 
and of the apostles. This point has been touched upon above. 
We saw then that he insisted that a l l ethics must be theological 
and must begin from the cross. For him the great point was not 
individual sins and the cultivation of the 'good l i f e ' , but the 
solidary fact of sinfulness, the answer to which was in the cross. 
In principle this must be the complete and sufficient answer. 
Christians are saved, and simply have to work out their salvation 
by referring each moral problem, indeed each action, to the cross. 
This i s the New Testament position, and Forsyth i s on firm ground 
in taking i t . However, help i s needed in applying the cross 
to moral problems. Some modern theologians have distinguished 
between the indicative 'one i s saved 1, which indicates the 
status of the Christian, and the imperative 'be ye perfect 1, 
which draws attention to his so far imperfect moral state. I t 
i s in this second part of the paradox that help i s needed. 
Forsyth i n s i s t s that we should find our perfection i n our 
faith, and not in our works, which presumably must remain 
imperfect. But, without settling a l l the questions, the New 
Testament does contain a l o t of ethical material from Which certain 
principles of moral conduct may be drawn. Forsyth does not use 
such material, partly, no doubt, because his chief interest was 
elsewhere, but also because he was afraid that a l l casuistry/must 
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be Roman. Here he i s definitely reacting against the popular 
Liberal Protestantism of his age, but appears to have gone too 
far. The vivid immediate awareness of redemption leading to 
spontaneous action in gratitude may be the best and surest spring 
of ethical action, but i t i s probably the least common. Such an 
awareness does not come to every Christian, and few, i f any, 
possess i t permanently. For the majority some form of casuistry 
i s a necessity, and more treatment of i t could be expected from 
one who l a i d as much stress on the importance of authority as 
Forsyth did. 
However, even when such criticisms have been allowed their 
f u l l weight, Forsyth's position remains a strong one, supported by 
the New Testament and by Christian experience. Such faults as 
there are in i t are chiefly due to the nature of his writing, and 
to the theological atmosphere of the age which he had in mind. 
In fact the wonder i s that his work should show such consistency 
over such a period and oa such a diversity of subjects. 
But what of i t s contemporary relevance? In one sense i t i s 
clea r l y very modern, that i s in the sense that the things which 
Forsyth was writing f i f t y years ago are now much more common place 
than they were In his day, and many people are writing his sort of 
theology today. Certain points of this sort have already been 
mentioned several times, such points as his approach to the New 
Testament; the existential element; the criticism of idealism; 
and the stress on the primacy of grace and the miraculous nature 
of revelation. But the question i s , has a l l this become so 
generally accepted that i t i s not necessary to read Forsyth to get 
jfc, and that there i s nothing that the church i n our own day can 
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learn from him? 
In a review of R.M. Brown's book "P.T. Forsyth; a Prophet 
for Today", G.W. Bromiley appears to be making this point when 
he writes "... i s i t r e a l l y the case that Forsyth i s a prophet 
for our own time as the author supposes? ... The works of 
Forsyth have a far more contemporary ring than those of the 
majority of theologians of his day. But to say that i s simply to 
say that he was a prophet in his own time ... That we can learn 
Jrom Forsyth i s obvious. Whether he has s t i l l an independently 
creative message i s another matter" (SJT Vol 9, 1956, pUU7). 
I t i s not quite clear what "an independently creative message " i s , 
and not certain that Forsyth would want to be independently 
creative. He would probably be sufficiently grateful i f others 
could learn from him, and many modern theologians appear to have 
done that. Among leaders of his own denomination Nathaniel 
Micklem and Daniel Jenkins quote him frequently; rather more 
impressive perhaps i s the number of Anglican scholars who are 
happy to record their indebtedness to him, including R.R. Williams, 
Douglas Webster, and F.W. Dillistone. Another Anglican, the 
Archbishop of York, wrote of "Positive Preaching and the Modern 
Mind", *T venture to say that i f the f i r s t three pages of this 
book were digested, believed, worked out and acted on by the men 
in a l l our theological colleges today, there would ensue a 
revolution in the ministry and the pulpit work of tomorrow's 
clergy 1 (F.D. Goggan, E.T. LXXII, p32U). In what ways then 
i s his work relevant, and, in particular, what can he teach us 
about authority? 
On the question of his general relevance two superficially 
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contradictory points can be made. In the f i r s t place, the 
theological climate of the church to-day i s not so different from 
that of Forsyth's day as many would l i k e to think. I t i s , of 
course, f a i r l y easy to draw parallels between different ages by 
concentrating on certain points which they have in common and 
ignoring other, perhaps more important points in which they di f f e r . 
I t i s a fact that in many ways the liberalism which Forsyth knew 
has gone, probably for ever. I t i s no longer necessary to defend 
or explain an appeal to St. Paul. But in two important respects 
certain movements in modern theology seem to come directly under 
Forsyth's criticism. The influential teaching of Paul T i l l i c h 
i s avowedly anthropocentric i n i t s starting point; and with this 
goes a stress on the immanence of God as the "Ground of our Being". 
J.A.T. Robinson has given popular expression to these views 
i n his book "Honest to God", and i t would not be d i f f i c u l t to find 
I&rallels between this book and the several others which have 
followed i t and share i t s general view-point, and R.J. Campbell's 
"New Theology" and the books which followed that. Basic to this 
movement i s an assertion of the primacy of the moral and an appeal 
to Kant, But frequently the desire to show the poss i b i l i t y of 
response to- the universal moral demand in personal encounter and 
love of man, leads to the omission of the note of holiness. The 
sense of awe-full demand runs down to an enlightened social 
conscience, often accompanied by anti-nomianism. 
I t must be admitted that this i s not the intention of the 
theologians concerned, but i t seems to be the automatic result of 
their starting point. There i s a continual effort to stress the 
seriousness of the demand. But, in spite of the use of such 
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existential terminology as "ultimacy","immediacy", "encounter", 
and "confrontation", the effort f a i l s . This i s partly no doubt, 
because too much energy i s dissipated in rather petulant criticism 
of "the traditional position", but i t i s also because "the Ground 
of our Being" does not do justice to the B i b l i c a l doctrine of God. 
However, in the second place, Forsyth would not have to 
complain so much today about an idealised view of man. Such a 
view often does accompany the sort of theology just mentioned, but, 
equally frequent, i s a greater willingness to see the element of 
sinfulness in man, even i f i t i s not given that name. Meanwhile, 
outside the church, novelists and playwrights have competed with 
each other to give adequate expression to the tragic element in 
human aff a i r s . Literature of the "angry young man" school, i s 
eloquent evidence that at le a s t some modern men are conscious of a 
"lostness" and "purposelessness" about the human situation; 
conscious too of a lack of f i n a l authority and certainty which 
has come from the criticism and rejection of the traditional 
authorities. 
I f , in these respects, Forsyth's thought i s relevant to the 
present day, what can he teach us about authority? Briefly, I 
-ffaink, he can teach four things. F i r s t he can teach the importance 
of the question of authority. He was surely right to see that i t 
was the basic religious question, and that i t must be a central 
theme in a positive gospel. Yet there are s t i l l those who 
consider i t to be a sign of spiri t u a l maturity, or even of 
dependence on the Holy Spir i t , to take a casual attitude to the 
whole question, asserting that the days of an authoritative 
religion are past. But without f i n a l i t y on this point, at least 
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i n principle, there can be no certainty elsewhere in the 
theological system, and, what i s worse, no confidence or assurance 
in Christian l i v i n g . 
Secondly, he can teach us that acceptance of a f i n a l objective 
authority does not involve the acceptance of authority in the form 
of i n f a l l i b l e propositions. Such modern discussions of authority 
as there are s t i l l tend to dwell on the innerancy of B i b l i c a l 
propositions, or the pronouncements of popes or other 
ec c l e s i a s t i c a l dignitaries on the one hand; and the claims of free 
•ftiought and progress, sometimes undergirded by a questionable 
doctriae of the work of the Holy Spirit, on the other. 
The f i r s t i s represented by such books as "Authority" by D. 
Martyn Lloyd-Jones, where the actual words of scripture are taken 
as the actual words of God, and attention i s drawn to "recent 
discoveries" which have disproved theories which were once regarded 
as "the assured results of modern knowledge" (op c i t pi*7). Dr. 
Lloyd-Jones i s scathing in his references to those who, while 
admitting the excesses of "Liberalism" and agreeing that i t was 
often hasty in i t s rejection of certain assertions in scripture, 
would now l i k e to c a l l a truce on the old battles and get on with 
the business of proclaiming the message of the Bible, speaking of 
i t s authority i n a different way. But he would need a good many 
more discoveries to complete his picture, and leaves the 
impression of valuing the actual words of the text above the 
Gospel i t s e l f , and of wasting energy and scholarship which could 
be much better directed. I t i s a great pity that this whole 
school of thought, with whose preaching and moral earnestness 
Forsyth would have had much i n common, seem to be untouched by the 
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renewal of interest in his work, where they would find so much 
which i s both congenial and relevant, and prefer to go behind 
him to the Puritans. 
A relevant example of the other approach i s found in a 
pamphlet "The Fin a l i t y of Congregationalism", by A.D. Belden, 
written as a criticism of the proposed draft constitution 
of the Congregational Union of England and Wales. Dr. Belden 
finds this f i n a l i t y i n Freedom, and speaks of Freedom as f i n a l 
for the Gospel, for Church Unity, and for Social Order, without 
considering any authority apart from a l e g a l i s t i c one. He does 
not refer to Paul, or mention the doctrine of redemption, so 
that the pos s i b i l i t y of a "founded freedom" such as Forsyth 
teaches i s not raised. 
Thirdly, Forsyth can teach us the importance of taking 
seriously the question of sin. He returned frequently to such 
verses as "the Lord hath a controversy with his people", and was 
scathingly c r i t i c a l of those who attempted to heal the hurt of 
God's people lig h t l y , crying peace where there was no peace. 
This i s a most relevant lesson. I t i s ironic that, at a time 
when many outside the church are probably more conscious of sin, 
as rebellion, as broken relationship, and as purposelessness, than 
they have been for many years, so many inside the church are 
busily explaining that things are not re a l l y so bad after a l l , 
and getting cheap laughs at the expense of fundamentalists. 
Finally, and underlying i t a l l , the modern church could learn 
the importance of preaching the New Testament Gospel of a decisive 
act of redemption as the f i n a l authority. Discussions of Church 
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unity seems frequently to get heated about the questions of 
episcopal and ministerial authority as i f these were themselves 
f i n a l and the mere basic question of what i n the l a s t resort 
Christianity i s seems sometimes to be squeezed out. 
Further we could learn from Forsyth to know this Gospel 
and to preach i t without concession to contemporary fashions i n 
philosophy. This need not lead to obscurantism, but i t could 
prevent the constant adaptation of the message to "the modern man" 
which i s tried so often without conspicuous success. After a l l , 
to refuse to indulge in such adapting, i s only an acknowledgment 
that the problem of communications rests at l a s t with the Holy 
Sp i r i t , and that God reveals Himself to whom He w i l l . Far too 
frequently the catch-phrase "problem of communications" i s used 
to cover the fact that the preacher i s not sure what he i s trying 
to communicate, or i s afraid that the New Testament gospel could 
not possibly get results to-day. 
Forsyth had no such qualms. His theology i s a confession of 
fait h , a testimony to experienced redemption. He was sure that he 
had found in the cross the true and magnetic North, and that he had 
been given in the Gospel a message of f i n a l authority, which, as i t 
had saved him, would also save the world. I t i s f i t t i n g to close 
with his own words, with which he concluded his second address as 
Chairman of the Congregational Union of England and Wales, ' I have 
found my rock, my reality, my eternal l i f e in my historic 
Redemption. And what i s moral rock, real existence, and s p i r i t u a l 
rmstery for me i s also the authority and charter of the Church, the 
l i v i n g power in a l l history, the moral foundation of Society, and the 
warrant of an i n f i n i t e future for the race." (CGS pl27). 
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